McCrone v. Bank One Corp.
Decision Date | 28 December 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 2004-1063.,No. 2004-1065.,2004-1063.,2004-1065. |
Citation | 107 Ohio St.3d 272,839 N.E.2d 1,2005 Ohio 6505 |
Parties | McCRONE, Appellee, v. BANK ONE CORPORATION; Kielmeyer, Admr., Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Brian Law Offices, Richard F. Brian, and Steven J. Brian, North Canton, for appellee.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Diane Richards Brey and Franklin E. Crawford, Deputy Solicitors, and J. Quinn Dorgan, Assistant Solicitor, for appellant, Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation.
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Robert C. Meyer, Canton, and Brett L. Miller, Columbus, for Bank One Corporation.
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and William A. Thorman III, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. Jaffy, and Marc J. Jaffy, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO.
{¶ 1} The question presented is whether R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) violates equal protection by excluding psychological or psychiatric injuries from workers' compensation coverage. We hold that it does not.
{¶ 2} Appellee, Kimberly McCrone, was an employee of Bank One Corporation from 1998 to 2001. During her employment, the branch in which she worked was robbed twice. At the first robbery on December 20, 2000, McCrone was present but was not the teller involved; however, she was the teller robbed on August 4, 2001. Although McCrone returned to work without claiming adverse effects after the first robbery, after the second she was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and has not worked for the bank since. She filed for workers' compensation benefits for her psychological condition stemming from the second robbery, but benefits were denied because she had not suffered a physical injury.1 McCrone exhausted her administrative appeals and then filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County. She challenged R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), the statute that excludes psychological or psychiatric conditions from the definition of "injury" for workers' compensation purposes, on constitutional grounds, alleging that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, as well as Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.2
{¶ 3} The bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied, and R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) was ruled unconstitutional as applied to McCrone. The trial court found that the exclusion of psychological injuries from workers' compensation coverage was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and thus found an equal protection violation. The Court of Appeals for Stark County affirmed. McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 2nd Dist. No. 2003CA00092, 2004-Ohio-2538, 2004 WL 1111021.
{¶ 4} These cases come before us upon acceptance of a discretionary appeal of the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC"), as well as upon the certification of a conflict from the Court of Appeals for Stark County. We found that a conflict exists. 103 Ohio St.3d 1459, 2004-Ohio-5056, 815 N.E.2d 676.
{¶ 5} The certified question asks "[w]hether R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, where it excludes from Workers' Compensation coverage psychological or psychiatric conditions occurring in the course of and arising out of the claimant's employment, but [which] do not arise from or occur contemporaneously with a compensable physical injury."
{¶ 6} Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In like manner, Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution, provides that Simply stated, the Equal Protection Clauses require that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like circumstances.
{¶ 7} The limitations placed upon governmental action by the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses are essentially the same. See Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (, )reversed on other grounds (1999), 526 U.S. 124, 119 S.Ct. 1162, 143 L.Ed.2d 227; Porter v. Oberlin (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 143, 151-152, 30 O.O.2d 491, 205 N.E.2d 363; State ex rel. Struble v. Davis (1937), 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 8 O.O. 552, 9 N.E.2d 684.
{¶ 8} "A statutory classification which involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio or United States Constitutions [sic] if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181. Since no one argues that fundamental rights or suspect classes are implicated in this case, the correct standard to be applied is the rational-basis test. Under this test, "" State ex rel. Nyitray v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 179, 2 OBR 715, 443 N.E.2d 962 (Krupansky, J., dissenting), quoting Dandridge v. Williams (1970), 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491.
{¶ 9} The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis. We must first identify a valid state interest. Second, we must determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational. See Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 260, 267, 652 N.E.2d 952. A statute will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and this court will not invalidate a plan of classification adopted by the General Assembly, unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. State ex rel. Lourin v. Indus. Comm. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 618, 620, 21 O.O. 490, 37 N.E.2d 595, overruled on other grounds, Caruso v. Alum. Co. of Am. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 306, 15 OBR 436, 473 N.E.2d 818. Thus, provided that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it will be upheld.
{¶ 10} Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution vests in the General Assembly the right to establish a workers' compensation system. It provides:
{¶ 11} McCrone claims that her equal protection rights have been violated because she is unable to benefit from workers' compensation coverage, since she has suffered no physical injury. First we must examine the statutory definition at issue.
{¶ 12} The General Assembly first defined the word "injury" for workers' compensation purposes as "any injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." G.C. 1465-68, 117 Ohio Laws 109, effective July 10, 1937. In 1959, the following italicized language was added to the term "injury" in R.C. 4123.01(C): "`Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." Am.Sub.H.B. No. 470, 128 Ohio Laws 743, 745, effective November 2, 1959.
{¶ 13} In 1986, R.C. 4123.01(C) was amended to define what constitutes a workers' compensation injury and what does not. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 718. R.C. 4123.01(C) provides:
{¶ 14} "`Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. `Injury' does not include:
{¶ 15} "(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease."
{¶ 16} Both before and after these amendments, courts have held that compensable injuries under the workers' compensation system require a physical component suffered by the claimant.3 In Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 292, 23 O.O. 496, 43 N.E.2d 266, overruled on other grounds, Village v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 129, 15 OBR 279, 472 N.E.2d...
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