McCormick v. Lowe and Campbell Ath. Goods Co.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1940
• Docket Number: No. 19664.,19664.
• Parties: BRYAN E. McCORMICK, A MINOR, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, J.G. McCORMICK, RESPONDENT, v. LOWE AND CAMPBELL ATHLETIC GOODS COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

144 S.W.2d 866

BRYAN E. McCORMICK, A MINOR, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, J.G. McCORMICK, RESPONDENT, v. LOWE AND CAMPBELL ATHLETIC GOODS COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT.

No. 19664.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

September 16, 1940.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County. — Hon. Albert A. Ridge, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Leslie A. Welch, Clyde J. Linde and Richard H. Beeson for respondent.

(1) The defendant was required to exercise ordinary care to test and in testing the pole to determine its fitness for the use for which it was sold — and the jury was warranted by the facts and the law in so finding. McLeod v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W. (2d) 122; Jacobs v. Frank Adams Elec. Co. (Mo. App.), 97 S.W. (2d) 849; Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co. (Mo.), 111 S.W. (2d) 66; Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 342 Mo. 912, 119 S.W. (2d) 240; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497; White v. General Chem. Co., 136 S.W. (2d) 345; Tegler v. Farmers Union Gas & Oil Co., 124 Nebr. 336, 246 N.W. 721; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F, 696; Heckel v. Ford Motor Co. (N.J.), 39 A.L.R. 989; Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 8 A.L.R. 1023, 261 Fed. 878; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 153 N.Y.S. 131; Holzman v. Harkary Bev. Co., 293 N.Y.S. 832; Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 287 N.Y.S. 118; Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576; Miller v. Stinfield, 160 N.Y.S. 800; U.S. Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F. (2d) 92; Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 Fed. Sup. 590; Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. (2d) 310; Employers' Lia. Assur. Corp. v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., 13 F. (2d) 128; Clark v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. (N.J.), 149 Atl. 828; Restatement of the Law on Torts, Sec. 395, p. 1073 et seq.; Smith v. Kresge Co., 79 F. (2d) 361, 363. (2) Whether defendant negligently failed to exercise ordinary care to test or in testing said pole was a jury question. Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., supra; Holzman v. Harkary Bev. Co., supra; DeLape v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 25 Fed. Supp. 1006; White v. General Chem. Co., supra; Healey v. Trodd (N.J.), 7 Atl. (2d) 640; Gutridge v. Mo. Pac., 105 Mo. 520, 16 S.W. 943; Tallman v. W.R. Nelson, 141 Mo. App. 478, 125 S.W. 1181; Ruch v. Pryor (Mo. App.), 199 S.W. 750; Hach v. Railroad, 117 Mo. App. 11, 93 S.W. 825; Rumetsch v. John Wanamaker, New York, Inc., 110 N.E. 760, 216 N.Y. 379. Defendant's contentions. (a) Plaintiff agrees no presumption of negligence. (b) Plaintiff agrees defect not inferable from mere fact of injury. (c) Plaintiff agrees latent defect of itself does not prove negligence. (d) Case made was on issue of testing, not inspection. Although there was no proof of the character of tests made by other vaulting pole manufacturers, such proof, had it been made, would not have constituted a defense. The jury could still pass upon the reasonable sufficiency of the tests, if any, made by this defendant. U.S. Radiator Corp. v. Anderson, 68 F. (2d) 87; Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., supra; Obermeyer v. Chair Mfg. Co., 120 Mo. App. 59, 96 S.W. 673; Lee v. Knapp & Co., 55 Mo. App. 406; Reichla v. Gruensfelder, 52 Mo. App. 43; Gummerson v. Bolt & Nut Co., 185 Mo. App. 7, 171 S.W. 959; Furber v. K.C. Bolt & Nut Co., 185 Mo. 301, 84 S.W. 890. (e) Plaintiff's two vaults at low height did not test soundness of entire pole. (3) Defendant's other contentions that demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained are fallacious. (a) Defendant gave no notice that the pole was defective or that it had not been subjected to reasonable tests. DuPont de Nemours v. Baridon, 73 F. (2d) 26 (8th); Morris v. DuPont, 314 Mo. 821, 109 S.W. (2d) 1229. (b) Defendant was negligent. Defendant's contentions are answered in our Point 2. (c) Defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. This is established by our Points 1 and 2. (d) Plaintiff was not negligent and did not assume the risk of defendant's negligence. (4) Defendant's Exhibits D, E and F were incompetent. Home Ins. Co. of New Y. v. Savage et al., 231 Mo. App. 569, 103 S.W. (2d) 900; Smith v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 123 S.W. (2d) 198; Baustain v. Young et al., 152 Mo. 317, 322, 323, 53 S.W. 921; Threlkeld v. Wabash Ry. Co., 68 Mo. App. 127, 136; Lynch v. M.-K.-T., 333 Mo. 89, 61 S.W. (2d) 918; 22 C.J., 921; Myerson v. People's Motorbus Co., 297 S.W. 451. (5) Plaintiff's expert witness was thoroughly qualified, he examined the very pole in question after the break, and properly stated his opinions as to the cause of the break and tests. Combs v. Const. Co., 205 Mo. 367, 104 S.W. 77; Adkins v. Railroad (Mo.), 292 S.W. 1075, 1077; Benjamin v. Street Railway, 50 Mo. App. 608, 609; Vitale v. Duerbeck, 338 Mo. 556, 92 S.W. (2d) 691, 694; Busch v. Woermann Const. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W. 621; DeDonato v. Wells, 328 Mo. 448, 41 S.W. (2d) 184, 187; Skinner v. Glass Co., 103 Mo. App. 661, 77 S.W. 1011; Young v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 64 S.W. (2d) 957; Scherpe v. Kohen Iron Co., 124 Mo. 8, 27 S.W. 446; Mummaw v. S.W.T. & T. (Mo.), 208 S.W. 476; Oakley v. Richards, 275 Mo. 266, 204 S.W. 505; Sudmeyer v. Railways (Mo.), 228 S.W. 64; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Berkey, 35 N.E. 3; Fraternal Const. Co. v. Foundry & Machine Co. (Ky.), 89 S.W. 265; Sawyer v. Shoup Co. (Mass.), 38 Atl. 333; Hoppelman v. Ship Bldg. Co. (Mass.), 100 N.E. 1023; Roberts v. Vroom, 212 Mass. 168, 98 N.E. 687; Railroad v. Farr, 56 Fed. 994; O'Leary v. Scullin Steel Co., 303 Mo. 363, 260 S.W. 55; James v. Bailey Reynolds, 325 Mo. 1054, 30 S.W. (2d) 124; Scanlon v. K.C., 325 Mo. 125, 28 S.W. (2d) 84; Langeneckert v. Sulphur & Chemical Co., 65 S.W. (2d) 648; Helfenstein v. Medard, 136 Mo. 595, 36 S.W. 863; Robinson v. Railway, 66 S.W. (2d) 185; Ambruster v. Levitt, 341 Mo. 364, 107 S.W. (2d) 80; Meily v. Railroad, 215 Mo. 589, 593, 114 S.W. 1013; Landers v. Quincy, O & K.C.R.R. Co., 156 Mo. App. 580, 137 S.W. 605; Connelly v. I.C.R.R. Co., 183 Mo. App. 408, 166 S.W. 1077; Griggs v. Supt. of Colony for Feeble-Minded, etc., 214 Mo. App. 304; Jenkins v. Chase (Mo.), 53 S.W. (2d) 21; Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 102 S.W. (2d) Grandstaff v. Wabash R.R. Co. (Mo.), 71 S.W. (2d) 174; Healey v. 600; Colwell v. St. L. & S.F. Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 494, 73 S.W. (2d) 222; Trodd (N.J.), 7 Atl. (2d) 740, 741. (6) Plaintiff's instruction No. 1 was not erroneous. By defendant's Instructions P, R, V and D-1 it is estopped to assert error. State ex rel. Reeves v. Shain, 122 S.W. (2d) 887. (7) The court did not err in refusing defendant's Instruction U. (8) The court did not err in refusing defendant's Instructions W and Z. (9) The court did not err in refusing defendant's Instructions G-1, H-1 and J-1. (10) The denial of request for leave for time in which to prepare petition and bond for removal after involuntary nonsuits were taken at the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence was not error. Shohoney v. Q., O. & K.C. Ry. Co., 223 Mo. 649, 122 S.W. 1025; McNulty v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 249 S.W. 730; Schwyhart v. Barrett, 145 Mo. App. 332, 130 S.W. 388; Hickman v. M.-K.-T. Ry., 151 Mo. 644, 52 S. W. 351; State ex rel. v. Kelley, 220 Mo. App. 413, 286 S.W. 724; Stith v. J.J. Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S.W. (2d) 447, 452; Zumwalt v. C. & A.R. Co., 308 Mo. 66, 266 S.W. 717, 726; Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 44 L. Ed. 303, 20 S. Ct. 248; K.C., etc., Co. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63, 23 S. Ct. 24, 47 L. Ed. 76; Lathrop, etc., Co. v. Interior Const. Co., 215 U.S. 246, 30 S. Ct. 76, 54 L. Ed. 177; Gt. Nor. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 38 St. Ct. 237, 62 L. Ed. 713; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 35 S. Ct. 355, 59 L. Ed. 594; Morris v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 68 F. (2d) 788, 193; Kraus v. C.B. & Q.R.R. Co., 16 F. (2d) 79.

John B. Gage, Paul Ware and James A. Moore for appellant.

Gage, Hillix, Hodges & Cowherd of counsel.

(1) The demurrers to the evidence should have been sustained. (a) Defendant gave notice to the Deuel County High School that bamboo vaulting poles will break and split. Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S.W. 430, 432; Miller v. Raymond, 84 Nebr. 543, 123 N.W. 1019; Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945; Ford Motor Co. v. Walber, 32 Fed. (2d) 18 (Cert. den. 280 U.S. 565); American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Chain Belt Co., 224 Wis. 155, 271 N.W. 828; Levin v. Muser, 110 Nebr. 515, 194 N.W. 672; Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351, 1 Am. Rep. 543 (Cited with approval and rule recognized in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382); Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (Ind.), 122 N.E. 1; Wissman v. General Tire Co., 327 Pa. 215, 192 Atl. 633; Kiser v. Suppe, 133 Mo. App. 19, 112 S.W. 1005; Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862; Bergstresser v. Van Hoy, 142 Kans. 88, 45 Pac. (2d) 855. (b) Defendant was not negligent. 1. The mere fact that an accident occurred raised no presumption of negligence. Bergendahl v. Rabeler, 268 Nebr. 459, 276 N.W. 673, 675; Tsiampras v. Union Pac. R. Co., 104 Nebr. 205, 176 N.W. 366; Engel v. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., 111 Nebr. 21, 195 N.W. 523, 526; Bohn v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 106 Mo. 429, 17 S.W. 580; Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp. (Mo.), 119 S.W. (2d) 240. 2. A defect could not be inferred from the mere fact of injury. Looney v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 200 U.S. 480, 486, 26 S. Ct. 303; Holmes v. Pellegrino, 102 N.J.L. 697, 133 Atl. 194; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 Fed. (2d) 26, 31; Bohn v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., supra. 3. Even the existence of a latent defect does not authorize the presumption or inference of negligence on the part of defendant. Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp., supra; O'Donnell v. Baum, 38 Mo. App. 245, 249. 4. Defendant made a reasonable inspection of the bamboo pole. Bennett v. Young (N.J. 1910), 75 Atl. 896; Atz v. Manufacturing Co., 55 N.J.L. 41, 34 Atl. 980; Randolph v. N.Y.C., 69 N.J.L. 422, 55 Atl. 241; ...