McClow v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.
Decision Date | 19 April 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-7511,87-7511 |
Citation | 842 F.2d 1250 |
Parties | John D. McCLOW, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WARRIOR & GULF NAVIGATION COMPANY, M/V SEMINOLE, Defendant-Appellee. Non-Argument Calendar. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Richard D. Horne, Hess, Atchison & Horne, William B. Jackson, II, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.
Broox G. Holmes, Donald C. Radcliff, Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Before HILL, FAY and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
After he was injured, plaintiff-appellant John D. McClow brought suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 688, and general maritime law. This appeal challenges a jury verdict and judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. ("Warrior & Gulf"). McClow argues that, at trial, the district court gave improper jury instructions regarding the appropriate standard of causation and burden of proof. We disagree and find no reversible error based upon the Record before us. 1
Before discussing the specific facts surrounding this case, we address an initial contention raised by McClow. McClow challenges our precedent in Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1975), modified, 546 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.1977). 2 In Spinks we adopted a "substantial factor" standard of causation for "unseaworthiness" claims brought under general maritime law. Spinks, 507 F.2d at 222-23. Jones Act claims, on the other hand, involve a less demanding standard of causation: "causation may be found if the defendant's acts or omissions played any part, no matter now small, in bringing about the injury." Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 685 (10th Cir.1981) ( ); see also Spinks, 507 F.2d at 222-23. In effect, McClow urges that we apply the lesser Jones Act standard of causation to general maritime law claims. 3 This we decline to do, as we remain bound by precedent.
We turn now to the key issue in this case. The thrust of McClow's contentions focuses on the district court's instructions to the jury regarding the appropriate burden of proof. Under Jones Act and general maritime law "unseaworthiness" claims, "the burden on the plaintiff to prove proximate cause ... is very light, even 'featherweight.' " Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1986) (citing Davis v. Hill Eng'g, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 331 (5th Cir.1977)). McClow argues that the district court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the burden of proof as it pertains to his general maritime law "unseaworthiness" claim.
Prior to the jury charge in this case, the parties discussed the district court's proposed jury instructions. These instructions mirrored substantially "Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases)" prepared in 1980 by the U.S. Fifth Circuit District Judges Association for use in Jones Act and general maritime law jury trials. The district court also considered and incorporated jury instructions proposed by each party.
During this pre-charge discussion, McClow's attorney, Mr. Jackson, objected to a proposed jury instruction on the standard of causation under general maritime law. A colloquy ensued as follows MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I think that it is an incorrect statement of the law that under a claim of unseaworthiness that there must be a finding or a showing of the condition being a substantial cause of the injury complained of. I think that the concept of the Jones act [sic] causation being a slight cause of the injury sustained is the way the courts--the way they've construed the Jones act, relatively slight.
ROA Vol. 3, Trial Transcript, at 30-31 (emphasis added).
During the actual jury charge, the district court instructed the jury on McClow's Jones Act claim: Id. at 100 (emphasis added). Later, the court instructed the jury on McClow's general maritime law "unseaworthiness" claim:
Unlike the Jones act [sic] claim, with respect to which the plaintiff may recover if the alleged negligence is proved to be a slight cause of the injury sustained, in order to recover on a claim of unseaworthiness, it must be proved that the unseaworthy condition was a substantial cause of the injury complained of.
Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
The district court did not, at this point, tell the jury that McClow's burden to prove causation under either claim is "very light." See Nichols, 792 F.2d at 1522 ( ). McClow claims that this "omission" of the district court constitutes reversible error. We disagree.
It is apparent from the trial transcript that McClow failed to object properly to the district court's instructions on plaintiff's burden of proof. McClow's attorney objected to the court's instructions as they pertained to the issue of causation. 4 He did not, however, object to the court's instructions regarding the appropriate burden of proof, even though he had numerous opportunities to do so. 5 Thus, on appeal, we analyze McClow's contention in light of Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 51 provides that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." Id. (emphasis added). Although a party need not make a "formal" objection to a court's ruling or instruction, it must be "clear that the trial judge understood the party's position." 5A Moore's Federal Practice sec. 51.04, at 51-9, 51-28 (1987). If the party fails to object properly, then we reverse only if the district court committed "plain error." See Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818, 822 (11th Cir.1988); see also Iervolino v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408, 1415 (11th Cir.1986) (, )cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1300, 94 L.Ed.2d 155 (1987).
We perceive no plain error in this case. 6 At no point did the district court misstate the law as it pertains to the burden of proof or standard of causation. "So long as his jury instructions reflect the pertinent substantive law, the trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording that he may employ." Andres v. Roswell-Windsor Village Apartments, 777 F.2d 670, 673 (11th Cir.1985). See also Somer v. Johnson, 704 F.2d 1473, 1477-78 (11th Cir.1983) ( ).
McClow's other contentions are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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