McCreary v. Sigler

• Decision Date: 07 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 18907.,18907.
• Citation: 406 F.2d 1264
• Parties: George McCREARY, Appellant, v. Maurice SIGLER, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

406 F.2d 1264 (1969)

George McCREARY, Appellant, v.Maurice SIGLER, Appellee.

No. 18907.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

February 18, 1969.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1969.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William G. Line, of Kerrigan, Line & Martin, Fremont, Neb., for appellant.

Bernard L. Packett, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., for appellee, Clarence A. H. Meyer, Atty. Gen. of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., on the brief.

Before MATTHES, GIBSON and LAY, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing En Banc Denied March 7, 1969.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

This case arises from a post conviction petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of the conviction of a Nebraska state prisoner on grounds that the evidence used against him was obtained by an illegal search in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.The federal district court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues presented and denied the writ.The district court found it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of the actual search warrant issue, since it found that the search was made with the voluntary consent of the owner.Upon a motion for rehearing, we vacated our original affirmance in view of Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797(1968).

A coin box was removed from a telephone in a public phone booth at a filling station in Fremont, Nebraska, on December 10, 1964.The filling station attendant reported the theft to the police and identified the petitioner and two girls who had accompanied him in and near the booth.The police immediately placed surveillance upon McCreary and the girls.One of the girls was Sharon Bradbury Stanek who lived with her fatherRussell Bradbury on the premises searched.It developed that the petitioner was staying in the same apartment.Shortly thereafter the deputy sheriff, D. W. Parker, obtained a search warrant from a justice of the peace and went to apartment 3 of the Claasen Apartments where Sharon was known to live.When Parker arrived at the apartment, he advised Mr. Bradbury of the fact that the officers had a search warrant and then showed him the warrant.Bradbury first got up to get a drink and then said, "You don't need it.Go ahead and search.I pay the rent here."

The Supreme Court of Nebraska had previously affirmed the conviction of petitioner holding(1) that petitioner had no standing to object to the search since the owner of the apartment had given his consent to the search, and (2) that the search was lawful, nevertheless, since the search warrant was validly issued.State v. McCreary, 179 Neb. 589, 139 N.W.2d 362(1966), cert. den.384 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 1877, 16 L.Ed.2d 689.

We cannot endorse the view of older cases that petitioner has no standing to object to the search.This view was rejected in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S.Ct. 725, 734, 4 L.Ed.2d 697(1959), where the Supreme Court said:

"No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him."

Upon reconsideration of Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797(1968), decided subsequent to the district court's findings of "consent" below, we hold that any consent given by Bradbury must be viewed as "impliedly coerced."The Supreme Court has expressly held that "`consent' * * * given only after the official conducting the search has asserted he possesses a warrant" is not a valid consent when the only showing is "no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority."Id. at 548-549, 88 S.Ct. at 1792.

The facts supporting "voluntary consent" are much stronger in Bumper than here.See391 U.S. at 547 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1788 n. 8.The Supreme Court, however, has made clear:

"When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.The situation is instinct with coercion — albeit colorably lawful coercion.Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."Id. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792.

See alsoOverton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85, 89 S.Ct. 252, 21 L.Ed.2d 218(1968)(per curiam).

An officer must have a legal basis for obtaining access to private living quarters under the badge of his office and the authority of the law.The clear logic of this rule is that a search conducted by reason of consent given upon representation of a warrant validly issued will not be lawful unless the warrant itself was validly issued.¹

The legal sufficiency of the affidavit for the search warrant, although not passed upon by the district court is a question of law and merits our review without remand.

The affidavit of the deputy sheriff reads as follows:

"* * * That he(Parker) has just and reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, upon information, that there is concealed or kept as hereinafter described, the following property, to-wit: Tools and picks and equipment for burglarizing telephone booths and a coin receptacle from the telephone booth in the Mark Schmidt Frontier Filling Station, 317 West 23rd, Fremont, Nebraska, that said property is concealed or kept in, on, or about the following described place or person, to-wit: Apartment 3 of the Claasen Apartments and all other areas of the apartment building to which Sharon Bradbury Stanek may have access; that said property is under the control or custody of Sharon Bradbury Stanek; that the following are the grounds for issuance of a search warrant for said property and the reasons for his belief, to-wit: George McCreary, Sharon Bradbury Stanek and Georgia Jones were in the filling station at about the time the money was taken and a reliable informant has informed me that he heard money making noise in a box while McCreary and Stanek were in the phone booth and Jones was talking to him.After the break-in the subjects were seen leaving the above apartment building by a Fremont Police Officer, Fred Whitt.The break-in occurred about 9:15 P.M. December 10, 1964.The warrant should be issued for an immediate search in the night time because to wait until day time will increase the possibility of the items being moved, and the public good required that the warrant be issued for night time search. * * *"

Before issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must satisfy himself that the affidavit meets the test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723(1964).This test has two aspects: (1) whether the informant is in fact reliable, and (2) whether the "underlying circumstances" as to how the informant came by his information demonstrate sufficient probability of credibility to allow the search of the premises in question.

This two-pronged test must be weighed with the added analysis of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637(1969).When the affidavit is based upon the hearsay of an informant, the statement as to reliability of the informant must include as well the affiant's "reason in support of this conclusion."The additional significance we glean from Spinelli is that the magistrate must assure himself that the affidavit is not merely based upon "casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation."89 S.Ct. at 589.However, older principles repeated in Spinelli are worthy of abbreviation here.In dealing with the sufficiency of affidavits (1) only a probability of criminal conduct need be shown, (2) standards less rigorous than rules of evidence determine sufficiency, (3) common sense controls and (4)"great deference" should be shown by the courts to a magistrate's determination of probable cause.

We have carefully reviewed the affidavit here and find there exists no "diluting of important safeguards" in showing deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause.However, in finding probable cause we are compelled to do so upon different reasons than those expressed by the state court.

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that since the informant had been identified as the filling station attendant at the time of trial, sufficient reliability had been established.A ...