McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 November 1934 |
| Docket Number | 18166. |
| Citation | 77 S.W.2d 175,229 Mo.App. 506 |
| Parties | JOHN A. McCOY, RESPONDENT, v. ST. JOSEPH BELT RAILWAY CO., APPELLANT |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1934.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Buchanan County.--Hon. Sam Wilcox Judge.
Action by John A. McCoy against St. Joseph Belt Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Randolph & Randolph and Nile Vermillion for respondent.
Brown Douglas & Brown for appellant.
Plaintiff, formerly employed as a switchman in the yards of defendant at St. Joseph, Missouri, brought this suit on April 14, 1933, to recover damages for an alleged violation of a written contract executed on March 10, 1928, in regard to his "seniority rights" in such employment, which governed his right to continue in such employment, and to be recalled thereto according to such seniority whenever and after he has been temporarily "laid off" on account of a slackening or less amount of business to be done in said yards.
After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of $ 3000 in plaintiff's favor, and judgment being rendered thereon, defendant appealed.
The contract sued on was executed March 10, 1928, as heretofore stated, by the president of the defendant, for said railroad on the one hand, and, for the yardmen, by a committee of three known as the "Grievance Committee" of the yardmen, that is, those who did the switching in the defendant's yards. These switchmen, called yardmen, constituted local lodge No. 92 of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (hereinafter for brevity called the B. R. T.). And the members of said local lodge No. 92 elected this "Grievance Committee" of the personnel required by the Constitution, and in accordance with, General Rule 1 of the Constitution and By-laws of the B. R. T. This committee dealt with the railway company concerning the following matters: What should constitute a day's work, the rate of pay therefor, the men's rights of seniority, their right to preference in work and promotion and the general working conditions in the yards.
Plaintiff entered defendant's employ as a switchman or yardman in 1918, and continued therein until sometime in April, 1932, when his employment ceased as hereinafter set forth. So that, at the time the contract herein sued on was executed, to-wit, March 10, 1928, plaintiff was in defendant's employ as a yardman as aforesaid and was a member of local lodge No. 92 of the B. R. T. The defendant railway company had been dealing in this manner with its yardmen, through such a committee, since plaintiff entered its employ in 1918.
The said contract entered into by the railway company and the above mentioned committee, contained, among many other things, the following provisions in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (m) of Article 12, to-wit:
. . .
. . .
"(m) This agreement supersedes all previous agreements and shall be in effect until March 10, 1929, and thereafter, subject to thirty days' notice by either party to the other of a desire to change or terminate the same or any part thereof."
Plaintiff alleged, and the evidence in his behalf clearly tended to show, that from and after the execution of said contract he worked thereunder and faithfully performed all his duties and services; was a competent and skillful employee of defendant and gained "a valuable seniority right thereunder" and that he was No. 17 on the "seniority list," and was never reprimanded nor complained against on account of the character of his work. This right of seniority not only entitled an employee to promotion in case, for any reason, the place held by the man ahead of him became vacant or he did not fill the same, but it also entitled the employee holding such seniority number to be called to employment in preference to anyone holding a lower number. In times when on account of a slack in work a man was not needed and was "laid off" temporarily, the place he occupied by reason of his seniority was still a valuable right since it governed his right to be recalled to work or preference therefor and also, perhaps, his rate of pay, if entitled to a promotion to a place of greater or higher rank than before. The contract guaranteed the employee the right to work according to his seniority in service and also provided that he would not be discharged without cause, or without a hearing. If dismissed or suspended, he was entitled to a hearing within five days, and, if upon a hearing, his dismissal or suspension was found to be unjust, he was to be reinstated and receive pay for all time so lost.
After said contract of March 10, 1928, was signed by the president of the railway company and the aforesaid committee, a copy thereof was sent to each yardman, including plaintiff, and from that time up to August 1, 1930, it was the contract under which the men worked, recognized as such by both the company and the men.
On August 1, 1930, a notice was posted by defendant in the yards that the management of the defendant company would be changed so that the Union Terminal Company (a switching company in St. Joseph), or the officials thereof, would take over the management of the yards of the defendant railway. The result was that defendant's employees became concerned or anxious about their status, or, as one of the witnesses put it, the employees were "wondering where we would wind up or what we were going to have left."
Thereupon, Clark (the chairman of the committee representing the groups of men working for the defendant railway), and Farmer, chairman of the committee for the men employed by the Union Terminal Railway, sent a request to the Grand Lodge of the B. R. T. to come and advise them. (Farmer, that night, cancelled his request, but Clark's remained.) In response to such request for assistance, McQuaid, vice-president of the B. R. T. came. Up to this point there is no conflict in the testimony, but from there on, it conflicts. However, there is ample testimony fully tending to show: That McQuaid was sent for to come and assist the men in their protest to the railway about the agreement to be made concerning their seniority rights and other conditions under which they were to work, not to decide for them the contract they should make or accept.
The evidence in plaintiff's favor is further to the effect that without any authority from the men, he sought to change the seniority rights and positions of the employees of defendant, over their objections, including plaintiff. He prepared a seniority list of the consolidated employees, that is, of both defendant Belt Railway and of the Union Terminal Railway, in which consolidated list the seniority of defendant's employees was reduced, and plaintiff's seniority was lowered from that indicated by his number 17 to that indicated by the number 31, over the protests, not only of the men themselves, but of the grievance committee which had been elected as successors to the members of the committee which had negotiated the contract of March 10, 1928; that McQuaid told the men that they would have to take the new arrangement whether they liked it or not; that, in the face of the protests of the men, he turned the list he had made himself over to the defendant's manager and drew up a letter to Mr. Van Vliet of the Union Terminal Railway Company to the effect that the seniority list had been agreed upon by the respective committees and the employees on both properties (i. e., the yards of both companies) "in so far as switching operations are concerned" and that "the employees of the St. Joseph Belt Railway have elected to work under the schedule in effect between the Union Terminal Railway Company and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. "
The evidence in plaintiff's favor further tends to show that defendant's manager told McQuaid to put out the above mentioned letter reciting that an agreement had been made. No denial of this was put in evidence though the officer in question was present in court.
The evidence in plaintiff's favor is further to the effect that it was never agreed by the committee either to consolidate the lists or to change any working arrangements, nor was any vote taken on these matters, and the matters stated as agreed to in the letter above mentioned were not agreed to at all. In fact, no notice was given to the men's committee or to plaintiff, of the change, other than the posting of the notice in the yards as aforesaid.
On cross-examination of Farmer, a witness for defendant, it was brought out that in the Constitution of the B. R. T. it was provided that "when through lease purchase or otherwise" a line of railway is taken over, all yardmen on the line taken over shall be conceded the right to go with the line or portion thereof taken over, by which they had been previously employed "and shall be regarded as having prior rights in their respective classes to work on runs originating and terminating on the...
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