McCorkell v. Karhoff

• Decision Date: 11 May 1894
• Citation: 58 N.W. 913,90 Iowa 545
• Parties: JOSEPH MCCORKELL, Appellant, v. JOSEPH KARHOFF, L. M. HARTLEY et al
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

58 N.W. 913

90 Iowa 545

JOSEPH MCCORKELL, Appellant, v. JOSEPH KARHOFF, L. M. HARTLEY et al

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 11, 1894

MAY 1 1894.

Appeal from Plymouth District Court.--HON. SCOTT M. LADD, Judge.

ACTION to rescind the contract for the sale of a horse, and cancel a conveyance of land. From a judgment dismissing the petition the plaintiff appealed.

Reversed.

Lewis & Holmes for appellant.

Sawyer & Taft for appellees.

OPINION

GRANGER, C. J.

I.

On the seventh day of January, 1890, the defendant Hartley sold to Howard McCorkell (a son of the plaintiff) a stallion named Hero for the agreed price of one thousand, eight hundred dollars, and two mares for five hundred dollars. In a bill of sale, the stallion was warranted to be "sound and healthy, and, with proper handling, a foal getter." In the petition, besides the averments of a breach of the warranty, it is averred that, to induce McCorkell to purchase the stallion, Hartley verbally represented the stallion to be a sure foal getter, and that he had personal knowledge of the fact that he was, upon which representations McCorkell relied in making the purchase; that the representations were false and known to be so by Hartley, when made. In payment for the horses, the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant Karhoff one hundred and sixty acres of land, which Karhoff has since conveyed, by quitclaim deed, to Hartley. The consideration for the land, besides the horses, was the payment of a note for three hundred and fifty dollars held by Hartley, on which the plaintiff was a surety. The plaintiff now offers to restore the property received from Hartley, and asks a rescission of the contract of sale, and a cancellation of the deeds under which Hartley has title to the land. Without objection, the issues have been joined, and a trial had in equity, under averments both as to the warranty and fraudulent representations, and it should be so tried in this court. There is no question but that the horse was sold for service as a stallion. There is dispute, in argument, as to the legal import of the warranty, wherein the horse is warranted, "with proper handling, a foal getter." Appellee's construction seems to be that, if the horse could or "did get foals," the terms of the warranty are met. We are to construe the language of the instrument in the light of the manifest understanding of the parties at the time it was made, and that understanding may be known from the purposes of the sale, as then understood by both parties. As we have said, the horse was bought for service as a stallion, and the warranty was made under a mutual understanding to that effect. Hartley surely understood that McCorkell accepted the warranty as of broader meaning than that any trifling percentage of foals would meet its requirements. He must have known that the warranty was accepted as meaning that the horse was a reasonably sure or safe foal getter. If so, whatever may have been his understanding, he is bound by the understanding of the other party. By Code, section 3652, it is provided: "When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he had reason to suppose the other understood it."

We think it was a warranty that the horse could do reasonable service as a foal getter, in view of the fact that he was bought exclusively for such a use. The horse did not meet the requirements of the warranty. With proper handling for the season of 1889, out of fifty-five mares served but seven or eight were with foal. The horse was used under conditions to fairly test his capacity under the warranty,...