McCoy v. McCoy

• Decision Date: 12 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 3087-08-3.,03 August 3087
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: Charles Clifford McCOY v. Lisa Collins McCOY.

687 S.E.2d 82

55 Va. App. 524

Charles Clifford McCOY v. Lisa Collins McCOY.

Record No. 3087-08-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Salem.

January 12, 2010.

Robert M. Galumbeck (Galumbeck, Dennis & Kegley, Attorneys, Wytheville, on briefs), for appellant.

Richard A. Forster (James R. Henderson, IV; Henderson & Forster, PLLC, Tazewell, on briefs), for appellee.

Present: McCLANAHAN, HALEY and BEALES, JJ.

BEALES, Judge.

Charles Clifford McCoy (husband) appeals from an order finding him in civil contempt for refusing to provide health insurance to Lisa Collins McCoy (wife) as provided under an agreement that was incorporated into their final decree of divorce. He argues that the health insurance provision is a form of spousal support and, thus, he was no longer obligated to provide the insurance after wife remarried. We agree with the trial court that this provision in the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA), as incorporated into the final decree of divorce, is not spousal support, and, therefore, husband was in contempt of court when he stopped providing health insurance for wife.

I. BACKGROUND

Husband and wife were divorced in May 2001. Prior to the divorce, on November 11, 2000, they signed a PSA, which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The PSA was divided into sections. In Section III, "Spousal Support, Maintenance & Alimony," husband waived all rights to spousal support without condition. In this same section, wife "specifically release[d] and indemnifie[d] the Husband from any and all claims for her support and maintenance as his Wife, provided that the Husband shall, at all times, perform his obligations as stated in this Agreement. ..." This section then provides that husband will not be allowed to discharge his obligations under the agreement through bankruptcy proceedings.

In the next sections, husband takes responsibility for various marital debts and the mortgage on the marital home while wife continues to live there, and he also obligates himself to make various payments to wife or see that she receives the value of particular assets.

In Section VI, labeled "Insurance," husband is obligated to "maintain health insurance of like quality of the Wife as she currently enjoys until she obtains employment offering comparable insurance."

Aside from one earlier period of non-payment, which is not involved in the appeal here, husband paid wife's health insurance premiums until May 2006, at which time he stopped. Wife continued to pay the premiums so that the insurance would not lapse. Wife then remarried in the fall of 2007.

Wife filed a show cause against husband for his failure to provide health insurance. After hearings on the issues, the trial court issued a letter opinion on May 8, 2008, finding that the PSA was not ambiguous and that both parties had waived spousal support in the agreement. The trial court, however, concluded that the health insurance provision was not spousal support; therefore, wife's remarriage did not nullify husband's obligation to provide and pay for the insurance. The court then entered an order on November 24, 2008, finding husband in contempt and sentencing him to six months in jail unless he purged himself of the contempt by paying wife for the premums that she paid, taking over the premium payments for the insurance, and paying wife's attorney's fees and costs.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Mootness

During oral argument in this case, husband informed this Court that, after he had noted his appeal of the November 24, 2008 contempt order, he had moved the trial court to vacate the contempt order, contending that wife had perpetrated a fraud on the court. The trial court then apparently heard argument on husband's motion and ultimately entered an order on March 26, 2009 that vacated the November 24, 2008 order. This order of the trial court did not simply stay enforcement of the contempt order or the final decree. Instead, the March 26, 2009 order explicitly "vacated" the "prior orders" that had been entered in the contempt proceeding (which would necessarily include the contempt order that husband appealed to this Court) and set a hearing date for April 22, 2009. Neither the trial court nor husband petitioned this Court for authority to enter the March 26, 2009 order.¹ Husband now claims the March 26, 2009 order made the earlier November 24, 2008 order a nullity, and, therefore, this appeal is moot. See Spotsylvania County Sch. Bd. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 243 Va. 202, 219, 415 S.E.2d 120, 130 (1992) (explaining that moot issues may not be considered on appeal).

While husband concedes that the November 24, 2008 order was appealable to this Court, he argues that the November 24, 2008 order was not a final order, so the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over this case and, therefore, acted within its authority when it vacated that order.² However whether or not the November 24, 2008 order was final or interlocutory, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to vacate that order once husband noted his appeal to this Court.

When a party files a notice of appeal, that notice "effectively transfers jurisdiction from the lower court to the appellate court and places the named parties within the jurisdiction of the appellate court." Watkins v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 42 Va.App. 760, 771, 595 S.E.2d 19, 25 (2004). As the Supreme Court of Virginia explained, "The orderly administration of justice demands that when an appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the parties involved in litigation and the subject matter of their controversy, the jurisdiction of the trial court from which the appeal was taken must cease." Greene v. Greene, 223 Va. 210, 212, 288 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1982); Frazer v. Frazer, 23 Va.App. 358, 379-80, 477 S.E.2d 290, 300 (1996) (finding the trial court lacked authority to modify a child support award after Mrs. Frazer had filed a notice appealing that award to this Court).

The trial court's March 26, 2009 order did not address a new enforcement action or stay enforcement of the contempt order pending the outcome of this appeal. Instead, the trial court actually withdrew the order that was appealed by appellant and was before this Court for consideration. Thus, the trial court simply did not have jurisdiction to enter the March 26, 2009 order³ vacating the finding of contempt entered on November 24, 2008. This Court, therefore, can proceed to rule on husband's appeal from the November 24, 2008 order as that order is not moot.

B. Health Insurance

Husband makes two arguments. First, he contends that the PSA unambiguously states that the providing of health insurance was a form of spousal support. Second, he contends that the trial court did not have the authority to order that he provide health insurance to wife.

The parties agree that the agreement is unambiguous, but disagree on what the agreement unambiguously intended. We agree with the parties and the trial court that the agreement was unambiguous. See Stacy v. Stacy, 53 Va.App. 38, 42 n. 3, 669 S.E.2d 348, 350 n. 3 (2008) (en banc) (noting that disagreements about the interpretation of a PSA do not require a finding that the PSA is ambiguous). However, we disagree with husband's interpretation of the PSA. Here, both the structure and the wording of the PSA clearly prove that husband's obligation to provide health insurance for wife was not a form of spousal support. See id. at 44, 669 S.E.2d at 350-51 (explaining that, when a PSA is plain and unambiguous, the courts must interpret the PSA as it is written).

First, the spousal support section and the insurance section are completely separate, with several sections regarding distribution of the marital assets and debt coming between them. Clearly, the insurance requirement is not included in the spousal support section — Section III of the PSA. Second, Section III, although using different wording for husband's waiver of support, clearly states that wife waives any request for support, except that she may request support if husband fails to fulfill his obligations under the PSA or attempts to discharge those...