McCoy v. Lyons

• Docket Number: 18169.
• Decision Date: 25 October 1991
• Citation: 120 Idaho 765,820 P.2d 360
• Parties: Agnes McCOY, Paul McCoy, Gregory McCoy, Justin McCoy, Abraham McCoy, Pauline Luke, Mary Louise Luke, Cecille Luke, Mary Doreen Luke White, and Rudy Luke, individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James F. LYONS, an individual, and James F. Lyons of the law firm of Nixon, Nixon, Lyons and Douglas, P.C., a professional corporation in the state of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent, and Frank LeRoux an individual; Frank LeRoux, d/b/a Ball Creek Ranch, Defendant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

120 Idaho 765

820 P.2d 360

Agnes McCOY, Paul McCoy, Gregory McCoy,

No. 18169.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Coeur d'Alene

April 1991 Term

October 25, 1991

Fred W. Gabourie, Sr., Plummer, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for defendant-respondent.Ausey H. Robnett, III argued.

BOYLE, Justice.

In this appeal from a summary judgment granted by the district court in an action alleging fraud, and other claims, we are called upon to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted.We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for trial on the remaining issues.

I.

According to the record,¹the plaintiffs in this appeal, members of the Luke and McCoy families, are all members of the Kootenai Indian tribe and residents of Canada in British Columbia.They are the heirs of Joseph Chiqui, a chief of the Indian tribe who resided in the United States on a reservation near Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho.

Chiqui died of natural causes in Bonners Ferry in September, 1974.Before his death, Chiqui inherited undivided fractional interests in five parcels of land, held in trust for him by the United States, by virtue of his status as an enrolled American Indian.Chiqui died testate but his will was disapproved by the U.S. Department of the Interior due to a technical violation of the regulatory scheme applicable to American Indians.²

As a result, on March 24, 1976, the Office of Hearings and Appeals of the U.S. Department of the Interior conducted a hearing to determine the heirs of the decedent, Joseph Chiqui.The defendant-respondent in this appeal, attorney James F. Lyons, appeared at that hearing on behalf of three persons—David Luke, Alice Shottana, and Baptiste Cutsack—who claimed to be heirs of Chiqui.The administrative law judge determined at that hearing that these persons lacked sufficient evidence of their relationship to Chiqui and gave them 60 days to produce such evidence.

On June 24, 1976, the administrative law judge issued an order determining the heirs of the estate.This order was not based on any information produced by Lyons.The administrative order stated: "This decision, insofar as heirship interests are concerned, is based solely upon records of the Northern Idaho Indian Agency as no one appeared at the time and place set for the hearing able to provide data essential to the family history of the deceased, nor has anyone so capable been identified thereto."Of the three persons Lyons had represented at the hearing, only David Luke was ultimately determined to be an heir of Chiqui.

Because the United States has no trust obligation to Canadian Indians, the plaintiff-heir's interests in the Chiqui estate were issued as alienable patents in fee.With the exception of David Luke, Lyons did not represent the thirteen heirs³ identified in the original order prior to the time it was issued.Nevertheless, on October 22, 1976, David Luke signed a fee agreement which provided that Lyons represented all of the heirs and that each of the heirs owed Lyons a fee.By April 30, 1977, the plaintiff-heirs signed documents at Lyons' office which indicated that they"would have received no interest in said estate or been declared an heir but for the efforts of [Lyon's law firm] under the employment agreement with David Luke."

The record raises questions of fact and contains seven allegations that Lyons arranged the sale of the Chiqui estate to Frank LeRoux doing business as Ball Creek Ranch while also representing the heirs in the sale.The amended verified complaint filed by the plaintiff-heirs alleges that Lyons had represented LeRoux in land transactions and other business matters prior to this sale.The record established, for purposes of summary judgment, that Lyons never informed the heirs that he represented LeRoux and there is nothing in the record before us indicating consent was obtained from the heirs allowing Lyons to represent both parties in the land sale transaction.

According to the heirs' depositions, Lyons notified them that they could obtain cash proceeds from a transaction on the Chiqui property by traveling to Bonners Ferry to sign the necessary paperwork.The heirs signed the deeds related to their land interests, but to varying degrees the depositions indicate several of the heirs did not fully understand what they were signing.According to the depositions, some thought the transaction was a sale and another thought it was a lease.All testified Lyons was not present to answer the heirs' questions before they signed the deeds, and when construed in a light most favorable to appellants, Lyons never explained to the plaintiff-heirs the significance of the agreements and deeds which they signed.

In addition, the record supports appellants' position that Lyons did not inform the plaintiff-heirs of an appraisal on the Chiqui property made by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1975 for the purpose of fixing probate fees or the 1976 administrative order which accepted the appraised value.Because Lyons had allegedly received the appraisal and the administrative order prior to the sale, the heirs alleged in the verified complaint that Lyons knew that the sales price arranged with LeRoux was grossly inadequate because it amounted to only a fraction of the appraised value.⁴

Christopher Luke, the chief of the Kootenai tribe and not a party to this suit, became aware of the price for which the land was sold to LeRoux in April, 1977.He contacted a barrister from Cranbrook, British Columbia, Canada, named Harvey Gansner who wrote Lyons on April 14, 1977 inquiring about the adequacy of the price and other aspects of the transaction.⁵

Lyons responded to Gansner's letter two weeks later,⁶ and asserted that but for his efforts the heirs would have received nothing.

In December of 1978, Gansner arranged with Tony Shelton, an attorney in Bonners Ferry, who agreed to take over the matter for Luke.When Lyons forwarded the file material to Shelton, he also wrote a letter to Chief Christopher Luke explaining that Shelton would contact him and that "[u]ntil then there is nothing further for you to do."On April 21, 1980, sixteen months after receiving the file, Shelton forwarded the file to Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc.On October 26, 1981, Legal Aid filed the heirs' verified amended complaint alleging causes of action based upon negligence and fraud theories.⁷

On June 26, 1987, Lyons filed a motion seeking summary judgment.On March 13, 1989, a hearing was held on the motion.After hearing oral arguments the district court advised the parties it would grant the motion for summary judgment.The subsequent written order indicated that the facts that form the basis of the complaint occurred prior to April, 1977 and that the complaint was filed "more than two years after the occurrence, act or omission of which they complain."The court also indicated that "the Plaintiffs did not submit affidavits, depositions or other evidence in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment which would establish an issue of fact regarding the Defendant's statute of limitations defense."As a result, the district court entered summary judgment for Lyons on the basis that the plaintiff-heirs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.This appeal followed.

II.

A motion for summary judgment"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."I.R.C.P. 56(c).Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876(1991);G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851(1991);Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37(1990);Olsen v. J.A. Freeman, 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285(1990);Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022(1987);Rawson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742(1986);Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238(1986);Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900(1985);Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923(1982);Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350(1982);Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 P.2d 402(1979);Farmers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150(1976);Ed Sparks & Sons v. Joe Campbell Constr. Co., 96 Idaho 454, 530 P.2d 938(1974);Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654, 516 P.2d 1168(1973);Stewart v. Hood Corp., 95 Idaho 198, 506 P.2d 95(1973);Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442(1968);Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428 P.2d 524(1967);Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 95(1965);Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 406 P.2d 805(1965);Jack v. Fillmore, 85 Idaho 36, 375 P.2d 321(1962);Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 353 P.2d 657(1960).As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary judgment, all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851(1991);Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37(1990);Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022(1987);Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238(1986);Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923(1982);Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350(1982).The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851(1991);Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868-69, 452 P.2d 362, 365-66(1969);Christiansen v. Rumsey, 91 Idaho 684, 429 P.2d 416(1967).This burden is onerous because even "[c]ircumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact."Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238(1986);Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868-69,...