McCoy v. State

Citation193 N.E.3d 387
Decision Date29 August 2022
Docket NumberSupreme Court Case No. 22S-CR-294
Parties James E. MCCOY, Appellant (Defendant below) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Mark K. Leeman, Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Chief Counsel, Appeals, Office of the Indiana Attorney General, Courtney Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 21A-CR-2000

Goff, Justice.

Under the Indiana Bill of Rights, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated." Ind. Const. art 1, § 11. To ensure this protection, our constitution requires a warrant, issued "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing" the scope of the intended search and seizure. Id. A suspect may, of course, waive the warrant requirement by consenting to the search. But to secure consent from a suspect in custody, police must first inform that suspect of the right to consult with counsel. Pirtle v. State , 263 Ind. 16, 28, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975). Without that advisement, any incriminating evidence seized during the search is inadmissible at trial. Id.

The defendant here, an apparent victim of a robbery and as a suspect under arrest for an unrelated offense, consented to a search of his home, ostensibly for the officer only to document the stolen property, without having received the requisite Pirtle warning. Because we see this case as a clear-cut violation of Pirtle ’s protections, and because we need not inquire into the officer's subjective views of whether the defendant was a victim or a suspect (as the State would have us do), we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained during the search. We thus reverse the defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.

Facts and Procedural History

Officer Cody Scott, while on patrol for the Logansport Police Department, received a tip of a nearby robbery in progress. The pedestrian who reported this tip to Officer Scott described the suspect and identified the victim's residence, adding that the victim himself—James McCoy—had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.1 Upon arriving at the house, Officer Scott observed McCoy, confirmed his identity, and "immediately" detained him for the active warrant. Tr. Vol. II, p. 62. Once in handcuffs, McCoy explained that several items from his residence had been stolen and that the robber had driven away just as the officer had arrived. The suspected robber—an acquaintance of McCoy's—eventually returned to the residence, having been located in the vicinity by other officers. At this point, a female approached the scene, identifying herself to Officer Scott as Jalyn Parkevich. The incident, she explained to him, was little more than a domestic dispute. According to Jalyn, she had been at McCoy's house the night before where she "observed methamphetamine" and where McCoy "had offered her" this drug in exchange for sex. App. Vol. II, p. 17. Evidently angered by this illicit proposition, the alleged robber, Jalyn claimed, sought retaliation by stealing some of McCoy's possessions. Immediately following this exchange, and upon Officer Scott's request, McCoy identified several items belonging to him still inside the suspected robber's vehicle. The officer then asked McCoy if he would escort him inside the house to document any other missing items. McCoy, still in handcuffs, agreed to the request.

Once inside the house, Officer Scott detected the odor of burnt "spice" (or synthetic marijuana) emanating from upstairs. Id. When they arrived at McCoy's bedroom on the second floor, the officer observed several plastic baggies strewn about the room. Based on these observations, and with knowledge of "possible narcotics inside the residence," Officer Scott suspended the investigation and contacted the prosecutor to apply for a search warrant. Id. The subsequent execution of that warrant revealed various drug paraphernalia, including a glass pipe with residue that later tested positive for meth, a vape cartridge containing THC oil, an opened pack of syringes, and a plastic baggie containing a substance that also tested positive for meth. After Officer Scott advised him of his Miranda rights, McCoy admitted that most of the items belonged to him, with the glass pipe apparently used "for smoking crack cocaine." Id. at 18.

The State charged McCoy with several offenses: level-6 felony possession of meth, level-6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, class-A misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and class-C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. See, respectively , Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a) (2021) ; I.C. § 16-42-19-18 ; I.C. § 35-48-4-11(b)(1) ; I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).

At trial, McCoy moved to suppress the State's evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful because, despite his detention, the arresting officer failed to give the necessary Pirtle warning. The trial court denied the motion. While acknowledging that McCoy "was in custody" when the officer asked to search the house, the court reasoned that McCoy's detention rested on a "[w]arrant unrelated to the charges that [are] subject to this case." Tr. Vol. II, p. 73. What's more, the court didn't "see this as a search," but, rather, "as an attempt to identify stolen property" from the alleged robbery, of which McCoy was the "apparent victim." Id. Finally, the court found nothing to suggest that the officer "was looking for evidence other than the stolen property," adding that, when the officer came across incriminating evidence, he stopped and left the premises to secure a proper search warrant. Id.

A jury found McCoy guilty on all counts except the unlawful-possession-of-a-syringe charge. And after entering judgment of conviction on all counts except the marijuana charge (for which it had entered a directed verdict of not guilty), the trial court sentenced McCoy to an aggregate term of 910 days.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence obtained during the search. McCoy v. State , No. 21A-CR-2000, 2022 WL 274713, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2022). In so holding, the panel reasoned (1) that because the officer detained him for an unrelated crime, McCoy was not entitled to a Pirtle warning; and (2) that the officer's search, performed only to document any property stolen from the residence and while in the presence of McCoy, did not amount to "an unlimited search, an unlawful search, or constitutionally prohibited police conduct as contemplated by Pirtle ." Id.

After hearing oral arguments from both parties, we now grant McCoy's petition to transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

On appeal, an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, with reversal warranted only if the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Carpenter v. State , 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). But when, like here, the trial court's determination involves the constitutionality of a search or seizure, that determination is a question of law to which a de novo standard of review applies. Campos v. State , 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

Discussion and Decision

For nearly a half century, Pirtle v. State has withstood the test of time as the "seminal case" on Indiana's constitutional requirement for consent to searches. Dycus v. State , 108 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2018). In Pirtle , police arrested the defendant for possession of a stolen vehicle. 263 Ind. at 21, 323 N.E.2d at 636. After police informed him of his Miranda rights on two occasions, Pirtle asked to speak with an attorney. Id. at 22, 323 N.E.2d at 637. But nearly twelve hours later, two other officers—unaware that Pirtle had invoked his right to counsel—questioned him about an unrelated homicide and asked for his consent to search his home. Id. Pirtle, never having spoken with a lawyer, agreed to the search, ultimately leading police to evidence implicating him in the homicide. Id. at 22–23, 323 N.E.2d at 637.

Pirtle challenged the admission of this evidence, which the trial court denied. Id. at 21, 323 N.E.2d at 636. But this Court reversed, holding "that a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent." Id. at 29, 323 N.E.2d at 640. Absent such a warning, the Court added, any evidence recovered during that search must be suppressed at trial. Id. While acknowledging a defendant may waive this right, the Court emphasized that the burden lies with the "State to show that such waiver was explicit." Id.

Because there's no dispute over his custodial status when Officer Scott asked to search his home, and because there's no dispute that the officer failed to advise him of his right to counsel before requesting that consent, this case, McCoy contends, amounts to a clear-cut violation of Pirtle ’s "core holding." Appellant's Br. at 19.

For its part, the State acknowledges Pirtle ’s concern with a custodial suspect's uninformed waiver of important constitutional protections when he consents to a search without the benefit of counsel. But because the officer here spoke to McCoy "as the victim of a crime," rather than as a suspect, the State insists that "the constitutional concerns expressed in Pirtle simply do not apply." Appellee's Br. at 11.

We agree with McCoy that this case only "requires a straightforward application of Pirtle to the uncontested facts." See Pet. to Trans. at 9–10.

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