McCoy v. Thresh
Decision Date | 12 November 2004 |
Citation | 862 A.2d 109 |
Parties | William McCOY, Jr., Appellant, v. Yvonne D. THRESH, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Douglas G. Miller, Carlisle, for appellant.
Yvonne Thresh, appellee, Pro Se.
¶ 1 Appellant, William McCoy, Jr. ("Father"), asks us to determine whether the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas erred when it declined to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA")1 and dismissed Father's custody complaint. We hold the court properly declined jurisdiction over the custody proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 2 The trial court has fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
(Trial Court Opinion, dated July 9, 2004, at 1-3). This timely appeal followed.
¶ 3 Father raises the following two issues for our review:
¶ 4 A court's decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See generally Zimbicki v. Zimbicki, 810 A.2d 168, 170 (Pa.Super.2002)
; Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 722 A.2d 725 (Pa.Super.1998); Merman v. Merman, 412 Pa.Super. 247, 603 A.2d 201 (1992). Under Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the court has overridden or misapplied the law, when its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when there is insufficient evidence of record to support the court's findings. Favacchia v. Favacchia, 769 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa.Super.2001). An abuse of discretion requires clear and convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures. Cohenour v. Cohenour, 696 A.2d 201 (Pa.Super.1997); Paulone v. Paulone, 437 Pa.Super. 130, 649 A.2d 691 (1994).
¶ 5 In his first issue, Father claims he offered substantial uncontested evidence that Pennsylvania was the child's "home state" under the UCCJA. Specifically, Father contends C.W.M. would have lived in Pennsylvania for the statutorily prescribed six-month period, but for Mother's "unilateral actions" of removing him from the jurisdiction and returning him to California. Father believes Mother's unilateral actions were intended to defeat Father's efforts and establish a forum beneficial to her, something that should not be condoned by this Court.
¶ 6 In the alternative, Father argues "significant contacts" with Pennsylvania justify the court's exercise of jurisdiction in the best interests of C.W.M. According to Father, C.W.M. attended school and church in Pennsylvania, has family members here, and desires to live in Pennsylvania. Although of shorter duration, Father contends the numerous contacts and relationships established in Pennsylvania are more beneficial to the child than those established in California. Father concludes the trial court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction under either the "home state" or the "significant contacts" prong of the UCCJA and insists this case must be remanded for further proceedings. We cannot agree.
¶ 7 The issue of jurisdiction in this matter is governed by the UCCJA, which provides:
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5344(a)-(c). Section 5343 defines "home state" in relevant part as:
"Home state." The state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent or a person acting as parent, or in an institution, for at least six consecutive months....
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5343. The home state is the preferred basis for jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA. Dincer v. Dincer, 549 Pa. 309, 701 A.2d 210 (1997).
¶ 8 Pennsylvania courts will not assume jurisdiction under the "significant contacts" principle unless it appears that no other state can assume jurisdiction under statutory prerequisites substantially similar to Pennsylvania law. Tettis v. Boyum, 317 Pa.Super. 8, 463 A.2d 1056, 1060-61 (1983). A petitioner seeking jurisdiction under the less favored "significant contacts" principle has the burden of proving the asserted bases for jurisdiction, which can be a heavy burden "especially if he approaches the matter...
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