McCoy v. Goord
| Citation | 255 F.Supp.2d 233 |
| Decision Date | 25 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01 Civ. 3133(DC).,01 Civ. 3133(DC). |
| Parties | Johnny McCOY, Plaintiff, v. Glenn S. GOORD, Commissioner, Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Johnny McCoy, Boydton, VA, Pro se, Plaintiff.
Eliot Spitzer, Esq., Attorney General of the State of New York by Lisa E. Fleischmann, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, New York City, for Defendants.
Johnny McCoy brings this pro se § 1983 civil rights action against twenty-six officials and employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). McCoy alleges numerous violations of his constitutional rights, including threats, beatings, and the denial of proper medical care, while incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing"). Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PLRA") and, as to certain defendants, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
McCoy's 122-paragraph complaint asserts claims based on nine incidents. On its face, the complaint alleges that McCoy filed grievances with respect to some but not all of the incidents, and the complaint does not report the results of the grievance proceedings, other than to allege that the grievance personnel did "Nothing!" Materials extrinsic to the complaint indicate that McCoy filed as many as nine grievances, although some of the grievances were based on the same incident. Defendants have also submitted an affidavit stating that a search of DOCS records reveals that McCoy did not appeal with respect to any grievance.
A host of questions are presented by the exhaustion issue: Is the exhaustion requirement jurisdictional? Or is failure to exhaust an affirmative defense? Must exhaustion be pleaded in the complaint? Is a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust addressed solely to the complaint? Or may extrinsic materials be considered? May unexhausted claims be considered on the merits? If the statute of limitations is an issue, is it tolled while the plaintiff is exhausting unexhausted claims? What happens if, as a practical matter, plaintiff cannot exhaust before the statute of limitations expires? Can procedural errors, such as missed administrative deadlines that render future exhaustion impossible, effectively bar an inmate from a federal court remedy?
As this case demonstrates, the PLRA's "enigmatic" exhaustion requirement,1 intended to reduce the perceived burdensome flow of prisoner litigation, has had the "perverse effectf ]" of generating extensive litigation.2 Indeed, the law on the narrow subject of the PLRA's exhaustion requirements continues to evolve month by month.
For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed. Although plaintiffs failure to fully exhaust is not plain from the face of the complaint, because he has been given notice and an opportunity to be heard, I treat this motion as a summary judgment motion and consider extrinsic materials submitted by both sides. Based on these materials, I conclude that plaintiff has not fully exhausted any of his claims. Next, as mandated by the PLRA, I consider whether McCoy's complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. I find that, with two exceptions, it does not. I conclude the complaint sufficiently pleads only two claims of excessive force. Although it appears that the statute of limitations will expire with respect to those claims shortly, the Court does not have the power to stay the action until McCoy can exhaust. Rather, it appears that dismissal is the only option, even though, as a practical matter, McCoy is not likely to be able to exhaust before the statute of limitations expires. Accordingly, the excessive force claims are dismissed without prejudice; the remainder of the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
The facts as summarized below are drawn from the complaint. For purposes of this motion, I assume the allegations are true.
Although McCoy is now incarcerated in Virginia, all events relevant to the complaint took place at Sing Sing from December 1996 through July 1998. On July 10, 1998, McCoy was transferred from Sing Sing to Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport").
McCoy names twenty-six defendants in the caption of his complaint. During McCoy's incarceration, defendants Moo-Young, Bedford, Cruz, Ramirez, Viviano, Gilchrist, Evans, Rios, and Paroline were employed as corrections officers by DOCS, assigned to Sing Sing.3 Defendant Murray was also employed by DOCS and was assigned to Sing Sing as a sergeant at that time. Defendants O'Brien, Aitcherson, Rivera, and DelSantos worked in Sing Sing Mental Health Services, while defendants Gross, Halko, and Figueroa were members of Sing Sing's medical staff. Defendants Goord and Greiner are the Commissioner of DOCS and Superintendent of Sing Sing, respectively. Also named as defendants are the Sing Sing Mental Health Staff, Sing Sing Medical Staff, and various John and Jane Does.
While imprisoned at Sing Sing, McCoy maintains that he was assaulted twice, verbally harassed, denied medical and mental health treatment, and subjected to fabricated disciplinary reports. McCoy claims these acts were part of a conspiracy of retaliation for a lawsuit, still pending in Bronx County, stemming from an April 1996 assault by officers at Rikers Island during a previous term of incarceration. (Compl.f I-B).
On January 22, 1997, McCoy sought counseling from Sing Sing Mental Health Services. His psychologist, defendant O'Brien, displayed an immediate prejudice against him, accusing him of being "highly litigious" and failing to help him "ascertain peace within the depressive state that dominated his inner soul." (Compl.lff 5-6, 8, 12). McCoy had another session with O'Brien on March 18, 1997. (Compl. ¶¶ 23). Later, upon gaining access to his mental health records in October 1998 after he was transferred to Southport, McCoy learned that O'Brien had noted during that session, "[h]e appears to be rationalizing Mental Health Services in a manipulative fashion for possible future litigation and/or immediate gratification." (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 116).
At his request, McCoy began seeing a new psychologist, defendant Aitcherson, on September 25, 1997. While initially helpful, Aitcherson later "biasly analyzed [McCoy's] disposition and character as being one of aggression." (Compl. ¶¶ 48-49, 52). During four other sessions between November 1997 and February 1998, McCoy tried to "express the displacency [sic] he was housed with," but Aitcherson disregarded his complaints, writing in his file that McCoy was a "psycho." (Compl.¶¶ 59-62,115).
On August 14, 1997, after passing out and complaining of amnesia, McCoy was interviewed by defendant Rivera. Rivera, "neglecting the seriousness of [his] amnesia," sent McCoy back to his cell, where he "could have been subjected to any type [of] physical abuse and/or death ... in that precarious state of being." (Compl. ¶¶ 41-43). Rivera also noted that McCoy appeared to be feigning amnesia. (Compl.¶ 42).
On the morning of January 23, 1998, McCoy was in a stairwell waiting to be pat-frisked by Officer Moo-Young before proceeding to the yard for recreation period. Sgt. Murray was assigned to supervise the pat-frisk and recreation period. Officers Cruz, Bedford, and Ramirez were also present. Moo-Young asked McCoy to lay his hands flat on the wall for the patfrisk and immediately pushed the base of McCoy's back, pressing him against the wall. He then grabbed McCoy's feet to pull him off the wall. McCoy would have fallen to the floor if he had not grabbed onto the "boiling pipes" above him. (Compl. ¶¶ 83-85). Cruz and Bedford tried to get McCoy off the pipes by punching him in the head and upper body while he hung for about ten minutes, "four feet off the ground in a horizontal position." (Compl. ¶¶ 86-88). Murray did nothing to stop the officers, but instead "aided and abetted" them by hiding around the corner. (Compl. ¶¶ 78, 109). Finally, several sergeants arrived at the scene and handcuffed McCoy. (Compl. ¶¶ 92-95).
McCoy was later treated in the emergency room for various injuries, including second-degree burns to his right tricep resulting from his contact with the boiling pipes. (Compl. ¶¶ 100-01). The defendants involved in this incident then filed an assault on staff charge against McCoy. In February 1998, the charge was dismissed. (Compl. ¶ 99).
McCoy alleges that on March 12, 1998, Murray "threatened] to assault" him, telling him that "it was not over, and that [he] and his correctional officers were going to hospitaliz[e][him]." (McCoy Letter of 6/20/02, at 2). That same day, McCoy filed a grievance regarding this incident. (Id.).
On March 17, 1998, McCoy was on his way to his housing block after recreation period when Officers Viviano, Gilchrist, Paroline, and Evans jumped him. In front of other inmates and staff, the officers forced him to the ground, handcuffed him, and led him to the commissary. After clearing the area of any witnesses, the officers threw McCoy face down on the floor and beat him until he resembled "the elephant man." (Compl. ¶ 17). As a result, McCoy sustained injuries to his right thigh and "tremendous facial trauma." (Compl.1 IV-A). Officer Rios was assigned to the commissary post at that time, but was not involved in the assault. (Compl ¶ 117).
Following this incident, McCoy was charged with several disciplinary infractions,...
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