McClure v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.

Docket NumberCivil Action 3:20-CV-00005-RJC-DCK
Decision Date18 March 2021
PartiesELIJAH MCCLURE, Plaintiff, v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

DAVID C. KEESLER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (Document No. 12). This motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and is now ripe for disposition. Having carefully considered the arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned will respectfully recommend that the motion be denied without prejudice in part and granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Elijah McClure (Plaintiff or “McClure”), initiated this action with the filing of a pro se complaint in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County on June 10, 2019. See (Document No. 1, p. 1, Defendant's “Notice of Removal”). At that time, Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against Defendant Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Defendant or “Board”). Id.

After filing a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's pro se complaint, Defendant participated in a hearing in Mecklenburg County Superior Court on October 3, 2019 on the motion. Id. The Superior Court granted Plaintiff an extension to file an amended complaint. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff filed the “First Amended Complaint” through counsel in Mecklenburg County Superior Court on December 3, 2019. (Document No. 3). In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant for negligence and gross negligence, for violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the 8th and 14th Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983), and for violations of Plaintiff's rights under the North Carolina Constitution at Article I, §§ 15 and 19, and Article IX, § 1. Id. at pp. 3-5.

Defendant removed this action to the Western District of North Carolina on January 3, 2020, filing a “Notice Of Removal.” (Document No. 1). Defendant then filed an “Answer” to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on January 9, 2020. (Document No. 4). On February 18, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (Document No. 6). However, on March 5, 2020, the undersigned denied Defendant's motion to dismiss on account of granting Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. (Document No. 10). Plaintiff filed his “Second Amended Complaint” on March 9, 2020. (Document No. 11). In so doing, Plaintiff did not alter the nature of the three claims alleged in the First Amended Complaint. (Document No. 11, pp 3-6).

The facts of this case are difficult and tragic. As detailed in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's claims arise from an October 2, 2015 fight inside the school building between students at Hopewell High School at the end of the school day. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff alleges that the fight was “broken up by faculty and/or staff members” of the Board, including the principal. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the students involved in the fight were then “sent out of the building to the bus lot, unsupervised, ” despite the Board's awareness of the “students' violent propensities.” Id. Once in the bus parking lot, “the same group of violent students” allegedly “viciously attacked Plaintiff [] as he waited outside at the bus lot, resulting in traumatic brain injuries to Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff contends that “no faculty or staff from [the Board] broke up the fight, ” and “it was [the Board's] practice of ejecting violent students outside of the school facility, rather than detaining them.” Id. He then alleges that he “was placed on the bus and sent home without receiving any medical attention and without any attempt by [the Board] to make contact with his parents.” Id. As a result of the attack, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered from “the development of neurological medical problems, including but not limited to epilepsy, and [has had to undergo] subsequent surgeries.” Id. Defendant filed an “Answer To Second Amended Complaint” on March 23, 2020. (Document No. 13).

Defendant filed the pending Motion To Dismiss on March 23, 2020. (Document No. 12). Plaintiff filed a “Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Dismissal Of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on April 1, 2020. (Document No. 14). Defendant filed a “Reply To Plaintiff's Opposition Of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on April 8, 2020. (Document No. 15). On April 21, 2020, Plaintiff sought leave to file a surreply in support of his opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss in accordance with Local Rule 7.1(e). (Document No. 16). The undersigned granted Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply on May 4, 2020 (Document No. 20), and Plaintiff filed a “Surreply In Support Of His Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on May 7, 2020. (Document No. 21). The motion has now been fully briefed and is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) seeks to dismiss a complaint for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that subjectmatter jurisdiction exists. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue the court must address before considering the merits of the case. Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999). “The subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is limited and the federal courts may exercise only that jurisdiction which Congress has prescribed.” Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).

When a defendant challenges subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), “the district court is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768. The district court should grant the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id.; see also Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).

Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(2)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) seeks to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). A party invoking federal court jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant. New Wellington Fin. Corp. v. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp., 416 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989).

When a court's personal jurisdiction is properly challenged by a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the jurisdictional question thus raised is one for the judge, with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove the existence of a ground for jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.., [W]hen, as here, the court addresses the question on the basis only of motion papers, supporting legal memoranda and the relevant allegations of a complaint, the burden on the plaintiff is simply to make a prima facie showing of a sufficient jurisdictional basis in order to survive the jurisdictional challenge. In considering a challenge on such a record, the court must construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction.

Combs, 886 F.2d at 676 (internal citations omitted). “Mere allegations of in personam jurisdiction are sufficient for a party to make a prima facie showing.” Barclays Leasing, Inc. v. Nat'l Bus. Sys., Inc., 750 F.Supp. 184, 186 (W.D. N.C. 1990). The plaintiff, however, “may not rest on mere allegations where the defendant has countered those allegations with evidence that the requisite minimum contacts do not exist.” IMO Indus., Inc. v. SEIM S.R.L., 2006 WL 3780422, at *1 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 20, 2006). “Rather, in such a case, the plaintiff must come forward with affidavits or other evidence to counter that of the defendant.. .factual conflicts must be resolved in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

There are two varieties of personal jurisdiction, general and specific. General jurisdiction requires “substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts or activities in the forum state. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014). Specific jurisdiction exists when a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).

Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the “legal sufficiency of the complaint” but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 952 (4th Cir. 1992); Eastern Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Robinson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009). “A...

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