McCoy v. Houston ex rel. Bernalillo Cnty. Sheriff's Office & the Bd. of Cnty. Commissioniers
| Decision Date | 13 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No: 16cv1377 MCA/LF,: 16cv1377 MCA/LF |
| Parties | MATTHEW MCCOY, Plaintiff, v. DAN HOUSTON, in his individual capacity, MANUAL GONZALES, III, in his individual capacity, RUDY MORA, in his individual capacity, LIEUTENANT PETE GOLDEN, in his individual capacity, BERNALILLO COUNTY, ex rel. THE BERNALILLO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE and THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONIERS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 58]. The Court has considered the parties' submissions and the relevant law, and is otherwise fully informed. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART Defendants' Motion.
Plaintiff began working for the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office (BCSO) in 2000 as a cadet. He was promoted to Sergeant in 2013. [Defs' Statement of Material Facts (SMF) ¶ 1; Pltf's Response, ¶ 1] In December 2012, Plaintiffs obtained a position through which he worked for the Village of Los Ranchos in addition to BCSO. [Defs' SMF ¶ 2; Pltfs' Response, ¶ 2] From December 2013 through February 2014, Plaintiff submitted overtime requests in advance to Chief Deputy Katz for his approval. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 3; Pltf's Response, ¶ 3] Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not dispute, that after Chief Deputy Katz retired, Plaintiff submitted his timesheets to Wendy Jiacoletti, who said she would obtain approval signatures. [Pltf's Response, ¶ 3]
A. Campaign Contributions and the 2014 Election
2014 was an election year for the position of Sheriff of Bernalillo County. [Defs SMF, ¶ 5; Pltf's Response, ¶ 5] Plaintiff was a supporter of then incumbent Sheriff Dan Houston: he worked on Houston's campaign putting up signs and donated $250 to Houston's campaign. [Depo of M. McCoy, p.63, 1.6 through p.64, 1.18; Defs' SMF, ¶ 6; Pltf's Response, ¶ 6] Following Houston's loss in the primary election in June of 2014, Plaintiff became a supporter of candidate Scott Baird but did not actively work on his campaign. He donated $100 in the form of an advertisement. [Depo of M. McCoy, Doc. 59-1, 64:1-25 to 66:1-3; Defs' SMF, ¶ 7; Pltf's Response, ¶ 7] The donation was reported in a Campaign Finance Report on the New Mexico Secretary of State's website on October 14, 2014. [Pltf's Response, ¶ 12; Defs' Reply, ¶ 5]
Scott Baird was defeated by Defendant Manuel Gonzales, III. [Defs' SMF ¶ 21; Pltf's Response, ¶ 21] Defendant Mora became Undersheriff after Defendant Gonzales took office in January 2015. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 21; Pltf's Response, ¶ 21]
B. Incidents Leading to an Internal Affairs Investigation of Plaintiff
In August 2014, Plaintiff was working security for an event at the Journal Pavilion. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 9; Pltf's Response, ¶ 9] He was driving an unmarked "black Charger." [Id.] On the way home, BCSO deputies saw the vehicle and followed him.When Plaintiff learned through a call from another officer that he was being pursued, he turned on the emergency lights and pulled over. [Id.] The two officers drove by and did not make contact with him. [Id.] Later that evening, the BCSO officers went to Plaintiffs' house, but Plaintiff declined to speak with them and instead wanted to speak to the Lieutenant or Sergeant on duty. [Id.] He eventually spoke to the acting Sergeant on duty, Sergeant Primazon.1 The deputies reported during the IA investigation that they had observed the black Charger going over 100 MPH and nearly hitting a curb. [Defs' Exh B; Defs' SMF, ¶ 9] Plaintiff disputes that he was speeding or driving erratically. [Pltf's Response, ¶ 9]
Defendant Houston was informed of the August, 2014 incident two months later on October 31, 2014 (i.e., seventeen days after the Campaign Finance Report reflecting Plaintiff's donation to Scott Baird was made public). [Defs' SMF, ¶ 10; Pltf's Response, ¶ 10] In the course of considering the August incident, Defendant Houston inquired into Plaintiff's supervisors and time cards. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 12; Pltf's Response, ¶ 12 ()] In so doing, Houston discovered that the signatures on some of Plaintiff's time cards were not authentic. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 13-14; Pltf's Response, ¶ 13-14] Defendant Houston ordered an IA investigation into both the August incident and "questionable time card submissions by [P]laintiff." [Defs' SMF, ¶ 15; Pltf's Response, ¶ 15]
C. The Internal Affairs Investigation, Criminal Investigation, and Submission of the LEA 90
Defendant Golden issued a "target letter" to Plaintiff the same day the IA investigation was ordered by Defendant Houston (October 31, 2014) and began investigating the allegations. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 16; Pltf's Response, ¶ 16] In April 2015, the BCSO White Collar Crimes Unit also opened an investigation. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 17; Pltf's Response, ¶ 17] In February, 2016, Defendant Mora submitted an "LEA 90," a form used to report alleged misconduct, was submitted to the Law Enforcement Academy. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 18; Doc. 59-6, Mora Depo, 55:20-56:21; Doc. 62-3, 55:2 - 556:1]
D. Investigations of Other Officers
Finally, the parties do not dispute that some BCSO supervisors were investigated for allegations of time card fraud in 2010, that both IA and criminal investigations were conducted, and that the criminal investigation was referred to the District Attorney. [Defs' SMF, ¶¶ 11; Pltf's Response, ¶¶ 11] In addition, they do not dispute that another deputy was investigated in 2016 for being untruthful with regard to time reporting, among other things. Both IA and criminal investigations were conducted. [Defs' SMF, ¶ 25; Pltf's Response, ¶ 25] The criminal investigation was referred to the District Attorney for review, and an LEA 90 was submitted. [Id.]
Additional facts are included in the Court's discussion of the parties' arguments.
Defendants move for summary judgment on some claims and request dismissal of other claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material factand the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this Rule, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Rather, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. Generally, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). The moving party need not negate the nonmovant's claim, but rather must show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must show that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). The nonmoving party cannot rely upon conclusory allegations or contentions of counsel to defeat summary judgment, see Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th Cir. 1988), but rather must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the responding party fails to properly address the movant's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), a district court may "grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the factsconsidered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Upon a motion for summary judgment, a district court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Kaus v. Standard Ins. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1997).
The Court's review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) focuses on the sufficiency of the complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to set out "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court held that "to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must have enough allegations of fact, taken as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In applying this test, a court accepts as true all "plausible, non-conclusory, and non-speculative" facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011), but does not accept as true any legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). In short, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court should disregard all conclusory statements of law and consider whether the remaining specific factual allegations, if assumed to be true, plausibly suggest the defendant is liable." Collins, 656 F.3d at 1214.
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges "42 U.S.C. § 1983 Constitutional Deprivations Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Houston, Gonzales, Mora, and Golden for Retaliation for Lawful Speech and Political...
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