McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Faulkner

• Decision Date: 24 August 1895
• Citation: 64 N.W. 163,7 S.D. 363
• Parties: McCORMICK HARVESTING MACH. CO. v. FAULKNER.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

64 N.W. 163

7 S.D. 363

McCORMICK HARVESTING MACH. CO. v. FAULKNER.

Supreme Court of South Dakota

August 24, 1895

Syllabus by the Court.

1. As a general rule, a negotiable promissory note, like any other written instrument, has no legal or operative existence as such until it has been delivered in accordance with the purpose and intention of the parties.

2. Promissory notes delivered by a person who has executed the same, upon the express condition that such notes shall not be deemed the notes of the party so executing them, or as delivered, unless they are also executed by another person named as a comaker, cannot be enforced by the payee against the person so executing them, unless also executed by the other person so named in the condition as a comaker.

3. In such case evidence tending to prove the condition upon which such notes were executed and delivered to the payee, and that such condition had never been complied with, is competent and does not come within the rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument.

4. Where the evidence leaves the facts undisputed, and they are such that different conclusions or inferences could not reasonably be drawn from them, it becomes the duty of the court to declare their legal effect.

5. The evidence in this case examined, and the conclusion reached by the court that the material evidence on the part of the defendant was undisputed, and that it was such that only one conclusion or inference could reasonably be drawn therefrom and that the court committed no error in directing a verdict for the defendant.

Appeal from circuit court, Faulk county; H. G. Fuller, Judge.

Action by the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company against William G. Faulkner. Defendant had judgment, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Frank Turner, for appellant. J. A. Pickler and D. H. Latham, for respondent.

CORSON P. J.

This was an action upon two promissory notes executed by the defendant. The defendant, in his answer, admits that he executed the instruments, but alleges as a defense that the notes were not executed and delivered to said plaintiff as promissory notes; alleges that said plaintiff promised and agreed with the defendant, at the time of the delivery of said pretended notes, that said instruments would not be used as promissory notes against defendant, unless the said plaintiff also secured the signature of one George Smith to said instruments, and then said instruments were to be the joint promissory notes of said defendant and of said George Smith; alleges that Smith's signature was not obtained and that the plaintiff wrongfully and fraudulently diverted said alleged notes from the purpose for which they were given, and fraudulently misapplied the same by using and holding said notes against the defendant as his sole promissory notes. On the trial the counsel for plaintiff objected to the evidence offered to sustain the defense, upon the grounds hereinafter stated. The evidence was admitted, and at the close of the trial the court directed a verdict for the defendant.

Two questions are therefore presented: First, was the evidence offered properly admitted? Second, did the court commit error in directing the verdict? The evidence and objections material to the questions under consideration are as follows "William G. Faulkner, having been called and sworn on his own behalf, testified as follows: *** Q. You may state to the jury under what circumstances and conditions those notes were signed. State fully the facts in the case. (Objected to as incompetent and irrelevant; that they are seeking to offer parol testimony to vary the terms of a written agreement; and plaintiff further objects upon the grounds that the answer of the defendant does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to this action. Objection overruled. Exception.) A. Well, this agent came to me in the field, with these notes, and wanted me to sign them. I didn't want to sign the notes. I wanted to know where Smith was, and he said he was going direct to Smith, and he produced a mortgage at the same time. I signed a note at the same time I signed the mortgage, and I signed those papers with the understanding that they would not be notes until George Smith signed them, and he was going direct from me to where George Smith was. I was in the field working when he came there. I objected to signing them, but he had the mortgage and the note, and he seemed to be interested in getting George Smith on the note, and I put them in his hands to get George Smith to sign them before they should be delivered as notes, and then I signed them, and he went on as if he was going to Smith's." It was further shown that the machinery for which the notes were given was purchased by the defendant and said George Smith jointly. And it further appeared that the chattel mortgage referred to in the evidence was made out in the names of the defendant and the said George Smith, as the mortgagors, and was signed by the defendant but not signed by Smith. We are of the opinion that the answer stated a good defense, and that the evidence under it was properly admitted. While the first part of the answer seems to indicate that the plaintiff's agent only agreed to procure the signature of Smith to the notes, yet, taking the whole answer together, and giving to it a liberal construction, as we are required...