McCraney v. Bigger Pulpwood Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1986
• Parties: Vernon McCRANEY v. BIGGER PULPWOOD COMPANY, INC., John Urquhart, Jr., and John Urquhart, Sr. Civ. 5440.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 1116

500 So.2d 1116

Vernon McCRANEY v. BIGGER PULPWOOD COMPANY, INC., John Urquhart, Jr., and John Urquhart, Sr.

Civ. 5440.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 26, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, 1986.

William D. Melton, Evergreen, and J. Milton Coxwell, Monroeville, for appellant.

David F. Steele, Monroeville, for appellees.

BRADLEY, Judge.

This is a workmen's compensation case.

The plaintiff, Vernon McCraney, was injured on February 6, 1984 while throwing a log chain. Defendant Bigger Pulpwood Company, Inc. (Bigger) had contracted with John Urquhart, Sr. (Urquhart), also named as a defendant, to haul logs from the Scott Paper Company Woodyard in Range, Alabama to Gulf Lumber Company in Mobile, Alabama. Urquhart then hired the plaintiff as a truck driver to haul logs.

Plaintiff alleges that he is an employee of Bigger within the meaning of our workmen's compensation laws and is entitled to relief thereunder.

The trial court, in its initial judgment, found that plaintiff was not an employee of Bigger and denied compensation. The court further stated that Bigger did not reserve any right of control over the manner in which Urquhart or the plaintiff fulfilled the contract and that the relationship between Urquhart and McCraney with Bigger was that of an independent contractor.

Pursuant to Rule 59, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, McCraney filed a motion for new trial requesting, inter alia, that the court revise its judgment and enter an appropriate finding and conclusion in response to plaintiff's contention that liability was imposed on Bigger under section 25-5-10(a), Code 1975.

The court then amended its original judgment and found that plaintiff was the employee of Urquhart, not of Bigger, and specifically that plaintiff was not a pieceworker under section 25-5-10(a), Code 1975.

Plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff contends that Urquhart must be classified as a pieceworker pursuant to section 25-5-10(a), Code 1975, and that as such the statute mandates Bigger's being held Urquhart's employer under our workmen's compensation laws. Plaintiff further argues that, once Urquhart is classified as a pieceworker and an employee of Bigger, plaintiff must also be deemed Bigger's employee.

In order to address plaintiff's contention that Urquhart was a pieceworker, we deem it helpful to examine the statute we are called on to apply. Section 25-5-10(a) of our Workmen's Compensation Act is as follows:

"(a) Any person who creates or carries into operation any fraudulent scheme, artifice or device to enable him to execute work without himself being responsible to the workman for the provisions of this chapter shall himself be included in the term 'employer' and shall be subject to all the liabilities of employers under this chapter. But this section shall not be construed to cover or mean an owner who lets a contract to a contractor in good faith, nor to a contractor who, in good faith, lets to a subcontractor a portion of his contract; but no person shall be deemed a contractor or subcontractor so as to make him liable to pay compensation within the meaning of this section who performs his work upon the employer's premises, with the employer's tools or appliances, and under the employer's directions, nor one who does what is commonly known as 'piece work,'...."

The first sentence of this section clearly provides that those persons who enter into fraudulent arrangements so as to avoid liability for their workers otherwise covered by workmen's compensation laws will not thereby escape classification as employers. The first section of the second sentence then creates an exception to this rule: Those employers who enter into good-faith, independent contractor relationships will not be subject to liability under the act, as they are not viewed as fraudulent schemers.

The second part of the second sentence appears to further define the first part of the second sentence by providing that no one can be denominated as a contractor or subcontractor who performs his duties on the employer's premises, with the employer's tools, and under the employer's directions, nor one who does "piecework." The effect of this provision is that one who engages in one of these enumerated activities is an employee, not an independent contractor.

The trial court held that Urquhart was an independent contractor and that plaintiff was an employee of Urquhart and not a "pieceworker." Plaintiff, however, asserts that Urquhart should be classified as a "pieceworker" under section 25-5-10(a), Code 1975, and as such the relationship between Bigger and Urquhart was that of employer and...