McCrary v. Runyon
| Decision Date | 29 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | FAIRFAX-BREWSTER,Nos. 73-2348,s. 73-2348 |
| Citation | 515 F.2d 1082 |
| Parties | Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Defendants, Southern Independent School Association, Appellant. Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and ColinM. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Appellants, Southern Independent School Association, Defendant. Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary,Plaintiffs, and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. Russell L. RUNYON, Katheryne E. Runyon and Southern Independent SchoolAssociation, Appellees. Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R.Gonzales, Appellees, v.SCHOOL, INC., Appellant. Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R.Gonzales, Appellants, v.SCHOOL, INC., Appellee. to 73-2352. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
George S. Leonard, Washington, D. C., and Louis Koutoulakos, Arlington, Va., for appellants in Nos. 73-2348, 73-2349 and 73-2350.
Andrew A. Lipscomb, Washington, D. C. (Gary R. Sheehan and Tolbert, Lewis & Fitzgerald, Arlington, Va., on brief), for appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 73-2351 and 73-2352.
Thomas J. Schwab, Washington, D. C., on brief for amici curiae in Nos. 73-2348, 73-2349 and 73-2351.
Allison W. Brown, Jr., Washington, D. C. (Robert M. Alexander, Arlington, Va. and Roderick V. O. Boggs, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellees/cross-appellants in Nos. 73-2348, 73-2349, 73-2350, 73-2351 and 73-2352.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, CRAVEN, BUTZNER, DONALD RUSSELL, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
The issue in this case is whether 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 1 prohibits private schools from denying admission to qualified black applicants solely on the basis of their race.
This appeal is a consolidation of two suits initiated by parents of black children who claim that they were denied admission to the appellant schools because of their race.
The Southern Independent School Association intervened in these actions, alleging that it is an association representing over 300 private, non-profit schools in the South, some of which concededly are racially exclusive in their admission policies. The position of the intervenor is simply that racial discrimination by private schools is not prohibited by § 1981, and, in any event, cannot be constitutionally prohibited.
As found by the trial judge, in early May 1969, the parents of Colin Gonzales contacted the Fairfax-Brewster School, a private school located in Fairfax County, Virginia, about enrolling their son in the school's summer day camp program, and continuing into the first grade in the fall. The Gonzales' learned of Fairfax-Brewster through a mass mailing addressed to "Resident," an advertisement in the Yellow Pages in the telephone book, and from a friend whose son attended the Summer Camp.
Thereafter, the Gonzales visited the school and, being pleased with what they saw, completed an application for their son. They also furnished, as required, a medical certificate and application fee. On May 16, 1969, the medical certificate and application fee were returned, accompanied by a form letter stating that the school was "unable to accommodate the application." No further explanation was given.
Mr. Gonzales called the school and spoke with someone who identified himself as Captain Reiss. In response to Mr. Gonzales' inquiry as to why his son's application was rejected, he was told that the school was not integrated.
Captain Reiss is the Chairman of the Board of Fairfax-Brewster School. His son, Robert, is the Administrative Director, and his daughter-in-law Olga is the Registrar.
Both Captain Reiss and his son deny any such conversation. They testified that Colin, age 51/2, was rejected because they felt that the kindergarten he had previously attended gave Colin insufficient preparation for the first grade at Fairfax-Brewster. Because they found Colin unqualified for the first grade, the Reisses concluded that "there was no point" in allowing him to enter the summer camp only to have to "yank him out" at the beginning of the academic year.
Subsequent to their son's rejection from Fairfax-Brewster, the Gonzales telephoned Bobbe's School, and were told that only members of the Caucasian race were accepted.
In August 1972, Mrs. McCrary called Bobbe's School about enrolling her two year old son, Michael, in the nursery school. She asked whether the school was integrated and accepted blacks, and was told it did not. She did not file a formal application with Bobbe's.
Mr. Gates, the superintendent of Bobbe's, testified that he never received a call from either the Gonzales or Mrs. McCrary. He testified that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race, although he said that no black child had ever applied.
The district court found the testimony of the Reisses "unbelievable," and concluded that Colin had been rejected from Fairfax-Brewster because of his race. He further found that both the Gonzales and Mrs. McCrary had called Bobbe's and had been told that the school would not accept blacks. It held that
Accordingly, the court concluded that the appellant schools practiced racial discrimination in their admissions policies.
On the authority of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 35 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973), it held that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private contractual arrangements, even when there is no state involvement. Therefore, it held that the schools were in violation of § 1981 in their admissions policies, and permanently enjoined defendants and intervenors from discriminating against blacks in enrollment in their schools. In addition, it awarded damages for embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish to Colin, Michael and Michael's parents, and attorney's fees against Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F.Supp. 1200 (E.D.Va.1973).
Defendants and intervenor appeal. We affirm the injunction and the award of damages, but reverse the award of attorney's fees.
Initially, the appellants contest the district court's findings of facts, urging that the district court was clearly erroneous in concluding that Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's practice racial discrimination.
There was conflicting testimony as to whether the Gonzales had been told that Fairfax-Brewster was not integrated and whether both the McCrarys and Gonzales were told that Bobbe's was not integrated. Resolution of this conflict depended upon the district court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. We may not reverse a trier of fact, who had the advantage of hearing the testimony, on a question of credibility.
In addition, the testimony of the black parents was corroborated and supported by the testimony of two other witnesses. Mrs. Bryant testified that she had telephoned Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's to inquire about their admissions policies and was told that the schools were not integrated. Mr. Brooks, Mrs. McCrary's supervisor at her job, testified that a Mr. Gates, at Bobbe's, told him, over the telephone, that Bobbe's did not accept blacks.
The trial judge also thought that the Reiss's story that Colin was rejected on educational rather than racial grounds was undercut by the fact that Fairfax-Brewster allows applicants to take an entrance examination when previous scholastic preparation is inadequate. Colin was not given this opportunity.
In short, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial judge's factual determinations, and we are unable to say that, viewing the record as a whole, he was clearly erroneous in concluding that Colin and Michael were denied admission to the schools because of their race.
The substantive legal questions, which have been the subject of varied comment in the literature, 2 we think were correctly resolved by the district court. Section 1981 is a limitation upon private discrimination, and its enforcement in the context of this case is not a deprivation of any right of free association or of privacy of the defendants, of the intervenor, or of their pupils or patrons.
It may once have been supposed that § 1981 served only the limited office of removing legal disabilities which state statutes imposed upon black people. It, of course, did cancel state statutes which imposed restrictions upon the right of blacks to contract, but the Supreme Court has clearly held that it did much more than that. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386; Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 35 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973).
In Jones v. Mayer, the Court was concerned with the right to purchase real estate. There a real estate developer had refused to sell a residence in a "white area" to the black plaintiff. Analyzing the text and legislative history of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 3 the Court held that § 1982 applied to purely private activity and provided a judicial remedy. As so construed, it was held that enactment of § 1982 was a valid...
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