McCollum v. Smith, 18921.
Decision Date | 04 January 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 18921.,18921. |
Citation | 339 F.2d 348 |
Parties | Warren McCOLLUM, Appellant, v. Orvil SMITH and Chan C. Wilson, doing business as S & W Equipment Rentals, a partnership, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Frank D. Padgett, Robertson, Castle & Anthony, Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellant.
A. Singleton Cagle, William L. Fleming, Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellees.
Before CHAMBERS, KOELSCH and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.
In this suit to recover damages for personal injuries, the district court directed a verdict against the plaintiff and he has appealed. His assignments of error all concern the validity of that ruling.
Plaintiff based his claim on negligence. His complaint was in two counts. In one he charged that the defendants were responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligent operation of a crane by their employee, Ed Choy; and in the other, he charged under an exception to the fellow servant rule that the defendants were themselves negligent in employing Choy, whom he alleged was an incompetent operator.1
"Although stated in varying ways at different times, the question a trial court must answer in deciding whether to direct a verdict (for the defendant) is `whether the evidence in its entirety would rationally support a verdict for the plaintiff, assuming that the jury took, as it would be entitled to take, a view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Phipps v. N. V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Stoomvart, Maats, 259 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1958), quoting Justice Frankfurter concurring in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65, 69 S.Ct. 413, 93 L.Ed. 497 (1958). And this court, in common with other appellate courts, applies the same test when reviewing a district court order. Sherwood & Roberts-Kennewick, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 322 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1963).
In this case the evidence disclosed that Concrete Engineering Company (Concrete) had entered into a subcontract with the construction firm of Haas & Haynie to manufacture and erect the framework for a four-story parking garage in Honolulu. The structural components of the frame were to consist of prefabricated concrete beams, joists and soffits of a type manufactured by Concrete at its plant.2 They were hoisted into place by means of cranes.
The plaintiff, Warren McCollum, was Concrete's engineer in charge of construction. His duties included deciding how the work was to be done, inspecting the materials before they were installed, interpreting the blueprints and directing Concrete's workmen on the job.
When the work of building the top story of the building commenced, Concrete had no crane of its own capable of reaching to that height; accordingly, plaintiff rented a large mobile P & H crane from the defendants, Orvil Smith and Chan C. Wilson who, as partners, carried on the business of leasing construction machinery. The rental agreement was oral and, so far as the evidence shows, was simply that for $70.00 per hour defendants would supply Concrete with the crane, an operator, and an oiler.
On Sunday, the power unit for the crane was driven to the job site. There, as specified by plaintiff, it was outfitted with a boom consisting of a main section 170 feet in length, together with a jib or second section 40 feet long that extended from the far end of the main section at an obtuse angle. The line or lines used to hoist loads ran down from the tip of this latter section.
On Monday, the crane, operated by defendant's employee Edward Choy, was put to work. The building materials were heavy and bulky. Lifting them was a very delicate operation, not only because of their weight but also because of the great length of the boom and line. And unless the load was directly beneath the tip of the boom when the lift began, it would sway in a considerable arc when raised from the ground, creating a hazardous condition. Choy, being seated beside the base of the boom, was himself unable to gauge, with any degree of accuracy, the position of the boom tip with reference to the particular load. He was given this and other needed information by one of the loaders who, through the use of a series of pre-arranged signals given by hand and arm, would indicate where to move the boom, the location and position of the line and when to make a lift.
Some of the beams were forty feet long and weighed as much as 6,000 pounds. For lifting, they were attached to a sling fashioned of two cables, each bearing a hook at one end and the other fastened to the boom line. These hooks were inserted by workmen into a stirruplike loop built into either end of a beam. After the hooks were set, the usual practice was to first raise the beam slightly so that it hung free of the ground. If the alignment with reference to the boom tip appeared correct, a signal would be given Choy to proceed, but otherwise he would be directed to lower the beam and reposition the boom.
The accident occurred on Thursday. Plaintiff was standing on the semi-trailer of a truck that had only recently brought in a load of forty-foot beams. He was helping hook them up and acting as signalman. After Choy had made some preliminary boom adjustments, plaintiff testified that he gave Choy the hand and arm signal meaning simply "ready to test, go ahead"; that Choy immediately, and without first allowing the line to be checked or receiving any clearance, commenced to make the actual lift; that the beam thereupon swung like a pendulum, striking plaintiff with great force and causing him to be violently knocked from the trailer to the ground.
From this evidence, taken at full value, it appears that Choy ignored or failed to correctly interpret plaintiff's signal, and took none of the usual precautions before commencing a move that was potentially harmful to plaintiff. We have no hesitancy in holding that such evidence would support a finding that Choy was negligent.
However, as an affirmative defense, defendants denied responsibility for their employee's acts on the ground that Choy, although in their general employ and operating their equipment when the accident happened, had ceased to be their servant and, for the time being was, with respect to the work being performed, the servant of Concrete — in short, that he was a loaned servant. If the evidence positively and unequivocally establishes that such was Choy's status, then the defendants, of course, are not responsible for the consequences of his negligent acts, for the rule is "elementary" that:
"When one person puts his servant at the disposal and under the control of another for the performance of a particular service for the latter, the servant, in respect of his acts in that service, is to be dealt with as the servant of the latter and not of the former."
Denton v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 284 U.S. 305, 308, 52 S.Ct. 141, 142, 76 L.Ed. 310 (1932). But if it appears debatable that Choy was then the servant of Concrete, the question whether there was a change of masters was one of fact for the jury.
In deciding this issue, a factor usually considered to be controlling is the location of the power to control the servant, for responsibility is regarded as a correlative of power. The Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 S.Ct. 252, 53 L.Ed. 480 (1909); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. City of Tacoma, 7 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1925); Western Marine & Salvage Co. v. Ball, 59 App.D.C. 208, 37 F.2d 1004 (1930); Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951); 17 A.L.R.2d 1388, 1393, § 2.
A careful consideration of the entire record in the light of these propositions makes manifest the conclusion that Choy was the servant of Concrete, so far as the outcome of this case is concerned.
As previously noted in this opinion, defendant's agreement with Concrete was to rent the crane complete with operating personnel. Their compensation in no way depended upon how much or how little the crane accomplished, but rather upon the number of hours it was operated. They did not undertake to...
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