McCracken v. State

• Decision Date: 11 January 1968
• Docket Number: No. 89,89
• Citation: 2 Md.App. 716,237 A.2d 87
• Parties: Donald D. McCRACKEN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 716

2 Md.App. 716

237 A.2d 87

Donald D. McCRACKEN v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 89.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 11, 1968.

I. Marshall Seidler, Baltimore, for appellant.

Donald Needle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee, Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., and Thomas Biddison, State's Atty., and Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City, respectively, Baltimore.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

On January 27, 1967the appellant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Judge James K. Cullen presiding, and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 12 years.At arraignment he pleaded not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense and not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the trial.At the close of the evidence offered by the State during the trial, after denying a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge, over objection, heard the question of the appellant's sanity out of the presence of the jury.After considering evidence produced by the appellant, consisting of testimony of a psychiatrist and of the appellant, the trial judge found the evidence insufficient to raise a question in the minds of reasonable men whether the appellant was or was not insane, and did not permit the issue of insanity to be presented for the consideration of the jury.On appeal the appellant contends that the trial judge erred both in the procedure followed and the finding made.

Chapter 709, Acts of 1967, codified as Art. 59, sections 7-12, Md.Code(1964 Repl.Vol.), changed the standard fer determining sanity with regard to criminal responsibility.We think it clear that the legislative intent was to have the provisions of the Act applicable to all cases tried on June 1, 1967 and thereafter but that they were not to have retroactive effect and we so stated in League v. State, 1 Md.App. 681, 685, 232 A.2d 828.Therefore the M'Naghten rule-the appellant's ability 'to distinguish between right and wrong and understand the nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself'-existing prior to June 1, 1967, was applicable to the appellant at his trial.Bergin v. State, 1 Md.App. 74, 227 A.2d 357.Rowe v. State, 234 Md. 295, 199 A.2d 785, held that the M'Naghten rule was the standard for determining sanity at the time of the commission of the crime as well as at the time of trial.In Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150, the Court of Appeals, confronted with the questions for the first time, determined which party-the prosecution or the defendant-had the burden of proof on the issue of insanity and which degree of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence-should be applied.In Jenkins v. State, 238 Md. 451, at page 463, 209 A.2d 616, at page 622, the Court stated that the holdings in Bradford were:

'(1) a man is presumed to have been sane and responsible for his acts at the time he committed a crime until there is adduced proof of his inability 'to distinguish between right and wrong and understand the nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself'(the M'Naghten rule) sufficient to raise a doubt as to his sanity as defined in the minds of reasonable men ('Evidence of some undefined mental disorder or instability is insufficient proof to overcome the presumption of sanity'), and (2) when there has been offered proof of insanity so defined sufficient to overcome the initial presumption of the sanity of the accused the State must prove sanity, as well as the other elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.'

Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 206 A.2d 802, held that the trial court should determine as a preliminary matter of law whether there has been offered evidence of insanity under the M'Naghten rule, sufficient, if believed, to raise a question in the minds of reasonable men whether the defendant is or is not insane.If the evidence is so sufficient, the question of the defendant's sanity is to be considered by the jury with instructions that the burden is on the State to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt.If the evidence is not so sufficient, the issue should be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.The Court followed the same rule in Jenkins v. State, supra.Finding that there was not sufficient evidence of insanity to rebut the presumption of sanity, it said, 238 Md. page 466, 209 A.2d page 624, that '* * * the issues of insanity now and then should not have been submitted to the jury.'The appellant points out, correctly, that in both Fowler and Jenkins the issues were presented to the jury.In Fowler, although the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the burden was upon the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court agreed with the contention of the State that it was not reversible error 'because there was no sufficient evidence of insanity adduced at the trial to require the submission of the issue of insanity to the jury and, therefore, the submission of that issue to the jury (which found him sane) was more than the appellant was entitled to.'237 Md. 512, 206...