McCready v. Hoffius, s. 185152

• Decision Date: 16 April 1999
• Docket Number: Nos. 185152,185314,s. 185152
• Citation: 593 N.W.2d 545
• Parties: Kristal McCready, Keith Kerr v. John Hoffius, Terry Hoffius; Rose Baiz, Peter Perusse v. John Hoffius, Terry Hoffius NOS. 108995, 108996. COA
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 545

593 N.W.2d 545

Kristal McCready, Keith Kerr v. John Hoffius, Terry Hoffius; Rose Baiz, Peter Perusse v John Hoffius, Terry Hoffius

NOS. 108995, 108996. COA Nos. 185152, 185314.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 16, 1999

Disposition: On order of the Court, the motion for rehearing is considered and, in lieu of granting rehearing we VACATE that portion of the December 22, 1998 opinion of the Court which holds that the Civil Rights Act does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution and we REMAND this case to the Circuit Court for the County of Jackson for further consideration of that issue and entry of an appropriate judgment.

KELLY, J., (dissenting).

I must dissent from the majority's order and the rationale behind the order.

In response to defendants' motion for rehearing, the majority has decided to vacate this Court's previous decision concerning the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act. As Justice BRICKLEY so aptly stated in another matter:

[P]rinciples of law deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction become precedent which should not be lightly departed. . . . "Only in the rare case when it is clearly apparent that an error has been made, or changing conditions result in injustice by the application of an outmoded rule, should we deviate from following the established rule." [People v. Jamieson, 436 Mich. 61, 79-80, 461 N.W.2d 884 (1990).]

Our recent decision has hardly had time to become outmoded. As I believe that this Court did not clearly err as regards defendants' constitutional claims, I do not agree with the proposed order vacating it.

I would not remand this case for further proceedings in the lower courts. Defendants have failed to show that a remand is warranted. When we declined to adopt defendants' constitutional arguments concerning the Civil Rights Act, we specifically held that defendants could not prevail on a remand, even assuming the facts were as they allege. They could not meet their burden under the compelling state interest test discussed in Wisconsin v. Yoder ² and Sherbert v. Verner ³. I fail to see how further fact finding will aid a discussion of this purely legal issue.

The requirements of the Civil Rights Act do not force defendants to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. Instead, the burden placed on their religious beliefs merely affects their commercial decision to enter the real estate market and impose these beliefs on their potential customers. The distinction has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982).

This Court has already thoroughly discussed the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act as applied in this case. Defendants have raised no newly decided binding precedent in support of their assertion that we erred in our previous holding. Thus, I respectfully dissent from its vacation.

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

I join Justice KELLY'S dissenting statement disagreeing with the decision to grant reconsideration in this case.

I also disagree with the decision to remand this case to the trial court. If a majority of the Court believes that reconsideration should be granted, then I...