McCowan v. HSBC BANK USA, NA

Decision Date12 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 07-CV-3245 (JFB)(MLO).,07-CV-3245 (JFB)(MLO).
PartiesChristiane McCOWAN, Plaintiff, v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Neil Frank, Pamela Jae Naples, and Peter Arcadia Romero of Frank & Associates, P.C., Farmingdale, NY, for Plaintiff.

James R. Grasso and Laurie S. Leonard of Phillips Lytle LLP, Buffalo, NY, and Meredith Leigh Friedman, HSBC Bank USA, National, Association, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Christiane McCowan ("McCowan" or "plaintiff") brings this action alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ("ADA") and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296 et seq. ("NYSHRL") against defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. ("HSBC" or "defendant"). Specifically, plaintiff alleges the following: (1) defendant discriminated against plaintiff by terminating her because of her actual disability, record of disability, and/or perceived disability—namely, depression; (2) defendant retaliated against plaintiff by terminating her for expressing her intention to file a formal complaint against her supervisor at work; and (3) defendant subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment based upon her disability.

Defendant has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's summary judgment motion is denied in part and granted in part. First, the Court concludes, after carefully reviewing the record in this case, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in plaintiffs favor, that disputed issues of material fact exist with respect to plaintiff's claims of discrimination based on actual disability under the NYSHRL, record of disability under the ADA and NYSHRL, and perceived disability under the ADA and NYSHRL, claim of a hostile work environment based upon actual disability (under the NYSHRL) or perceived disability, and plaintiff's claim that defendant retaliated against her for threatening to bring a formal complaint or lawsuit against her supervisor. Thus, those claims survive summary judgment.

However, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not presented evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding plaintiff's claim of discrimination based upon actual disability under the ADA. In particular, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that, at the time of the alleged adverse employment actions in 2006 (namely, her denial of a pay increase/ bonus and her termination), plaintiff was not suffering from a disability that substantially limited a major life activity because she was not experiencing any symptoms of depression at that time. Thus, summary judgment is warranted on the actual disability claim under the ADA.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts.1 Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Thus, the Court shall construe the facts in favor of the plaintiff.

1. Plaintiff's Employment with HSBC

Plaintiff worked for defendant HSBC and its predecessor, Marine Midland Bank, from February 1982 until her termination on April 11, 2006. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) For the last fifteen years of her employment with HSBC, plaintiff worked in HSBC's Commercial Lending Department for the Long Island area as a Senior Commercial Support Specialist. (Id. ¶ 3.) Prior to her termination, she held the position of Senior Commercial Support Specialist in the Relationship Support Unit ("RSU"). (Id. ¶ 4.) In this position, plaintiff's responsibilities included providing clerical support for lending officers by processing loan documentation. (Id. ¶ 5; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 5.) Two other employees, Noel Tam and Pui Lau, were also employed in the RSU in the same position as plaintiff. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 9.)

From 1999 until plaintiff's termination, Michelle Lin was the RSU Manager and plaintiffs direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 6.) Joanne Carboneri was also employed in the RSU as a Relationship Support Officer and was in charge of the RSU when Ms. Lin was absent. (Id. ¶ 8.) During the same period of time, Philip Panarelli was the Senior Manager of HSBC's Commercial Lending Group. (Id. ¶ 7.) He oversaw the RSU and was Ms. Lin's direct supervisor. (Id.)

2. Plaintiff's Disability Leaves

In June 2000, plaintiff took a two-month disability leave from work due to depression. (Id. ¶ 10.) In 2002, plaintiff took another two-month disability leave due to her depression. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff returned to work thereafter and alleges that she did not experience symptoms of depression immediately following her return. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 12.) In January 2005, plaintiff took a third disability leave for depression. She returned to work in April 2005. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 13.) Again, at the time of her return, plaintiff did not experience symptoms of depression. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 14.)

When plaintiff was on leave due to depression, she alleges that she was unable to leave her house, was unable to eat or sleep, and unable to "function" generally when experiencing symptoms of her disability. (Id. ¶ 15; Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 15.)

3. Plaintiff's Performance

As plaintiff's supervisor, Ms. Lin was responsible for evaluating plaintiff's performance at HSBC. Ms. Lin rated plaintiff with an overall performance rating of "3," or "Good," on her 2003 evaluation but rated plaintiff as a "4," or "Marginal," rating for cooperation. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 16; Declaration of Michelle Lin (hereinafter "Lin Dec.") ¶ 3.)

On January 30, 2004, Ms. Lin requested that plaintiff clean out a closet so that it could be used to store files. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 17.) Defendant alleges that plaintiff "refused" to clean out the closet (id.), but plaintiff alleges that she told Ms. Lin she "was unable to" clean out the closet due to a severe dust allergy, which plaintiff claims to have discussed with Ms. Lin on several prior occasions. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 17; compare Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18 with Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Lin "never asked plaintiff's co-workers to clean closets." (Id. ¶ 18.) On February 5, 2004, plaintiff received a "Final Written Warning" from Ms. Lin during her employee interim job discussion, which appeared to be related to the dispute regarding Ms. Lin's directive to clean out the closet. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Final Written Warning also referenced a discussion that Ms. Lin had with plaintiff in September 2003, regarding plaintiffs conduct toward her coworkers and Ms. Lin. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiff thereafter submitted a written response to the warning. (Id. ¶ 20.)

According to plaintiff, on April 5, 2004, she received a second interim job discussion, which indicated that her probation period due to the Final Written Warning ended effective April 5, 2004, that her performance had improved, that she had demonstrated teamwork on a daily basis, and that she was removed from the Final Written Warning. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 21.)

On plaintiff's May 2005 evaluation for the 2004 work year, Ms. Lin rated plaintiff with an overall performance rating of "3," or "Good," but rated her score for cooperation a "4," or "Marginal." (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 22.)

In July and September 2005, plaintiff and Ms. Lin had meetings regarding plaintiff's lateness to work, the nature of which is disputed by the parties. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 23-25; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 23-25.) According to defendant, Ms. Lin told plaintiff that it was unacceptable to come to work late, but plaintiff continued to come to work late on occasion. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 23-24.) Defendant alleges that one incident involved plaintiff reporting to work twenty minutes late. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that she was rarely late but, if late, she would make up the time on her lunch break. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Lin told plaintiff it was unacceptable to make up lost time due to lateness during her lunch break. Regarding the specific incident where plaintiff was twenty minutes late, plaintiff alleges that she arrived late to work one morning due to problems with a squirrel in her attic. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff contends that she apologized and explained her tardiness to Joanne Carboneri, and Ms. Carboneri reported this incident to Ms. Lin. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff was subsequently reprimanded by Ms. Lin for the lateness. (Id.) According to defendant, plaintiff walked out of the September 2005 meeting regarding her consistent tardiness before it ended (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 26), but plaintiff alleges that she left the meeting "after Ms. Lin refused to speak with her privately." (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 26.)

Subsequently, on September 12, 2005, Ms. Lin gave plaintiff an interim job discussion, at which she told plaintiff that she had been reporting to work late and that she was required to report to work by 8:30 a.m. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 27.) Defendant also asserts that, some time in 2005, plaintiff did not process a document in a timely manner. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff claims that she did not receive the document in the proper manner that she usually received time-sensitive documents but does not dispute that she did not process the document that day. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 28.) During the 2005 mid-year review, plaintiff told Ms. Lin that Ms. Lin was "twisting" her words, and plaintiff accused Ms. Lin of stabbing plaintiff in the back. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 29.) Ms. Lin rated plaintiff with an overall performance rating of "4," or "Marginal," on plaintiff's 2005 evaluation, which plaintiff received in January 2006. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 30.) Plaintiff submitted a written response to her 2005 evaluation. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that her negative 2005 evaluation resulted in her not receiving a pay increase or bonus for...

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