McConnell v. McConnell

• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WALKER, J.
• Citation: McConnell v. McConnell, 75 N.H. 385, 74 A. 875 (N.H. 1909)
• Decision Date: 07 December 1909
• Parties: McCONNELL v. McCONNELL et ux.

74 A. 875

75 N.H. 385

McCONNELL

v. McCONNELL et ux.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack.

Dec. 7, 1909.

Transferred from Superior Court, Merrimack County; Chamberlin, Judge.

Writ of entry for the foreclosure of a mortgage by Ola McConnell against Robert McConnell and wife. Transferred from the superior court on plaintiff's exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

The issue tried related to the validity of the defendant's set-off, in which the plaintiff was charged for the board of herself and children for a period of two years and two months. The plaintiff's husband is the defendants' son. In March, 1902, she went with her child to the defendants' home and and remained there until June, 1904. She became 21 years of age on April 29, 1904, when the note and mortgage in suit were turned over to her by her guardian. When she went to the home of the defendants nothing was said about her board; but both before and after she became of age the matter of the board of herself and children was mentioned several times. After she became of age she told the defendants they might apply the board upon the mortgage debt. There was no agreement between the parties as to the price of the board. The plaintiff did some work in the defendants' home that was of some value. The plaintiff's husband is not financially responsible, and the defendants never looked to him for the board, but gave credit to the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff was liable for the reasonable price of the board, and allowed the set-off to that extent, and the plaintiff excepted.

Almon F. Burbank, for plaintiff. Martin & Howe and Joseph A. Donigan, for defendants.

WALKER, J. It is argued that the court erred in allowing, by way of set-off, the defendants' account for the board of the plaintiff and her children while she was a minor, because during that time she was under guardianship. This contention is based upon a strict and literal construction of section 25, c. 177, Pub. St. 1901, which provides that "no contract of any nature whatever, made by a person under guardianship, after the appointment and during the continuance of the guardianship, shall be valid in law." But as the court remark in McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569, 571, "this provision of the statutes must have a reasonable construction. It cannot have been intended to render invalid all implied contracts; for such construction might expose the party to actual suffering for the necessaries of life, or oblige the town to maintain him and his family as paupers for a time, when he had ample means for their support, and thus produce the very mischief it was intended to prevent. And we are of opinion that it cannot be construed to prevent the party from binding himself for necessary expenditures, by an implied contract, although a note, or special contract for price or time of payment, would come within its prohibition." This construction of the statute was referred to with approval in Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133, 137, 2 Am. Rep. 202, 97 Am. Dec. 592, where it is said: "In McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569, it has been settled that, although the statute may avoid the contracts of spendthrifts for their protection, yet at the same time it does not avoid their implied contracts or liabilities for necessaries." As the statute was evidently enacted for the protection of wards against their improvidence, the legislative purpose, as explained more than 70 years ago, cannot now be overcome by technical reasoning based on verbal refinement. Having received food and lodging from the defendants with the understanding that the necessaries thus furnished should be paid for, and not deemed a gift, the plaintiff became bound by an implied promise to pay the defendants what the accommodation was reasonably worth. The fact that she was under guardianship did not deprive her of any legal ability she otherwise had to provide for her reasonable sustenance. Although she was a minor, it is not claimed that the common law relating to minors prevents them from incurring obligations by implication of law which inure to their benefit Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, 47 Am. Rep. 209. Such an obligation she incurred to the defendants and ratified it after becoming of age,...