McClung v. State
| Decision Date | 15 May 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 4609,4609 |
| Citation | 217 Ark. 291,230 S.W.2d 34 |
| Parties | McCLUNG v. STATE. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Ike Murry, Atty. Gen., Robert Downie, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Defendant McClung was indicted for the crime of involuntary manslaughter on account of the death of Mrs. Fannie Vailes in a highway collision between a truck driven by defendant and another truck in which Mrs. Vailes was a passenger, driven by Jim Vailes, her husband. The trial in Circuit Court resulted in jury verdict of conviction, with a one-year penitentiary sentence. Defendant's appeal is based upon alleged errors in the instructions given and refused by the trial judge.
The evidence given by the prosecution indicated that defendant may have been drunk at the time of the collision, that his vehicle had been weaving from one side to the other of a busy highway for some miles before the collision occurred, and that Vailes, driver of the other truck, had pulled toward the left side of the highway in an effort to avoid defendant's truck but was struck by defendant who pulled back toward the right side of the road just as he came up to Vailes' vehicle. This set of facts of course suggested the possibility that negligence in both Vailes and the defendant constituted concurrent proximate causes of the collision and ensuing death.
(1) One point urged by defendant is that he should not be convicted unless Mrs. Vailes' death was caused solely by his wrongful conduct. This view appears in defendant's objection to the State's instruction number 1, given by the Court, also in defendant's instruction number 3, refused by the Court. The law is otherwise. It has long been well settled that one whose wrongdoing is a concurrent proximate cause of an injury is criminally liable therefor (other elements of liability being present) the same as if his wrongdoing were the sole proximate cause of the harm done. This is true both as against a plea of contributory negligence in the person harmed, Bowen v. State, 100 Ark. 232, 140 S.W. 28; Benson v. State, 212 Ark. 905, 208 S.W.2d 767; and a plea of concurring negligence in another, Bishop v. State, 73 Ark. 568, 84 S.W. 707; Taylor v. State, 193 Ark. 691, 101 S.W.2d 956. Also see 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th Ed., § 204.
(2) Another point urged by defendant is that there was error in instruction number 6, offered by the State. This instruction dealt with concurrent negligence and would have permitted the jury to find defendant guilty, despite the concurring negligence of another, if it found that defendant's acts 'were a necessary part of the chain of acts and that the death would not have been caused except for the unlawful act or acts, if any, of the defendant.' The unsoundness of this instruction is obvious. It is a statement of mere 'but for' causation in its crudest form. Under it, a defendant who had a week previously stolen the truck he was driving would be made criminally liable for a death occurring in a collision in which he was not at fault, since 'the death would not have been caused except for the unlawful act * * * of the defendant' in stealing the truck which otherwise he would not have been driving. For proximate causation we must find more than that a given result would not have happened but for the prior occurrence of fact 'A'; we must find that fact 'A' was a substantial and currently operative factor in bringing about the result in question. See Restatement, Torts, § 431.
In the instant case, however, there was no evidence of far-fetched and remote causation, as distinguished from evidence indicating acts of the defendant which were substantially and currently operative in producing the collision and death, by which the jury could have been distracted. So long as there was no evidence to which the erroneous instruction could be applied, it is improbable that the defendant would be harmed by it. Other instructions given by the Court made the matter of causation reasonably clear to the jury.
Apart from that, defendant's objection to instruction 6 was not on the ground that it was an erroneous statement as to what constitutes proximate causation. The...
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Jefferson v. State
...of liability being present) the same as if his wrongdoing were the sole proximate cause of the harm done." McClung v. State, 217 Ark. 291, 293, 230 S.W.2d 34, 35 (1950). For proximate causation, this court must find more than a given result would not have happened but for the prior occurren......
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...Ann. § 5-2-205 (1987). Where conduct hastens or contributes to a person's death, it is a cause of the death. See McClung v. State, 217 Ark. 291, 230 S.W.2d 34 (1950); Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29 S.W. 894 (1894). Causation may be found notwithstanding that death occurred several years af......
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...hastens or contributes to a person's death is a cause of death. Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766 S.W.2d 410 (1989); McClung v. State, 217 Ark. 291, 230 S.W.2d 34 (1950); Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29 S.W. 894 (1894). See also, W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, 1 Substantive Criminal Law, § 3.12......
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