McCoy v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 03 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 4621.,4621.
• Citation: McCoy v. District of Columbia, 256 A.2d 908 (D.C. 1969)
• Parties: Marie L. McCOY, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

256 A.2d 908

Marie L. McCOY, Appellant, v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 4621.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 30, 1969.

Decided October 3, 1969.

Albert N. Lobl, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp.Counsel, with whom Charles T. Duncan, Corp.Counsel, Hubert B. Pair, PrincipalAsst. Corp.Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp.Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and FICKLING and NEBEKER, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment based on a finding that appellant was not the common-law wife, and thus, is not the widow of the late Hurland T. McCoy.The finding operates to deny appellant her claim against the District of Columbia for salary and annual leave unpaid to Mr. McCoy at the time of his death.

In her effort to prove existence of her common-law marriage, the appellant testified that she"married" Mr. McCoy in August, 1947.¹The balance of her testimony was an effort to demonstrate absence of any impediment to the asserted marriage, cohabitation and a general community reputation reflecting a marital state.Numerous documents were introduced to aid in establishing such a reputation or a mutual holding out to the public that the two were husband and wife.

That common-law marriages are recognized as lawful in the District of Columbia is clear.²However, it is equally clear that the proof of such a relationship must derive from evidence

that the parties cohabited as husband and wife in good faith, that is, that the cohabitation followed an express mutual agreement to be husband and wife.United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 61, 269 F.2d 249, 252(1959).

See alsoHoage v. Murch Bros. Const. Co., 60 App.D.C. 218, 50 F.2d 983(1931), which requires that the agreement be "per verba praesenti."A careful examination of the record fails to disclose any evidence relating to such an agreement.Presumably, if there was an agreement, appellant could have testified to that effect.

Moreover, it cannot validly be contended on this record that existence of such an agreement can be inferred from proof of cohabitation and reputation.While it is true that when neither of the parties is available as a witness the requisite agreement might, through inference, be established from cohabitation and reputation, it is the law in the District of Columbia that

* * * when one of the parties to the alleged marriage asserts its existence but * * * denies or fails to say there was mutual consent or agreement then mere cohabitation, even though followed by reputation, will not justify an inference of mutual consent or agreement to be married.United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton, supra, (emphasis supplied).

See also the cases cited and quoted in n. 3 of that opinion.Accordingly, the record not only supports the finding of the trial court, it compels such a finding.

An additional comment by way of conclusion appears warranted in view of present-day sensitivity to many problems of community life.As the court observed in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton, supra at 60, 269 F.2d 249, there is no statute in the District of Columbia on the subject of common-law marriage.Accordingly, such a status is the product of an antiquated law and inattention to whether there is a need for a change.It cannot be gainsaid that few people really understand that such a marriage requires more than mere cohabitation...