Mccormick v. Miller

• Decision Date: 31 March 1882
• Citation: 40 Am.Rep. 577,102 Ill. 208,1881 WL 14541
• Parties: CHARLES MCCORMICKv.CAROLINE MILLER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

102 Ill. 208

1881 WL 14541 (Ill.)

40 Am.Rep. 577

CHARLES MCCORMICK

v.CAROLINE MILLER et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa Nov. 10, 1881.Rehearing denied March Term, 1882.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. JOHN BURNS, Judge, presiding. Mr. DAN. R. SHEEN, for the appellant:

Complainants in the original bills having virtually bought at an administrator's sale, should have examined the title, as the rule of caveat emptor applies. Bishop et al. v. O'Connell, 69 Ill. 434.

The law presumes that a purchaser inspects the records before buying, and if he does not, he assumes all the risks of title. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kennedy et al. 70 Ill. 364.

McCormick claims to have purchased and paid for this property. This position is consistent with honesty, and is presumed to be true. O'Neil v. Boon et al. 82 Ill. 589; Munn v. Burges, 70 Id. 604.

This court has decided that such persons are presumed to know their rights, and it is “not incumbent upon either party to advise or remind the other of them.” Watt v. McGaillard, 67 Ill. 518.

One person has no right to rely upon the representations of another, in regard to title, where the records are easy of access; and if he sees fit to do so, it is at his own peril. Buchanan v. International Bank, 78 Ill. 503.

A person has not only constructive notice, but actual notice of whatever appears upon the face of his own title. White v. Kibby, 42 Ill. 510. And generally, upon the question of notice, see Russell v. Ransom, 76 Ill. 171; Doran v. Mullen, 78 Id. 346.

Upon the question of fraudulent concealment, and fraudulent representations, see VanHorn v. Keenan, 28 Ill. 448; Miller v. Craig, 36 Id. 110; Noetling v. Wright, 72 Id. 390; Hall v. Jarvis, 65 Id. 304; Tuck v. Downing, 76 Id. 97; Gage v. Lewis, 68 Id. 615; Grant et al. v. Fellows, 58 Id. 242; Wood v. Seward, 46 Id. 457; Bond et al. v. Ramsey, 89 Id. 29; Mitchell v. McDougal, 62 Id. 502; Frank et al. v. Tolman, 75 Id. 648; Campbell v. Carter, 14 Id. 286; Rupert v. Mark et al. 15 Id. 542.

Mr. E. P. SLOAN, and Mr. J. W. COCHRAN, for the appellees:

Fraud vitiates any contract, and all acts between the parties to it. Sims v. Klein, Breese, 302; Deere v. Lewis, 51 Ill. 254; Jamison v. Beaubien, 3 Scam. 113; Trevo v. Walters, 4 Id. 35; Walker v. Hough, 59 Ill. 375.

Fraud may consist in making false representations, with knowledge of their falsity, with a design to deceive and defraud, or in a willful concealment of the truth for a similar purpose. Lockridge v. Foster, 4 Scam. 569; Mitchel v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416; Case v. Ayers, 65 Id. 142; Allen v. Hart, 72 Id. 107; Mitchell v. McDougal, 62 Id. 501.

A conveyance which has been obtained through fraud and covin, will be set aside; and it is not in the mouth of the fraudulent grantee to say that his grantor did not exercise proper precaution. Lloyd v. Higbee, 25 Ill. 603.

Fraudulent intent may be found from the acts of the purchaser after the sale. Brown v. Schuler, 41 Ill. 192.

Courts of equity can set aside and cancel deeds fraudulently obtained. Clement v. Evans, 15 Ill. 92; Kennedy v. Northrup, 15 Id. 148.

Fraud may be proved by circumstances. Greely v. Sample, 22 Iowa, 338; Bryant et al. v. Simoneau et al. 51 Ill. 327; Bullock v. North, 49 Id. 222; Bois v. Herney, 32 Id. 130; Reed v. Noxon, 48 Id. 323; Rothgerber v. Gough, 52 Id. 436; Swift v. Lee, 65 Id. 336.

Circumstances so strong as to create a suspicion of fraud, and yet some doubt remains--the fraud is proven. Bryant v. Simoneau, 51 Ill. 327; Swift v. Lee, 65 Id. 336.

Where a party is ignorant of his own rights, but which are known to the other party. M'Carthy v. Decaix, 2 Rus. & Mylne, 614. The statutory quitclaim deed from McCormick to Hawkins, conveying “the then existing legal or equitable rights of the grantor in the premises,” will not protect the grantee against the fraudulent act of his grantor in obtaining his title. 3 Wash. on Real Estate, 356; May v. LeClair, 11 Wall. 232.

That which is sufficient to put a party upon inquiry, is notice of whatever the inquiry, reasonably prosecuted, would disclose. Russell v. Ranson, 76 Ill. 167; Watt v. Scofield, 76 Id. 261; Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne & K. 699; Dickey v. Lyon, 19 Iowa, 544; Smith v. Jackson, 76 Ill. 254.

Hawkins must have paid his purchase money, to be protected. Story's Equity, secs. 64c, and 1502, and authorities cited; Powell et al. v. Jeffries, 4 Scam. 387; Brown v. Welch, 18 Ill. 343; Roseman et al. v. Miller, 84 Id. 299.

Proof that payment has been secured, is not sufficient. Brown v. Welch, 18 Ill. 343; Straus v. Kranert, 56 Id. 254.

The notes given by Hawkins to McCormick for said property were not a good consideration. Somes v. Skinner, 16 Mass. 351; Straus v. Kranert, 56 Ill. 254.

Mr. JUSTICE MULKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

On the 19th day of August, 1878, Caroline Miller and Anna Fredericks filed in the Peoria county circuit court their respective bills in chancery, against Charles McCormick, John Birks, Maria M. Birks, John Hawkins, and Daniel R. Sheen, to set aside certain conveyances of real estate situate in Peoria county, this State. John Birks and Maria Birks answered, admitting the material facts alleged, and also filed a cross-bill, setting up substantially the same state of facts charged in the original bills, and praying similar relief. The cases were subsequently consolidated, and the other defendants answered the original bills, denying the main facts relied on for relief.

It appears that the land in controversy formerly belonged to Kitridge D. Earl, being certain portions of lots 2, 4 and 6, in block 19, in the city of Peoria; that Adeline H. Earl, his wife, at the same time owned other portions of the same lots; that on the 30th day of April, 1850, Earl conveyed the portions of these lots owned by him to David Sanborn, in fee, in trust for his wife, for life, with remainder in fee to his daughter, Maria M. Earl, now Mrs. Birks; that on the 4th of August, 1863, Earl died, leaving a last will and testament, by which he devised his entire estate, both real and personal, to his wife, for life, giving her full power to sell and convey the same, at her discretion, and limiting the remainder, in so much of the estate as should be undisposed of at the time of her decease, to his daughter, Mrs. Birks; that on the 25th of July, 1865, Adeline H. Earl, supposing herself, by virtue of her husband's will, to be the absolute owner of the entire premises, for the consideration of $6500, conveyed, by warranty deed, to George A. Beseman certain parts of these lots, including the same portions theretofore conveyed by her husband to Sanborn in trust for herself and daughter; that Beseman subsequently became insane, and Peter Schertz was appointed his conservator, who, in 1868, under an order of court, sold at public sale the premises last above mentioned, one portion of which was struck off to George Fredericks, at $3600, and the residue to Augusta Beseman, for the consideration of $4450; that in pursuance of their respective purchases the conservator conveyed to George Fredericks on the 22d of September, 1868, and to Augusta Beseman on the 15th of June, 1870; that on the 20th of June, 1870, Augusta Beseman, for the consideration of $2000, sold and conveyed to appellee Caroline Miller, a part of the same premises purchased by her of the conservator, as just stated, and being a part of the land now in controversy; that in consideration of $4000, George Fredericks, on the 17th of December, 1872, conveyed the part of the premises purchased by him to I. C. Edwards, who, for a like consideration, on the 27th of the month, conveyed the same to appellee Anna Fredericks, being the residue of the premises in controversy; that on the 4th day of April, 1878, Birks and wife, for the consideration, as expressed in the conveyance, of one dollar, “and other considerations,” by quitclaim deed, conveyed a part of the premises in controversy to appellant, Charles McCormick, and on the 9th of the same month, by a similar deed, for a like consideration, conveyed to him the residue; that on the 17th of July, 1878, McCormick, for the consideration, as expressed in the deed, of $7000, sold and quitclaimed the entire premises to John Hawkins, and took a deed of trust on the property conveyed to secure the purchase money, which was payable in three installments, the last maturing four years from the date of the transaction; that all the foregoing conveyances were duly recorded in the recorder's office of Peoria county, and the property in each of them is described by metes and bounds; that prior to the conveyances from Birks and wife to McCormick, he had intermarried with Augusta Beseman, Beseman having in the meantime died.

So far there is no controversy about the facts; but it is claimed by appellees that while they all supposed that Mrs. Miller and Mrs. Fredericks had acquired, through mesne conveyances from Adeline H. Earl, absolute fee simple titles to their respective premises, they had, in truth and in fact, only acquired her life estate, and that Charles McCormick, with full knowledge of the defect in the titles, and also of their ignorance of such defect, by means of fraudulent concealment and false and fraudulent representations, obtained the two quitclaim deeds above mentioned from Mrs. Birks and her husband, whereby he obtained from her the remainder in fee in the premises which she acquired by virtue of the trust deed from her father to Sanborn, in April, 1850, as heretofore stated.

There are other facts and interests involved in this suit which are settled by the decree, but it is not important to note them here, as McCormick alone has appealed. So far as he is concerned, the important inquiry is, were the conveyances from Birks and wife to him obtained under such circumstances as will require a court of equity to set them...