McConihay v. Wright

• Decision Date: 11 April 1887
• Citation: 7 S.Ct. 940,30 L.Ed. 932,121 U.S. 201
• Parties: MCCONIHAY, Trustee, and others v. WRIGHT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

121 U.S. 201

7 S.Ct. 940

30 L.Ed. 932

MCCONIHAY, Trustee, and others v. WRIGHT.

April 11, 1887.

The complainant in this case, Theodore Wright, the appellee, a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania, filed his bill in equity September 24, 1881, against the appellants, citizens of the state of West Virginia, the object and prayer of which were to quiet his title to certain real estate described therein. The title of the complainant to the premises in controversy is derived from the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the state of West Virginia. That company was chartered by a special act of the legislature of Virginia, February 16, 1850, and made a body politic, 'for the purpose of exploring, digging, mining, raising, and transporting coal and other minerals and substances, and for manufacturing mineral, vegetable, and other articles, in and from the counties of Kanawha and Boone, and such other counties as may hereafter be created out of parts of said counties.'

The third section of its charter is as follows: 'That it shall and may be lawful for the said company to erect and construct a slack-water navigation from some convenient point on Kanawha or Coal rivers, contiguous to their said lands, and along the bed of the said Coal river to the Great Kanawha: provided, however, that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to prevent the said rivers from being and remaining public highways free for the navigation of all the citizens of this commonwealth; and also to construct such railroad or railroads from any point on their said lands to the Great Kanawha river, or any other navigable stream in the valley of the Kanawha river and its branches, or to connect with any other railroad or improvement which is now or may hereafter be authorized by the state of Virginia in the said valley of the Kanawha and its branches; and, to enable the said company to carry out the provisions in this section contained, they are hereby invested with all the rights, powers, and privileges, and subjected to all the limitations and restrictions, contained in an act entitled 'An act prescribing certain general regulations for the incorporation of railroad companies,' passed March 11, 1837, so far as the same are applicable to and not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.'

By the second section of the charter the company was authorized to purchase and hold lands, not exceeding 10,000 acres at any one time, in the said counties of Kanawha and Boone, or in any new counties that had been or might thereafter be formed and created out of parts of said counties.

In pursuance of the authority given by its charter the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company of Virginia, on the eighth of January, 1853, acquired by deed a title in fee-simple to a tract of land containing about 10,000 acres. John McConihay owned land between this tract and the Kanawha river. For the purpose of acquiring a right of way for a railroad, and a depot on the banks of the Kanawha river, in order to transport its coal, the Winifrede Company, by judicial proceedings, appropriated a tract through the lands of McConihay, being a narrow strip four or five miles long, connecting its tract of coal land with the bank of the river. That strip, appropriated in that way and for that purpose, is the subject of the controversy in this suit. A demurrer interposed by the defendants was overruled, and the case was heard finally upon bill, answer, replication, and proofs. A decree was rendered in favor of the complainant, from which the defendants prosecute the present appeal.

J. F. Brown, for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 203-205 intentionally omitted] R. C. McMurtrie and Edwd. B. Knight, for appellee.

MATTHEWS, J.

The first error assigned is that the case is not one of equitable jurisdiction, it being contended that the complainant below had a complete and adequate remedy at law. The bill sufficiently alleges that the complainant is in possession of the premises in controversy, and in this respect is supported by the proofs. The prayer of the bill is that the defendants may be required to assert and declare the rights and title claimed by them in and to the premises, and that in the mean time they may be enjoined 'from interfering with or hindering or obstructing your orator, his agents or employes, in any manner in the use and eno yment of said way and depot until the further order of said court,' and for general relief. The contention of the appellants, however, is that by the statute of West Virginia the complainant might have maintained an action of ejectment. Reference is made, in support of this contention, to the West Virginia Code of 1868, c. 90, to show that an action of ejectment in that state will lie against one claiming title to or interest in land, although not in possession. Admitting this to be so, it nevertheless cannot have the effect to oust the jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States as previously established. That jurisdiction, as has often been decided, is vested, as a part of the judicial power of the United States, in its courts by the constitution and acts of congress in execution thereof. Without the assent of congress, that jurisdiction cannot be impaired or diminished by the statutes of the several states regulating the practice of their own courts. Bills quia timet, such as the present, belong to the ancient jurisdiction in equity, and no change in state legislation giving, in like cases, a remedy by action at law, can of itself curtail the jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States. The adequate remedy at law, which is the test of equitable jurisdiction in these courts, is that which existed when the judiciary act of 1789 was adopted, unless subsequently changed by act of congress.

The next assignment of error is that the proof fails to sustain the title set up by the appellee. That title is based upon two judicial sales. The first of these was a sale to Henry A. Cram, in a proceeding commenced in 1860 by the Bank of Virginia and other judgment creditors against the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company, the object of which was to marshal the assets of that corporation, and apply them to the payment of its debts. A decree was rendered therein on January 26, 1861, ascertaining the debts of the company and their priority as liens, and ordering a sale of its property for their satisfaction. That decree directed the sale of 'that ten thousand acre tract of land belonging to the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company, fully set out and described in the bill and exhibits and other proceedings in this cause, and lying on Kanawha and Coal rivers and on Field's creek, in the counties of Kanawha and Boone, together with all improvements thereon used in the mining, transporting, and shipping of coal, including railroad iron, picks, shovels, cars, engines, and whatever other tools and implements there may be upon the property belonging to said company.' The sale to Cram was duly confirmed by the court, and a deed conveying the property made to him by the commissioner. Subsequently, in 1878, Henry A. Cram, the purchaser, filed his bill in equity against Edward A. Bibby and others, in which he alleged that the purchase made by him at the sale under the decree in favor of the Bank of Virginia was made in trust on behalf of himself and others. The object and prayer of his bill were that the trusts arising out of the agreements set forth therein, in pursuance of which the purchase was made, might be administered and carried out under the direction of the court, and an account taken of the expenditures of the complainant, the property sold, and the proceeds divided among the parties in interest. By an amendment the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company was made a party to the bill; and in a second amendment it was alleged that, at the sale made under the decree in the Bank of Virginia Case, the railroad track and road-bed leading from the Kanawha river to the ten thousand acre tract, some five miles long, more or less, was sold, and should have been conveyed by the commissioner in his deed, to the complainant, but by mistake was left out, and not embraced in the conveyance. The complainant therefore prayed that the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company, and all parties named as defendants in the original bill, be made defendans to the amended bill, and that the court would treat the roadway as a part of the property embraced in the deed to the complainant; adding that it was a coal property, that the road and road-bed and rails cost some $300,000, and that the property was valueless without this roadway; and the court was asked to sell the property, including the roadway, as an entirety. To this amended bill an answer was filed in the name and on behalf of the Winifrede Mining & Manufacturing Company, admitting the allegations of the bill and amendments to be true, and particularly that the property, including the road-bed and the ten thousand acre tract and rails, was sold as an entirety, and as such purchased by Cram, and should have been included in the deed from the commissioner to him as purchaser.

In this suit a final decree was passed ordering a sale of the property as prayed for and described. It was declared in that decree that 'the legal title to the tract of 10,180 acres of land, more or less, situated on Field's creek and Big Coal river, West Virginia, and in the bill and amended bills more particularly described, together with the road-bed and right of way from the same to the Kanawha...