McClurg v. Dall. Jones Enters. Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-00201-JHM |
| Parties | Johnny MCCLURG, Plaintiff v. DALLAS JONES ENTERPRISES INC. d/b/a Clay's Trucking, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Mark N. Foster, Madisonville, KY, for Plaintiff.
J. Andrew Inman, LaToi D. Mayo, Michael J. LaCourse, Littler Mendelson, PC, Lexington, KY, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [DN 14]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DENIED .
According to his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Johnny McClurg is a commercial truck driver. [DN 7 ¶ 19]. He was diagnosed with diabetes
in 2007. [Id. at ¶ 20]. Federal and state regulations prevent individuals with diabetes from driving commercial motor vehicles unless they obtain a medical waiver. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(3) ; 601 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:005. McClurg obtained a medical waiver from the Commonwealth of Kentucky but did not obtain a medical waiver from the federal Department of Transportation. [DN 7 ¶¶ 23, 26]. McClurg's Kentucky medical waiver states that it is valid in "Intrastate Commerce only." [Id. at ¶ 25; DN 7-2]. Because that is the only medical waiver he obtained, McClurg could only drive in "intrastate commerce."1
After McClurg's diabetes
diagnosis, Defendant Dallas Jones Enterprises, a Kentucky-based trucking company, hired McClurg. [DN 7 ¶¶ 8, 30]. Dallas Jones hired McClurg fully aware of his medical restrictions and that he could only drive in "intrastate commerce." [Id. at ¶¶ 27–31]. Although Dallas Jones's business sometimes requires drivers to drive in interstate commerce, it agreed that McClurg would not "indiscriminately share[ ]" job assignments with the other drivers. [Id. at ¶ 31]. Instead, Dallas Jones only assigned McClurg to routes within the state of Kentucky. [Id. at ¶¶ 32–48]. McClurg performed this work along with Dallas Jones's "other drivers who ... were prohibited from driving in interstate commerce." [Id. at ¶ 31].
Throughout McClurg's employment, Dallas Jones paid him on a "per-ton basis"—a flat fee for every ton of coal transported. [Id. at ¶¶ 50–52]. But McClurg would sometimes work more than forty hours in a week, and Dallas Jones did not increase his fee on those deliveries. [Id. at ¶¶ 53–54]. Believing he was entitled to overtime when he worked more than forty hours in a week, McClurg sued. His Amended Complaint asserts two causes of action: a federal claim for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and a state law claim under the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act ("KWHA"). [Id. at ¶¶ 84–104]. He also seeks to represent a collective (for the FLSA) and class (for the KWHA) of similarly situated plaintiffs.
Dallas Jones moves to dismiss McClurg's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. [DN 14-1]; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ]," League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen , 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007), "accept all well-pled factual allegations as true," id. , and determine whether the "complaint states a plausible claim for relief," Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Under this standard, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief, which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff satisfies this standard only when he or she "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint falls short if it pleads facts " ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability," id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ), or if the alleged facts do not "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Instead, the allegations must "show[ ] that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ).
Some of McClurg's claims, and all of this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, sound in the FLSA. The FLSA, which applies to employees engaged in interstate commerce, requires employers to pay time-and-a-half whenever an employee works more than forty hours in a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Here, Dallas Jones's motion does not challenge the substantive FLSA allegations. Instead, Dallas Jones contends the FLSA does not apply at all because the Motor Carrier Act ("MCA") exemption to the FLSA indisputably applies to McClurg. If the MCA exemption applies, McClurg cannot avail himself of FLSA protections. Alternatively, Dallas Jones asks the Court to deny McClurg's proposed collective and class action and force the case to proceed on an individual level only. The Court will address each argument in turn.
The FLSA does not apply to "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service." 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). This exemption is known as the MCA exemption. The Secretary of Transportation possesses the power to regulate an employee if (1) the employee works for a motor private carrier that transports property in interstate commerce and (2) the employee's work activities "affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles" in interstate commerce. Sec'y of Labor v. Timberline South, LLC , 925 F.3d 838, 850 (6th Cir. 2019) ; 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a) ; see 49 U.S.C. §§ 31502(b)(2) ; 13102(15). If the Secretary of Transportation possesses this regulatory power over a particular employee, whether or not it actually exercises the power, the Secretary of Labor lacks jurisdiction and the FLSA (and its overtime provisions) do not apply. See Barlow v. Logos Logistics, Inc. , 34 F. Supp. 3d 686, 690 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (); see also White v. U.S. Corr., L.L.C. , 996 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2021) () (quotation omitted). FLSA exemptions receive a fair reading, and the defendant bears the burden of proving the MCA exemption applies. Timberline South , 925 F.3d at 850.
McClurg acknowledges that his employment satisfies many prerequisites for Department of Transportation jurisdiction: Dallas Jones is a "motor private carrier" that transports property in interstate commerce. [See DN 7 ¶ 31]. And McClurg's duties as a truck driver "affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles." See Cerutti v. Frito Lay, Inc. , 777 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Pa. 2011) ()
(quotation and citation omitted). But McClurg maintains his driving did not occur in interstate commerce, as defined by the MCA, so the Secretary of Transportation lacks jurisdiction and McClurg should receive the FLSA's overtime protections. See Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co. , 425 F.2d 407, 410 (6th Cir. 1970) (). The parties’ sole dispute on this Motion to Dismiss is whether McClurg drove in interstate commerce.
There are three distinct ways a driver's transportation occurs in "interstate commerce" under the MCA: (1) the driver transports goods across state lines; (2) the driver transports goods within a state, but that purely intrastate transportation is part of a "practical continuity of movement" across state lines; or (3) the driver has never transported goods in interstate commerce (under either of the first two methods) but has a reasonable expectation that he could be called to do so. Timberline South , 925 F.3d at 850 ; Jones v. L&G Trucking, LLC , No. 15-cv-40, 2017 WL 1173937, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2017) ; Finney v. Free Enter. Sys., Inc. , No. 3:08-cv-383, 2012 WL 5462971, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 8, 2012).2 McClurg does not qualify under the first method: he pled that he never transported goods across state lines because his medical restrictions prevented him from driving outside Kentucky. [DN 7 ¶ 30]. Dallas Jones's motion focuses on the second method of establishing "interstate commerce": practical continuity of movement.
It is well established that "purely intrastate transportation can constitute part of interstate commerce" under the MCA "if it is part of a continuous stream of interstate travel." Walters v. Am. Coach Lines of Miami, Inc. , 575 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "For this to be the case, there must be a ‘practical continuity of movement’ between the intrastate segment and the overall interstate flow." Id.
This "practical continuity of movement" test derives from the Supreme Court decision in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co. , 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943). In Jacksonville Paper , the Court considered whether seven paper warehouses engaged in interstate commerce. The warehouses never shipped or delivered paper across state lines but "constantly receiv[ed] merchandise in interstate shipments."...
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