McCrady v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 15 November 1904
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: McCRADY v. PRATT.

101 N.W. 227

138 Mich. 203

McCRADY v. PRATT.

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 15, 1904

Error to Circuit Court, Kent County; Willis B. Perkins, Judge.

Action by Eliza McCrady against Stephen N. Pratt. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed.

M. C. Huggett, for appellant.

Smedley & Corwin, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY J.

The plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment of $50.25 for boarding the defendant's son. The theory upon which the case was submitted to the jury may be best stated by quoting the charge of the circuit judge: 'It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant's son, Charles M. Pratt, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant and at his request, came to the plaintiff's boarding house and requested board, and said that his father would pay for it, as he was learning the drug business and did not earn much money. It is claimed by the plaintiff that she relied upon these representations and boarded the defendant's son, and that at one time when he was sick that nursed him and took care of him about two weeks; that he remained with her something like a year, when he began to run behind in his board bill, and shortly afterwards left the city. The plaintiff further claims that the defendant, Stephen, pratt the boy's father, afterwards came to the city of Grand Rapids, and that she saw him and had a talk with him about the balance due her for the board of his son. Plaintiff further claims that in this conversation defendant admitted that he had told his son to come to Grand Rapids and select a boarding place, and that he would pay his board until he was twenty-one years old. On the part of the defendant it is claimed that he never agreed to pay for his board, or any part of it; that he never authorized his son to procure board from the plaintiff; and that he did not agree to pay any of the boy's board after he became twenty-one years of age. Now, as a matter of law, I charge you that a father is not ordinarily liable for the board furnished to his son, unless he agrees to pay the same; and I charge you that unless you find that the father told the son to pick out a good boarding house, and that he would pay his board, the father is not liable. That is, the defendant in this case is not liabe. But should you find from the evidence in the case that the defendant did agree to pay his son's board, then he is liable, and the plaintiff should recover. The burden of proof to prove this agreement rests upon the plaintiff. She must satisfy your minds by a fair preponderance of evidence that, at the time this son came to her boarding house, he was authorized by the father to procure board upon the father's...