McCoy v. Com.
| Citation | 2 Va.App. 309,343 S.E.2d 383 |
| Decision Date | 06 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 0285-85,0285-85 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Virginia |
| Parties | Ephrim L. McCOY v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record |
Boyd Scarborough (Griffin, Pappas & Scarborough, Portsmouth, on brief), for appellant.
Lucy H. Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William G. Broaddus, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Present: BAKER, BARROW and HODGES, JJ.
Ephrim L. McCoy, the appellant, was convicted in the trial court of possession of cocaine and possession of heroin. The dispositive question in this appeal is whether McCoy had standing to attack the validity of a search of an apartment in which he was a visitor. We find that he did not and affirm.
On September 6, 1984, Detective K.E. O'Brien of the Portsmouth Vice and Narcotics Squad obtained a search warrant for the premises at 3019 Turnpike Road in Portsmouth, Virginia. The premises were leased in the name of Chandra Tyson, alias Pony. Detective O'Brien and two other detectives made a no-knock entry through the front door by use of a steel battering ram. A fourth officer, Detective Young, went to the back door. Seconds after Young heard the noise emanating from the front of the building, appellant and Eddie Tyson attempted to exit from the rear door. Young identified himself as a police officer and the two men ran back inside pursued by the detective. While in pursuit, Young saw appellant throw several yellow capsules from his right hand into the kitchen sink. After appellant was apprehended, Young ladled thirteen capsules from the sink and found one capsule on a dish cloth. Young also removed one hundred eighty dollars in U.S. Currency from appellant's left hand.
At trial appellant moved to suppress the admission of the capsules into evidence. He testified that he had visited the premises where he was arrested on one occasion prior to his arrest on September 6, 1984. On both occasions, he was permitted to enter by Eddie Tyson after knocking on the front door. He knew that Chandra Tyson and her brother, Eddie, occupied the apartment. The appellant stated that he expected privacy while on the premises. Detective O'Brien testified, however, that the apartment was not used as a private residence, but solely as a distribution center for drugs.
The motion to suppress was overruled and the drugs and the certificate of the chemical analysis were received into evidence. The analysis showed the capsules contained both heroin and cocaine.
In order to obtain protection against unreasonable search and seizures, appellant bears the burden of proving that he has standing to assert the constitutional right. Abell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 607, 614, 272 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1980). Until Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) was overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), anyONE LEGITIMATELY ON THE PREMISES searched who was charged with a possessory crime had automatic standing to challenge the legality of that search. "[D]efendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated." Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85, 100 S.Ct. at 2549. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966-67, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). The test is whether the appellant objectively had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and place of the disputed search. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In making the analysis the court looks to the "totality-of-the-circumstances." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).
In examining what circumstances may be considered the court in United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1721, 72 L.Ed.2d 140 (1982) said:
[F]actors to be weighed include whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched, whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he...
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Josephs v. Com., 0423-87-2
...in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2554, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); see also McCoy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 309, 311, 343 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1986). Our interest lies in the second alternative--the legitimacy of presence at the location of a search. The Jones Court No......
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White v. Commonwealth
...on the premises.” United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir.1981), quoted with approval in McCoy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 309, 312, 343 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1986). Whether the defendant had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy “based on a property interest or other soc......
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Atkins v. Commonwealth Of Va., Record No. 1864-09-1.
...appellant objectively had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and place of the disputed search.” McCoy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 309, 311, 343 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1986). In determining whether an expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, a court looks to the totality of th......
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Logan v. Com.
...(apartment hallway); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir.1976) (apartment garage). V. In McCoy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 309, 312, 343 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1986), this Court held that the defendant visiting in an apartment did not therein have such a reasonable expectation ......