McConnell v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 April 1967
• Docket Number: No. 23572.,23572.
• Citation: McConnell v. United States, 375 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1967)
• Parties: Joseph Monroe McCONNELL, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

375 F.2d 905 (1967)

Joseph Monroe McCONNELL, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 23572.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 11, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Irving Silver, Mobile, Ala., Joseph Monroe McConnell, Jr., pro se, for appellant.

Vernol R. Jansen, Jr., U. S. Atty., Mobile, Ala., Don Conway, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee.

Before GEWIN and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges, and SPEARS, District Judge.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

The appellant, Joseph Monroe McConnell, Jr., was tried and convicted by a jury upon a three count indictment charging violation of the narcotics laws of the United States. He was sentenced to a term of five years by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. On this appeal he claims that his trial was constitutionally inadequate because he was not represented by counsel at every stage of the proceeding. We agree and remand the case for a new trial.

The appellant and one Grady Monroe Holsen were jointly indicted for conspiracy to violate the narcotic laws of the United States and for the illegal possession and sale of narcotic drugs.¹ The indictment was returned on January 12, 1966, and the appellant was arraigned on January 21, 1966. His retained attorney, Mr. Brooks Taylor of Crestview, Florida,² was not present at the arraignment, but he had called the United States Attorney and requested that a plea of not guilty be entered to each count of the indictment, with leave to attack the validity of the indictment. The appellant informed the Court that he had no objection to such a plea and the plea was entered as requested.

On March 11, 1966, the United States Attorney brought to the attention of the Court the fact that Mr. Taylor had filed a motion on February 14, 1966, seeking to withdraw as attorney for the appellant. The motion alleged that the appellant had not paid Mr. Taylor as promised and had otherwise refused to cooperate. The Court granted the motion after the appellant consented. The Court then stated to the appellant that his case was set for trial within ten days, and asked the appellant if he wanted the court to appoint a lawyer for him. The appellant stated that he did not desire appointed counsel, and that he would retain private counsel. The Court again stated that he was willing to appoint an attorney to represent the appellant, but commented that he would not continue the trial in the event the appellant failed to secure the assistance of counsel by the trial date. The appellant again stated that he did not desire appointed counsel, and assured the Court that he would retain counsel before the trial date. In response to a question of the United States Attorney, he said that he would represent himself in the event he did not have an attorney by the trial date.

Shortly after Mr. Taylor withdrew, the appellant contacted a Mr. Stanard, a Mobile attorney, and requested that Mr. Stanard represent him. Mr. Stanard asked the appellant to come to his office and to bring a copy of the indictment. The appellant's copy of the indictment had not been returned by Mr. Taylor at that time, and before the appellant received the indictment from Mr. Taylor, he was arrested by the City of Mobile on local charges.

The appellant's case, along with the case against Holsen, was called for trial on March 21, 1966. The appellant appeared without counsel,³ but assured the Court that he had retained Mr. Stanard to represent him. While Mr. Stanard was being contacted by an officer of the Court, the Court granted Holsen, who was represented by counsel, a continuance to secure the testimony of a witness. Upon being contacted, Mr. Stanard informed the Court that he did not represent the appellant. When apprised by the Court of Mr. Stanard's statement, the appellant then asked the Court to appoint an attorney. The Court reminded the appellant of the previous colloquy had in connection with the withdrawal of Mr. Taylor and again stated that the case was going to be tried that day. The Court proceeded to select a jury and during this process the appellant again requested that counsel be appointed. The request was denied. The appellant insisted that he thought he had retained Mr. Stanard. The Court stated that he was sorry a misunderstanding had occurred but that the trial would have to proceed.⁴

The trial commenced and the Court vigorously cross-examined the three witnesses who appeared for the government, but the appellant did not take part in the conduct of the trial in any way. The appellant claimed to have one witness, whom he thought was in Birmingham, but when the Court gave him an opportunity to state the nature of the witness's testimony he refused to make any comment. The case was submitted to the jury without argument on behalf of either the appellant or the government. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. The appellant was sentenced on March 29, 1966. He was not represented by counsel when sentenced.

The appellant urges numerous grounds for reversal, but his chief complaint is that he was denied the right to counsel as provided by the Sixth Amendment at the arraignment, the trial, and when he was sentenced. The government argues that he waived his right to counsel and relies on the fact that the Court offered to appoint counsel before the trial date, which offer the appellant rejected, insisting that he would retain his own attorney, which he failed or neglected to do. The government further points to the fact that appellant was warned that the trial would proceed as scheduled in the event he did not retain his own attorney.

At this stage of our history, the right of a criminal defendant to have the effective assistance of adequate counsel at every material stage of the criminal process is firmly entrenched in the very fibre of our constitutional framework. Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The right to counsel attaches whenever the accused is substantially deprived of his freedom, Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and continues through the sentencing process. Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834, 839-840 (8 Cir. 1955). Where the rights of the accused may be substantially affected as a result of the arraignment, he must be represented by counsel. Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961). In view of the waiver provisions of Rule 12, Fed.R.Crim.P., there is little doubt that the arraignment in a federal criminal prosecution is a vital part of the criminal process and consequently the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel at that time. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; Hamilton v. State of Alabama, supra; Anderson v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 352 F.2d 945, 947 (1965). However, the accused's lack of counsel at arraignment is not so inherently prejudicial to the rights of the accused as to vitiate, in all cases, an otherwise valid conviction. To require that a conviction be set aside, it is necessary that the accused demonstrate some possible prejudice which resulted from the absence of counsel. Anderson v. United States, supra; McGill v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 348 F.2d 791 (1965).

In the instant case, while the appellant did not have counsel actually present at the arraignment, he did have the assistance of counsel in entering his plea. The plea entered was the one advised by his retained counsel who was aware of the nature of the charges against him. Under the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the plea of not guilty with leave to attack the indictment did not compromise any of the appellant's rights. Indeed, the plea protected the appellant against the waiver of a substantial class of motions under Rule 12. In addition, the appellant indicated that he wished the plea to be entered as requested by his counsel, and thus it was entered with his consent. Although there may be circumstances in which the lack of counsel at arraignment would require that a conviction be set aside, we are convinced after a careful review of the record that in the instant case there was not the slightest possibility of prejudice resulting from the appellant's lack of counsel. Accordingly, we find the appellant's first point to be without merit.

The appellant's lack of counsel at the trial, however, is an entirely different matter. Not only is it clearly established that, absent an intelligent and competent waiver, lack of counsel at a criminal trial requires the conviction to be set aside, Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, but the inadequacy of the appellant's defense and the consequent prejudice is manifest from a perusal of the record in this case. In determining whether there is a competent, informed and intelligent waiver, the judge before whom an accused appears without counsel is charged with a serious responsibility that can not be perfunctorily performed. Day v. United States, 357 F.2d 907 (7 Cir. 1966). See United States v. Curtiss, 330 F.2d 278 (2 Cir. 1964); Cross v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 325 F.2d 629 (1963). All reasonable presumptions must be indulged against a waiver, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, and any waiver must clearly appear on the record.

"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer." Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. at 516, 82 S.Ct. at 890.

In the case before us, the record clearly demonstrates that the appellant desired the assistance of counsel and there is only...