McCray v. Here
| Decision Date | 15 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 13-6540 (RBK/JS) |
| Parties | EMANUEL MCCRAY, Plaintiff, v. UNITE HERE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
KUGLER United States District Judge:
Before the Court are the motions of Defendant Public Storage (Doc. No. 10), Defendant UNITE HERE and affiliated defendants (the "UNITE HERE" defendants)1 (Doc. No. 13), Defendants Richard Trumka and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (the "AFL-CIO") (Doc. No. 18), Defendant Extra Space Storage, A Real Estate Investment Trust ("Extra Space Storage") (Doc. No. 19), Defendant HST Lessee San Diego LP ("HST")2 (Doc. No. 20), and Defendant Auction.com (Doc. 23) to dismiss the Complaint of Emanuel McCray ("Plaintiff") against them. For the reasons set forth below, these motions will be GRANTED.
UNITE HERE is a labor organization that represents workers in the United States and Canada in the hotel, gaming, food service, and other industries. Compl. ¶ 19. Although the origin of Plaintiff's involvement with many of the defendants is not entirely clear, it appears that he is a former employee of the Hilton Hotel in Vancouver, Washington. Id. Ex. 2. Based on correspondence submitted by Plaintiff with his Complaint, it appears that on March 26, 2013, Hilton sent a letter to Plaintiff advising him that it was obligated to terminate his employment under its Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with UNITE HERE, Local 9, because he failed to pay union dues despite being notified that his dues were in arrears. Id. Evidently, the CBA between the Hilton Vancouver and UNITE HERE, Local 9 required all employees whose job duties involved bargaining unit work to become and remain union members within thirty-one days of the effective date of the CBA, or for new employees, within thirty-one days of their date of hire. It appears that Plaintiff was in fact terminated on March 27, 2013 as a result of his failure to pay the union dues. Id. ¶ 183.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendants AFL-CIO and UNITE HERE are front organizations for an "international organized crime ring engaged in the toxic brew of crime, drug trafficking, piracy and terror . . . ." Id. ¶¶ 18, 48.3 The Complaint alleges that the defendants have conspired to violate a litany of federal laws, including murder, bribery, extortion, sale into involuntary servitude, and embezzlement. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff also refers to a Consent Decree dating back to 1995 between the United States and the Hotel Employees andRestaurant Employees International Union ("HEREIU"), which was a predecessor labor organization to UNITE HERE. Id. ¶¶ 5-15.4 Plaintiff does not attach a copy of the consent decree, although he cites it a numerous times in his Complaint, alleging that UNITE HERE officials have violated its provisions. Id.5
It appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff began raising complaints about the activities of UNITE HERE at some time in 2012, which included the reporting of alleged illegal activities to the United States Department of Labor. In particular, Plaintiff complained of the 2012 merger of UNITE HERE Local 8 and UNITE HERE Local 9, which he believed to be illegal. Id. ¶¶ 76-83, 108-110. Plaintiff asserts that UNITE HERE Local 9 entered into a contract with Hilton Worldwide, requiring it to "operate a closed union shop," which he also maintains is unlawful. Id. ¶ 90. Plaintiff evidently opposed the CBA between Local 9 and Hilton because it required him to become a dues-paying member of Local 9 in order to remain a Hilton employee. Plaintiff further contends that UNITE HERE Locals 8 and 9 filed fraudulent tax returns in 2009 and 2010, and that UNITE HERE illegally maintained a pension account in his name even though he was not a union member. Id. ¶¶ 111-114. Plaintiff was allegedly made aware of the account when he was notified that he was entitled to retirement benefits. Id. ¶¶ 111-112.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Trumka, president of the AFL-CIO, declined an invitation from Plaintiff to attend a meeting to discuss "an organized crime ring." Id. ¶¶ 49-50. Plaintiff asserts claims for civil conspiracy and alleges a racketeering conspiracy involving UNITE HERE under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Compl. ¶¶ 183-186. Plaintiff also asserts an accounting claim in connection with his pension and the pensions of others. Id. ¶¶ 187-188. Finally, Plaintiff seeks fourteen declaratory judgments. Id. ¶¶ 189-205.
Each moving defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim against it. The UNITE HERE Defendants also argue that this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant HST further argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it and that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the allegations against it. Plaintiff has not filed a brief in opposition to any of the instant motions.6
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, "courts accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to theplaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id.
When a plaintiff is not represented by counsel, courts should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Such a pro se complaint should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if "it appears 'beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Where a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should normally be granted. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the rule is not absolute; leave to amend is inappropriate where it would cause undue delay, the amendment is motivated by bad faith or a dilatory motive, the amendment would cause prejudice, or the amendment is futile. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Id. (citations omitted).
A civil action may be brought under RICO by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of" the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Thus, a civil RICO claim can be said to have three elements: "(1) a violation of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the violation of Section 1962." De Falco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). To state a violation of the substantive portion of section 1962(a), a plaintiff must show that "income derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity" was used to "acquire, establish or operate any enterprise that affects interstate commerce." Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990). Section 1962(b) prohibits "any person from acquiring or maintaining an interest in, or controlling any such enterprise 'thorough a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. Finally, Section 1962(c) involves the conduct of an enterprise's affairs "through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id.Thus, to state a claim under either 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b) or (c), a private RICO plaintiff must allege that defendants engaged in "a pattern of racketeering activity," which requires a showing that defendants committed at least two of the predicate acts specified in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). See id. To state a claim for a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), the plaintiff must show that a defendant conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), or (c). Id.
A defendant in a racketeering conspiracy need not itself commit or agree to commit predicate acts. Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, "all that is necessary for such a conspiracy is that the conspirators share a common purpose." Id. Thus, if defendants agree to a plan wherein some conspirators will commit crimes and others will provide support, "the...
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