McCloud v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC17-2011,SC17-2011
• Citation: 260 So.3d 911
• Parties: Antoine E. MCCLOUD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

260 So.3d 911

Antoine E. MCCLOUD, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC17-2011

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 20, 2018

Howard L. "Rex" Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and William L. Sharwell, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, C. Suzanne Beschard, Bureau Chief, and Bilal Ahmed Faruqui, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent

LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in McCloud v. State , 224 So.3d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in McCray v. State , 171 So.3d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). McCloud , 224 So.3d at 847. We have jurisdiction.

See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. This conflict concerns the proper interpretation of Florida's witness tampering statute: section 914.22, Florida Statutes (2014). For the reasons that follow, we approve the decision below and disapprove of the First District's precedent discussed in McCray .

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case presents a pure question of statutory interpretation; however, to the extent that the facts are relevant, the Second District sufficiently recited them:

The incident that gave rise to the witness tampering charge occurred on the morning of March 8, 2015. Mr. McCloud awoke to noise made by his six-year-old daughter [ (the younger daughter) ] in the living area of his home. Mr. McCloud began yelling at his daughter to play more quietly and threatened to spank her. The victim, who was the child's mother and Mr. McCloud's wife, also awoke and told Mr. McCloud to calm down. Upon being told to calm down, Mr. McCloud became angry, approached the victim, who was still in bed, and screamed at her to stop interfering with his attempts to discipline their daughter.

The victim testified that Mr. McCloud then pushed her in the chest and poked her in the forehead about two to three times. After he stopped pushing her, Mr. McCloud then left the bedroom. Upon his exit, the victim began shouting to her twelve-year-old daughter [ (the older daughter) ] to call for help. Mr. McCloud returned to the bedroom with a gun in his hand. He threatened to kill the victim if she ever took the children from him. Mr. McCloud then left the bedroom again and approached the older daughter, who was watching the incident unfold from the hallway outside of the bedroom. The victim testified that Mr. McCloud took the older daughter's cell phone out of her hands and said, "Are you going to call those people on me? Are you telling my daughter to call those people on me?" The victim also testified that at some point during the incident, Mr. McCloud took her cell phone and threw it to the ground, causing the battery to fall out.

The older daughter testified that upon hearing the victim shout for help, she left her bedroom and observed from the hallway that Mr. McCloud was on top of the victim, apparently holding her arms down for about twenty seconds. She also saw that the victim's phone was broken on the floor. The older daughter also testified that as she was standing in the hallway, Mr. McCloud approached her and grabbed her cell phone out of her hands. The older daughter stated that upon seizing her cell phone, Mr. McCloud stated, "You can't call the cops on me. You can't get my kids to call the cops on me."

Mr. McCloud took the stand in his own defense at trial. He testified that he never hurt the victim and that he took the phone from his older daughter as a form of punishment for her failure to clean the house. He further testified that at the time he took the phone from his older daughter, the phone's screen was black and that there was no phone call in progress.

At the close of the State's case, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal. Defense counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for witness tampering because under McCray, , the State was required to and failed to present evidence that "the victim [or witness] was attempting to contact law enforcement during the time of the incident." The trial court denied the motion, finding that the State's evidence was sufficient to present the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. McCloud guilty of tampering with a witness as charged. It also found him guilty of simple battery, a misdemeanor in the first degree, and assault, a misdemeanor in the second degree.[n.1]

[n.1] Mr. McCloud does not challenge his convictions for battery and assault.

McCloud , 224 So.3d at 843-44.

McCloud appealed the denial of motion for judgment of acquittal to the Second District, relying upon the First District's precedent articulated in McCray . Id. The Second District rejected McCray , certified conflict with the decision, and affirmed McCloud's conviction for witness tampering. Id. at 847.¹

This review follows.

ANALYSIS

The issue central to the certified conflict is whether section 914.22(1)(e), Florida Statutes, requires the State to demonstrate that a witness attempted to contact law enforcement to prove its case in chief on witness tampering. Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the statute does not designate an attempt to contact law enforcement as an element of the crime; accordingly, the Second District's interpretation below was correct.

Standard of Review and Legal Standard

This Court undertakes de novo review for questions of statutory interpretation. E.g. , Polite v. State , 973 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007). The purpose of this endeavor is to effectuate the Legislature's intent because "legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis." State v. J.M. , 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002) ; e.g. , In re Ginsberg's Estate , 50 So.2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1951) ("It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of a statute should be ascertained and effectuated."); Getzen v. Sumter Cty. , 89 Fla. 45, 103 So. 104, 107 (1925) ("The intent of organic or statutory provisions is the essence of the law."); State v. Patterson , 67 Fla. 499, 65 So. 659, 660 (1914) ("[L]egislative intent ... is the essence and vital force of the law."); State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. , 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 984 (1908) ("In construing and applying a duly enacted statute, the valid legislative intent is the guiding star."); Curry v. Lehman , 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18, 20 (1908) ("[T]he primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent."); 48A Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes § 116 (2014) ("The primary rule of statutory construction, and the ultimate goal in construing a statutory provision, is to give effect to legislative intent." (footnotes omitted) ); 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:5 (7th ed. 2014) ("[T]he essential idea that legislative will governs decisions on statutory construction has always been the test most often declared by courts."); see also Heydon's Case , (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch.) (detailing the traditional common law rule of legislative intent guiding statutory construction). In order to "discern legislative intent, this Court looks first to the plain and obvious meaning of the statute's text." Smith v. State , 204 So.3d 18, 21 (Fla. 2016) (quoting W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See , 79 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2012) ). If the statute is "clear and unambiguous," then this Court does not look beyond the plain language or employ the rules of construction to determine legislative intent—it simply applies the law.

Gaulden v. State , 195 So.3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Borden v. E.-Eur. Ins. Co. , 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) ).²

Section 914.22(1)(e), Florida Statutes

In pertinent part, the witness tampering statute is clear and unambiguous:

(1) A person who knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or threatens another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, or offers pecuniary benefit or gain to another person, with intent to cause or induce any person to:

....

(e) Hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of information relating to the commission or possible commission of an offense ....

....

commits the crime of tampering with a witness, victim, or informant.

§ 914.22(1)(e), Fla. Stat. To prove witness tampering under that plain language, therefore, the State must demonstrate that a defendant knowingly acted, threatened, or attempted either, with the specific intent to "[h]inder, delay, or prevent" a victim's communication to law enforcement with regard to a criminal offense. Id. ; see Taffe v. State , 232 So.3d 431, 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ; McCloud , 224 So.3d at 846 ; Gill v. State , 622 So.2d 92, 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ; see also McAlpin v. Crim. Justice Standards & Training Comm'n , 155 So.3d 416, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; cf. State v. Gray , 435 So.2d 816, 820 (Fla. 1983) (holding that the predecessor to this statute did not create a specific intent crime).³ The conflict here relates to whether the statute further requires the State to establish that the witness attempted to contact law enforcement during the commission of the underlying criminal offense. McCloud , 224 So.3d at 845. The Second District held below that the plain language of the statute does not include a witness's attempt to contact law enforcement as an element of the crime, id. at 845-46 ; whereas the First District, on nearly identical facts, came to the opposite conclusion in McCray , 171 So.3d at 832. Based on the plain language of section 914.22(1)(e), Florida Statutes —which is clear and unambiguous—we conclude that the First District misread the statute and improperly added an element to the offense in contravention of the plain language.

Nothing in the plain language of ...