McCourtie v. U.S. Steel Corp.

• Citation: 253 Minn. 501,93 N.W.2d 552
• Decision Date: 21 November 1958
• Docket Number: No. 37418,37418
• Parties: . UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Appellant. Supreme Court of Minnesota
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 552

93 N.W.2d 552

253 Minn. 501

Charles McCOURTIE, Respondent, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Appellant.

No. 37418.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 21, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The defendant was erecting the structural steel for a building having an area of 98 by 100 feet and an overall height of 130 feet. The employees of defendant, who were working on the outside walls of the structure at a height of about 60 feet, negligently permitted a steel beam to fall injuring plaintiff, who was working on the ground floor level. The plaintiff was an employee of another subcontractor engaged in the installation of plumbing. The steel construction had been completed in the area where the plaintiff was working, and there was evidence to establish that his superior had received clearance from the defendant to begin plumbing installations in that area. It was the recognized practice for plumbers not to begin work in a particular area until the steel construction had been completed there. In action by the plaintiff against the defendant subcontractor to recover for personal injuries it is held that the employees of the defendant and the plaintiff were not 'working together' or engaged in a 'common activity' on the same project in such fashion that they were subject to the same or similar hazards so as to bring defendant within the protection of M.S.A. § 176.061.

2. The purpose of the special verdict authorized by Rule 49.01 of Rules of Civil Procedure is to permit the jury to make findings of ultimate facts, free from bias, prejudice, or sympathy and without regard to the effect of their answers upon the ultimate outcome of the case; and in submitting a special verdict it is error for the court to inform the jury in its instructions, expressly or by necessary implication, of the effect of an answer to a question of the special verdict upon the ultimate right of either party to recover or on the ultimate liability of either party. Where the verdict pursuant to such instruction is excessive, indicating that it was rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice, such error is prejudicial requiring a new trial.

Morgan, Raudenbush, Morgan, Oehler & Davis, St. Paul, for appellant.

Bonner, Bonner & Clements, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Eugene M. Warlich, St. Paul, Doherty, Rumble & Butler, St. Paul, of counsel, for amicus curiae.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff.

Plaintiff was working as an employee of a plumbing subcontractor when he was struck by a piece of steel dropped by defendant's employees, who were engaged in the steel structure work in a manner hereinafter described. The case was submitted to the jury on a special verdict, and the jury found that defendant was negligent; that such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries; that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence and did not assume the risk of the injuries which he sustained; that plaintiff's employer and defendant were not engaged on the same project; that plaintiff and the employees of defendant were not working together in the performance of such project; and that plaintiff and defendant's employees were not working together in the performance of such project in a manner which exposed them to the same or similar risks at the time of such injury.

The first question we have to consider is whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff's cause of action was barred by M.S.A. § 176.061. For the purpose of determining that issue, the facts may be briefly summarized.

Reserve Mining Company was engaged in the construction of a taconite processing plant and related facilities at Silver Bay on Lake Superior. Hunkin, Arundel & Dixon Company was the general contractor on the job. A part of the plant consisted of a powerhouse. The general contractor sublet the plumbing installation work on the powerhouse to Cherne-Sundland Company, plaintiff's employer. The general contractor sublet the steel construction work to the American Bridge Division of defendant, United States Steel Corporation. Both subcontractors were either insured or self-insured under the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act.

Plaintiff suffered a severe injury to his leg on April 20, 1954, when a piece of steel fell from the superstructure which was being constructed by employees of defendant. Plaintiff had been working on the taconite plant construction from November 1953. At the time of the accident here involved, part of the steel superstructure had been erected. The record indicates that about 60 percent of the steel work had been completed. The columns and beams forming the skeleton of the superstructure were in place, connected with temporary fitting bolts and drift pins. Plaintiff was installing plumbing on the ground level. From 50 to 100 of defendant's workmen were working on various parts of the superstructure. Steel for use in this work was elevated to or near the place where it was needed, by a crane. At the time of the accident a crew of defendant's employees was installing girts on the outside walls of a part of the building. When the crane could reach the place where they were needed, the girts were raised singly and immediately connected to the columns and bolted in place. When the crane could not reach the place where the girts were needed because of the interference of beams, the girts were raised by the crane in bundles. They were pushed as far toward the place where they were to be used as possible by some of defendant's employees and then landed on steel beams. While a bundle of 12 pieces was being raised in that manner, it struck a part of the structure, causing 8 of the 12 pieces to slide out of the bundle and ricochet down through the steel skeleton of the building. When the pieces started to fall, an employee of defendant yelled 'headache,' an expression used in the industry to warn those below that something was falling. Plaintiff tried to get away but was struck on his leg by a piece of steel weighing over 175 pounds and was severely injured. Several of defendant's employees sought shelter under or near beams or wherever they could find protection from the falling steel.

1. The defendant contends that the plaintiff and the employees of the defendant, who caused his injuries, were engaged in due course of business, in furtherance of a common enterprise, or project, in the accomplishment of the same or related purpose in operation on the premises where the injury occurred. It asks this court to interpret § 176.061, subds. 1 and 4, so as to hold that, where contractors and subcontractors or separate subcontractors are engaged in performing component parts of the same undertaking, they are engaged in the same project and that, if employees of such contractors and subcontractors are exposed to the same or similar hazards, the latter are within the protection afforded by § 176.061.

In considering the arguments of the defendant it is unnecessary to further discuss the history of § 176.061, as that subject is fully discussed in Tevoght v. Polson, 205 Minn. 252, 285 N.W. 893, and in Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 8 N.W.2d 808. In preface it should be observed that prior to the adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1913 an injured workman could recover only by bringing a common-law action in negligence. ¹ However, with the adoption of the first workmen's compensation law in 1913, ² a person injured in the course of his employment could proceed against his employer for the compensation provided for by the act or could sue the third-party tortfeasor in a common-law action for negligence. ³ If the injured person recovered in the common-law action for negligence against the third-party tortfeasor, the amount of the recovery could not be greater than the amount fixed by the compensation act. Thus, in effect, the injured person was limited to the amount he could recover under the compensation act, even though he was not barred from bringing an action for negligence.

The act was amended in 1923 by L.1923, c. 279, § 1, to provide that the prohibition in respect to the right of injured workmen against a negligent third party applies 'only where the employer liable for compensation * * * and the other party * * * legally liable for damages were engaged in the due course of business, (a) in furtherance of a common enterprise, or (b) the accomplishment of the same or related purposes in operation on the premises where the injury was received at the time thereof, and not otherwise.' In discussing this amendment in the Gleason case, Mr. Justice Olson said (214 Minn. 507, 8 N.W.2d 812):

'* * * We think the obvious legislative purpose in adopting the amendment was to restore to the Injured person an enlarged remedy against the negligent third party. * * * It is thus apparent that the blame is placed where it belongs, upon the party at fault, where of right it should be.'

As a result of the 1923 amendment the injured employee was again permitted to maintain an action for common-law negligence in an unlimited amount except where prohibited by statute, and it is further clear, as Mr. Justice Olson indicated, that the legislature intended to enlarge both the rights and remedies of the injured workman and the liability of the third-party tortfeasor to the injured person. ⁴

The statutory terms 'common enterprise' and 'the same or related purposes' are admittedly confusing when an attempt is made to apply them to a fact situation, and they have caused difficulty in attempts of this court to interpret them consistently. It should be acknowledged, however, that the intent of the legislature in certain respects is clear. It is certain that the legislature intended to restore, at least in part, the common-law rights of the workman injured by a negligent third party when both employers were under the act. In reviewing the authorities as they apply to various fact situations, one basic principle...