McCormick v. Miami Univ.

• Decision Date: 18 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–3614.,11–3614.
• Parties: Regina Ann McCORMICK, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. MIAMI UNIVERSITY; Karen Maitland Schilling, Dean; Terri Messman–Moore; Margaret Wright, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

693 F.3d 654

284 Ed. Law Rep. 51

Regina Ann McCORMICK, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.MIAMI UNIVERSITY; Karen Maitland Schilling, Dean; Terri Messman–Moore; Margaret Wright, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 11–3614.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: June 5, 2012.

Decided and Filed: Sept. 10, 2012.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 18, 2012.

ARGUED:Dianna M. Anelli, Anelli Holford, Ltd., Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant. Kathleen M. Trafford, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Dianna M. Anelli, Anelli Holford, Ltd., Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant. Kathleen M. Trafford, Tracie N. Ransom, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: KEITH, McKEAGUE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Regina McCormick was pursuing a graduate degree in psychology at Miami University in Ohio when she was diagnosed with several illnesses that slowed her progress in her graduate studies. After the faculty voted against promoting McCormick to doctoral status, she filed suit against the university and its officials, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and disability in violation of state and federal laws. To circumvent the expired two-year statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim—which provides an express cause of action against state actors—McCormick asserted federal claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims, concluding that McCormick's discrimination claim under § 1981 was barred because § 1983 provided the exclusive means to bring a damages suit against state actors in either their official or individual capacities for violations of § 1981. The district court dismissed McCormick's Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims as time-barred. On appeal, McCormick argues that the district court improperly extended the Supreme Court's holding in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), to bar using § 1981 as a mechanism to sue state actors in their individual capacities. This court has not squarely addressed whether § 1983 provides the exclusive means to sue a state actor acting in their individual capacity for alleged violations of § 1981. Upon due consideration, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

Miami University's Psychology Department admitted McCormick into its graduate program for the fall semester of 2000. During her second year of study, in 2002, McCormick was diagnosed with plica syndrome, knee and wrist dysfunction, degenerative disc disease, and rheumatoid arthritis. McCormick alleges that her illnesses and treatment drastically slowed her progress in her graduate studies by impairing major life functions such as walking and utilizing her arms and hands. McCormick reported her condition to her advisor and Dean of the Psychology Department, Dr. Karen Schilling. She also requested reasonable accommodations in the form of additional time within which to complete her Ph.D.

McCormick further alleged that when her health problems began in 2001, Defendant–Appellee Dr. Terri Messman–Moore agreed to give McCormick a C+ grade in a course to serve as a place holder, allowing McCormick to receive financial aid with the understanding that the course work would be completed at a later time. However, Dr. Messman–Moore allegedly reneged and required McCormick to retake the class in its entirety.

In January 2003, McCormick received a letter from Dr. Len Mark, on behalf of the psychology faculty, informing her that despite receiving two Cs—which would normally be grounds for dismissal—the faculty would allow her to continue her studies. The letter warned that promotion to doctoral status was unlikely unless she made dramatic improvement in the quality of her work. The letter established time limits within which to complete certain tasks. During the same month, McCormick was diagnosed with an arthritis-related condition in her left wrist that required surgery. McCormick opted to undergo surgery at a future date. She informed Dr. Schilling of her condition and requested additional time within which to complete her assignments.

On May 7, 2003, Dr. Mark wrote another letter to McCormick on behalf of the faculty, expressing disappointment that McCormick was unable to complete her tasks in accordance with the time limits set forth in the January 2003 letter. The letter further warned that, without dramatic improvement, the likelihood of the faculty supporting her promotion to doctoral status was even less than in January 2003.

After receiving the May 2003 letter, McCormick earned a 4.0 grade point average for several semesters. Upon completing the coursework for her master's degree, McCormick earned a cumulative GPA of 3.72. She successfully defended her master's thesis and received an A grade.

On April 28, 2006, in a seven to three vote, the faculty declined to promote McCormick to doctoral status. McCormick alleged that the faculty denied her promotion because she would take too long to complete the dissertation; however, the termination letter that McCormick received did not state a reason for the faculty's decision. After the faculty vote, McCormick's brother telephoned Dr. Schilling, who allegedly discussed with him the pervasiveness of racism within the Psychology Department.

On May 5, 2010, McCormick filed a complaint in federal court alleging that Defendants–Appellees engaged in: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.02, 4112.99, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; (2) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99; (3) retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.02, 4112.99; (4) breach of express contract; and (5) breach of public policy. McCormick alleged that the foregoing violations resulted from the Defendants–Appellees' decision not to advance McCormick to doctoral status. McCormick sued the three named faculty members in their individual and official capacities. Defendants–Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on June 6, 2010. On May 5, 2011, the district court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss all claims pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, or Rule 12(b)(6) for lack failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court concluded that McCormick's discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 failed as a matter of law because such claims cannot be brought under § 1981 against state actors in either an official capacity or an individual capacity. The district court also concluded that the discrimination claims based on the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were time-barred and that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the state law claims. McCormick filed a timely appeal.

II.

We discuss each of McCormick's claims in turn. McCormick sued Miami Universityand three of its faculty members, both in their individual and official capacities, for alleged violations of state and federal law. McCormick's complaint sought both injunctive relief and money damages. We respectively organize McCormick's claims into those brought under § 1981, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and state laws.

Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Lovely v. United States, 570 F.3d 778, 781 (6th Cir.2009), and Rule 12(b)(6), Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir.2006).

A plaintiff must provide only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without having detailed factual allegations, but the complaint must contain more than conclusions and an unsubstantiated recitation of the necessary elements of a claim. Id. We assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief as a matter of law. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993).

Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) are categorized as either a facial attack or a factual attack. “Under a facial attack, all of the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.... Under a factual attack, however, the court can actually weigh evidence to confirm the existence of the factual predicates for subject-matter jurisdiction.” Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir.2012).

Section 1981 Claims§ 1981 Claims Against State Actors Sued in their Individual Capacity

The foremost issue presented in this appeal is whether § 1983's express cause of action against state actors precludes using § 1981 as a mechanism to sue state actors for money damages in their individual capacity. In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, the Supreme Court resolved a similar issue regarding § 1981 suits against local governmental units. 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598. The Jett Court held that § 1983 provided the exclusive federal damages remedy for a claim against a state actor accused of violating rights secured by § 1981. Id. at 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702. McCormick claims that the holding in Jett is limited to suits against government entities and individuals sued for money damages in their official capacity. The district court concluded that a state employee cannot be...