McCoy v. Vankirk

• Decision Date: 25 May 1954
• Citation: 377 Pa. 515,105 A.2d 112
• Parties: McCOY et ux. v. VANKIRK. VANKIRK v. McCOY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

105 A.2d 112

377 Pa. 515

McCOY et ux. v. VANKIRK.

VANKIRK v. McCOY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 25, 1954

Action by driver of one automobile against driver of another, tried together with cross action by second driver and wife who rode with him, for damages sustained in collision. From judgment of Court of Common Pleas, Butler County, Nos. 1 and 2 December term, 1953, J. Frank Graff, J., on verdicts for the first driver in both actions, the second driver and wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Nos. 54 and 55, March term 1954, Musmanno, J., held that the question whether the first driver, when he approached the highway from a side road and saw the other automobile on the highway speeding toward him could with prudence enter the highway on assumption he had ample time to reach his lane before the other automobile could reach the intersection, was for the jury.

Affirmed.

Luther C. Braham, Galbreath, Braham & Gregg, Butler, for mCcoy et al.

John L. Wilson, Butler, for Vankirk.

Lee C McCandless, Butler, for appellees.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, MUSMANNO, and ARNOLD, JJ.

MUSMANNO Justice.

On April 10, 1950, an automobile owned and operated by B. F. Vankirk came into collision with an automobile owned and operated by Harold M. McCoy. Vankirk was injured, Mrs. McCoy (travelling in the car with her husband) was injured, and both cars were damaged. B. F. Vankirk brought suit in trespass against Harold McCoy. Harold McCoy and Mrs. McCoy sued Vankirk.

The lawsuits were tried together and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Vankirk in the sum of $1,850 and denied the McCoys any recovery at all. For these verdicts to be mutually consistent, the jury had to find that Vankirk was free of contributory negligence in his suit against McCoy and equally free of negligence in the suit against him by the McCoys. So as to remove all doubt on this score, the presiding judge said to the jury at the time of the rendition of the verdict:

‘ You could not have rendered the first verdict in favor of Vankirk if you thought he was guilty of negligence. I want you to be sure about this. If you all think Mr. Vankirk was not guilty of negligence, I want you to stand up; if that is what you mean.’

Whereupon the jury all rose to their feet.

At the oral argument before this Court on the appeal, counsel for the McCoys practically conceded that, in the face of the jury's open confirmation of Vankirk's nonnegligence, he had indeed a tight knot to untie if he expected to win the new trial for which he contended. But it does not appear, in spite of his vigorous and painstaking effort in that direction, that he was able to loosen any of the legal cords which have bound up this lawsuit into a final and irrevocable adjudication. The trial was conducted by three able and experienced lawyers (Harold McCoy being represented by one lawyer in his capacity as defendant and by another lawyer in his capacity, together with his wife, as plaintiff); the proceedings were presided over by a veteran jurist of distinguished ability; and the issue, which was a simple one, was decided fairly and rationally by the jury.

The jury found that Vankirk sustained recoverable injuries because McCoy drove his automobile: (1) at 70 miles per hour; (2) on the wrong side of the road; and (3) with such egregious recklessness that it skidded sideways for 106 feet, striking Vankirk's car with an impact that forced it back from a forward motion for some 20 to 25 feet and spinning it the arc of a complete circle, while McCoy's car itself described a violent half turn.

The evidence established McCoy's negligence with mathematical certitude. McCoy's counsel labored long at the oar of a court-pronounced contributory negligence, but he never succeeded in reaching shore with his argument. Nor was it possible for him to do so, since the record demonstrates that the facts could not have permitted the trial court to announce, as a matter of law, that Vankirk was guilty of contributory negligence. The notes of testimony reveal that Vankirk, approaching from a side road into Highway Route No. 8 (on which thoroughfare the accident occurred), stopped 8 feet from the edge of the highway, noted an automobile some 600 or 700 feet away, entered cautiously into Route No. 8 and had travelled two or three car lengths on his own side of the highway when McCoy's car bore down on him broad-side!

Witnesses testified that McCoy was travelling from 60 to 70 miles per hour. It was a question for the jury as to whether Vankirk, knowing that McCoy was...