McColl v. Marlboro Graded School Dist. No. 10

• Decision Date: 10 January 1928
• Docket Number: 12349.
• Citation: 141 S.E. 265,143 S.C. 120
• Parties: McCOLL v. MARLBORO GRADED SCHOOL DIST. NO. 10 et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

141 S.E. 265

143 S.C. 120

McCOLL v. MARLBORO GRADED SCHOOL DIST. NO. 10 et al.

No. 12349.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 10, 1928

Original application by H. L. McColl, for himself and other taxpayers to enjoin the Marlboro Graded School District No. 10 and others from issuing bonds of such district. Petition dismissed, and injunction dissolved.

H. J Riley, of Bennettsville, for petitioner.

McColl & Stevenson, of Bennettsville, for respondents.

WATTS C.J.

This is an application in the original jurisdiction of the court permanently to enjoin the issuance of bonds of the Bennettsville school district, known as Marlboro graded school district No. 10. The petitioner, for himself and other taxpayers of the district, seeks to have the proposed bonds declared unlawful upon a number of grounds specified in the agreed statement of facts attached to the petition, and submitted as a controversy without action.

It appears that in 1926 because of the seriously crowded condition of the school buildings the trustees began to make arrangements for the erection of a new building and under the authority of an act of the General Assembly purchased a suitable site for a new school and have paid for same. Because of the 8 per cent. limitation of the Constitution the trustees were advised that the district had no power to issue the amount of bonds necessary for the purposes of a new building. Thereafter an amendment to article 10, § 5, of the Constitution, was adopted in legal fashion permitting Marlboro graded school district No. 10 to vote bonds to an amount not exceeding 16 per cent., " under such restrictions and limitations as the General Assembly may prescribe and where the question of incurring such indebtedness is submitted to the qualified electors of said school district as, provided in the Constitution upon the question of bonded indebtedness. " (See 33 St. at Large, p. 1781, § 1.) It is under this language, quoted verbatim from the amendment, that the major objections hereafter discussed arise.

After the amendment referred to above was adopted, the school district held an election upon the question of issuing bonds, in accordance with the terms of the general statute as to school bond elections, found in section 2606, vol. 3, of the Code. The provisions of this section were complied with, the requisite number of electors and of resident freeholders signed the petitions, and all legal requirements were complied with to make a valid election as far as section 2606 of the Code was concerned. In this election there was a large majority of votes cast for the issuance of the bonds. As appears by the agreed statement of facts there is no controversy except as to the features mentioned below.

It is contended by petitioner that inasmuch as the constitutional amendment authorized the district to vote bonds under such restrictions and limitations as the General Assembly may prescribe, it was necessary for the General Assembly actually to take some step to put the constitutional amendment into effect, whereas no act of any kind was passed by the General Assembly, but the election was thereafter had under the terms of the general statute, as to school bond elections above mentioned.

Another way of stating this criticism is that the constitutional amendment was not self-executing and required the aid of legislative action. This objection is not well founded. The language of this amendment is practically identical with several previous amendments to article 10, § 5, of the Constitution, as printed in volume 1 of the Code of 1922. The same language occurs in the amendment as to Laurens school district, Hunter school district No. 5 of Laurens county, and Lancaster school district. It would therefore appear that under the construction of the Constitution by the Legislature itself, no such special statute as here contended for was necessary to put the constitutional amendment into effect. The contemporaneous construction given by the Legislature to the Constitution is entitled to respect at the hands of this court under the rule many times stated. Bradford v. Richardson, 111 S.C. 205, 97 S.E. 58; Thompson v. Livingston, 116 S.C. 412, 107 S.E. 581; Evans v. Beattie, 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538.

Furthermore, this court has frequently declared the rule that it will hold no statute unconstitutional unless the invalidity appears, established beyond a reasonable doubt, and that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of constitutionality. McKiever v. City of Sumter , 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60; Spartanburg County v. Miller, 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 673.

The general presumption of law and the specific rule frequently laid down in this state is that all constitutional provisions are self-executing, and are to be interpreted as such, rather than as requiring further legislation, unless the contrary clearly appears. Brice v. McDow, 116 S.C. 324, 108 S.E. 84; Becker v. A. C. L. R. Co., 128 S.C. 131, 121 S.E. 476.

The whole contention is that there ought to have been some action taken to put the constitutional amendment into effect. It is not denied that the Legislature could have declared that the election should be held under the terms of the general law as was done in this case. The Legislature had already adopted and set up a general method of holding school bond elections. This method was...