McCray v. Lee

• Decision Date: 24 September 2021
• Docket Number: 16-CV-1730 (KMK)
• Parties: LIONEL McCRAY, Plaintiff, v. SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM LEE, WATCH COMMANDER LT. PLIMLEY, SERGEANT KUTZ, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

LIONEL McCRAY, Plaintiff, v. SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM LEE, WATCH COMMANDER LT. PLIMLEY, SERGEANT KUTZ, Defendants.

No. 16-CV-1730 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

September 24, 2021

Lionel McCray Marcy, NY Pro se Plaintiff

Neil Shevlin, Esq. State of New York Office of the Attorney General New York, NY Counsel for Defendants

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS United States District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff Lionel McCray (“Plaintiff”), currently residing at Central New York Psychiatric Center, filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Superintendent William Lee (“Lee”), Watch Commander Lt. Plimley (“Plimley”), and Sergeant Kutz (“Kutz” and, together with Lee and Plimley “Defendants”), alleging violations of his and similarly situated inmates' rights under the Eighth Amendment and New York State law. (See Third Am Compl. (“TAC”) (Dkt. No. 97).) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Partially Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”). (See Defs.' Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 115).) For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

In its March 29, 2018 Opinion & Order (“2018 Opinion”), the Court summarized in detail the allegations in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”). (See Op. & Order (“2018 Op.”) 2-7 (Dkt. No. 76); Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) (Dkt. No. 60).) Plaintiff's TAC substantially replicates those allegations, albeit with minor additions. (Compare SAC, with T A C .) Though the Court assumes familiarity with its 2018 Opinion, it will briefly summarize the allegations carried over from the SAC to the TAC. Where relevant, the Court will also identify any new allegations and claims raised in the TAC.

Here, as in the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Lee, as Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility (“Green Haven”), “was responsible for the policy making, operation, management, care[, ] and custody of the convicted prisoners housed at [Green Haven], ” and was “also ultimately responsible for the training and supervision of the correctional officers employed at Green Haven.” (TAC ¶ II(D)(2); see also 2018 Op. 4.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee “exercised deliberate indifference to the health, safety[, ] and limited exercise needs of [Green Haven] inmates” by “creat[ing] a policy and custom” of failing to remove snow and ice from Green Haven's outdoor exercise yards during winter months; failing to “creat[e] an egress for winter snow and ice removal from the facility's closed-in outdoor exercise areas”; “closing down the facility's C, D[, ] and J block yard for the entire winter months”; and “restrict[ing] access to the facility's only [indoor] gym.” (TAC ¶ II(D)(3).) Lee's policies, Plaintiff alleges, were “intended to deter prisoners' physical exercise at [Green Haven] and violate [their] Eighth Amendment Constitutional rights.” (Id.)

As in the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Plimley, as Lee's agent, was responsible for implementing Lee's policies and inspecting recreational areas for any safety hazards. (Id. ¶ II(D)(4); see also 2018 Op. 5.) According to Plaintiff, Plimley showed deliberate indifference to the health, safety, and exercise needs of Green Haven prisoners when he determined that the “hazardous piles of unremoved snow and ice in the facility's outdoor exercise areas” were safe for prisoners' daily exercise use “during the winter months of 2014.” (TA C ¶ II(D)(5).) Plimley also showed deliberate indifference by “wantonly” implementing Lee's policies, including the policy not to remove snow and ice from the facility's exercise areas; the policy not to create “egress” for snow and ice removal; the policy of closing down Green Haven's C, D, and J block yards during winter months; and the policy of restricting access to Green Haven's sole indoor gym. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Plimley showed deliberate indifference when, on February 20, 2014, he ordered Green Haven's G and H block yards safe for prisoners' exercise use despite “deteriorating winter conditions of unremoved snow and ice.” (Id.)

With respect to Kutz, the TAC alleges that he too acted as Lee's agent, and was “responsible for facility area supervision.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(6); see also SAC ¶ II(D)(12) (alleging that “Kutz, an agent of the [D]efendant William Lee, . . . was charged with supervision of Keeplock Inmates['] one[-]hour exercise in the facility's G and H block yard”).) T h e T A C further alleges that it was Kutz's duty at Green Haven “to enforce the policies and customs created by [Lee] and implemented by [Plimley].” (TAC ¶ II(D)(6).) Kutz, like Plimley, allegedly showed deliberate indifference by enforcing Lee's various policies regarding recreational space. (Id. ¶ II(D)(7).) Specifically, by carrying out Lee's policy of “closing down the C, D[, ] and J block yard[s] during the winter months, restricting access to [Green Haven's] gym[, ] and ignoring piles of winter snow and ice in the facility's outdoor exercise areas, ” Kutz had “full knowledge . . . that he was unreasonably subjecting prisoners . . . to deprivation of limited exercise opportunit[ies] and exposing [them] to probable serious harm.” (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that Kutz's “failure to take any action” regarding the “deplorable conditions of [unremoved] piles of snow and ice”-particularly as those conditions existed in the G and H block yards on February 20, 2014-“was the moving force behind” Plaintiff's injuries and alleged constitutional deprivation. (Id.)

Plaintiff's lawsuit stems from an incident that occurred on February 20, 2014, when “more than three quarters of each of [Green Haven's] outdoor exercise yards [were] buried in waist[-]high snow and ice.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(12).) On that day, Kutz “gave [P]laintiff and other keeplocked inmates a direct order to proceed into the G & H block yard for a one[-]hour keeplock exercise.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(14).) Kutz “had inspected the yard, [and] knew of its deteriorating condition as a result of . . . Lee's polic[ies].” (Id.) At around 10:10 A.M., Plaintiff was “walk[ing] down a snow and ice covered side walkway between H block and the snow[-]covered handball court in the G & H block yard” (Id.) To avoid a “frozen solid sheet of ice” that was on the walkway floor, Plaintiff stepped onto “a snowbank pile of ice from a prior storm.” (Id.) When he did so, however, Plaintiff “lost [his] traction on the icy floor” and fell to the ground. (Id.) To “save his face and hand from injury, ” Plaintiff “folded himself” and “braced for impact.” (Id.) He landed on his left shoulder, but as he landed on the ground, he also “heard a pop from his left ankle area.” (Id.) After being helped to his feet by a fellow prisoner, Clive Webley, Plaintiff limped to E block and requested an emergency sick-call. (Id. ¶ II(D)(15).) A Green Haven doctor took an incident report and gave Plaintiff a bandage and painkillers. (Id.) After Plaintiff “filed a grievance for lack of adequate medical care and the hazardous conditions in the facility's yards, ” his “health care provider” ordered that he receive an X-ray and MRI. (Id.) As a result of his slip and fall, Plaintiff “suffered [an] extensive tear to his left ankle ligament, ” and was required to undergo “months of physical therapy and steroid injection treatment.” (Id. ¶ III.) He also dislocated his left shoulder, which “now pops in and out of [its] socket at random, ” thereby “causing bodily and mental pains.” (Id.)

The allegations above are virtually identical to those in Plaintiff's SAC. (Compare SAC ¶¶ II(D)(1)-(17), with TAC ¶¶ II(D)(1)-(19).) Once again, Plaintiff alleges that the “actions, policies[, ] and customs of the [D]efendant[s]” deprived him of a hazard-free environment in which to enjoy limited exercise, thus violating the Eighth Amendment. (TAC ¶ II(D)(21).) He alleges that Lee showed deliberate indifference to his health and safety by developing unconstitutional policies designed to “deny movement around the yards, deter exercise[, ] and disregard safety within the yards during the winter months.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(22)(a).) He alleges that Plimley showed deliberate indifference by “executing” these policies and by “knowingly expos[ing]” Plaintiff and other prisoners “to the deteriorating winter conditions in the facility's yards during the winter months of 2014, and order[ing] the G and H block yard safe for keeplocked inmates . . . on February 20, 2014.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(22)(b).) Likewise, he alleges that Kutz showed deliberate indifference by “enforc[ing]” Lee's policies, failing to “remedy some of the constitutional violations present in [Green Haven's] G & H block yard, ” and by “knowingly expos[ing] [P]laintiff to [the] conditions that caused his injuries [on] February 20, 2014.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(22)(c).)

The TAC also incorporates a new allegation and legal theory that was absent from the SAC. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the primary purpose of the challenged policies and actions was “not only to deprive [him] of his constitutional rights[, ] but also to violate the Anderson v Coughlin consent decree” (the “Anderson Decree”). (Id. ¶ II(D)(22)(d) (italics added).) According to Plaintiff, the Anderson Decree requires Defendants to “keep outdoor exercise areas at Green Haven . . . free of accumulation of ice and snow.” (Id. ¶ II(D)(18).) A “general provision” of the Anderson Decree, Plaintiff alleges, was that the decree “be prominently posted in the Green Haven . . . law library to put all future defendants on notice.” (Id.) Thus, he concludes, Lee, Plimley, and Kutz all “had knowledge of the stipulations” in the Anderson Decree. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that as “a prisoner currently incarcerated in a New...