McCue v. State of Kan., Dept. of Human Resources, s. 96-3412
| Decision Date | 07 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-3412,97-3004 and 97-3238,s. 96-3412 |
| Citation | 165 F.3d 784 |
| Parties | 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1183, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,695, 1999 CJ C.A.R. 1340 Caryn McCUE, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES; Joe Dick; Joseph Ybarra; Bill Medlock; Bob Molander, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Deanne Watts Hay, of Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, L.L.C., Topeka, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
Timothy W. Monsees, of Monsees, Miller & Defeo, Kansas City, Missouri, for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Before BALDOCK, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
During her employ as a special investigator with the Quality Control Unit of the Kansas Department of Human Resources, plaintiff Caryn McCue was allegedly sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, defendant Joseph Ybarra. After three years of The Department appeals the district court's jury instructions, failure to dismiss as a matter of law, admission of certain evidence, submission of the issue of front pay to the jury, and the award of attorneys' fees. Ms. McCue cross-appeals the district court's grants of summary judgment against her claims, and admission and exclusion of certain evidence. We affirm the district court's challenged jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and its ruling on the judgment as a matter of law; we reverse the court's ruling on front pay; and we remand for further action. Pursuant to Ms. McCue's motion for voluntary dismissal and Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss Ms. McCue's cross-appeals.
alleged harassment, she filed an internal complaint, and nearly three years later she was discharged. She filed the instant suit approximately two years after her termination. She brought actions against the State of Kansas, the Department of Human Resources ("Department"), and various Department employees, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, defamation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on several claims, retaining jurisdiction only over the Title VII retaliation action against the Department. At trial, a jury found for Ms. McCue on the retaliation claim and returned a verdict, part advisory and part binding, of $300,000 ($50,000 emotional distress; $75,000 back pay; $175,000 front pay). The district court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and subsequently granted Ms. McCue's application for attorneys' fees.
Caryn McCue, the plaintiff, is a former employee of the Kansas Department of Human Resources. Ms. McCue alleges that from 1986 to October, 1990, her supervisor, defendant Joseph Ybarra, harassed her by soliciting her for sex, making lewd comments about her, and threatening her job security should she ever complain of his behavior.
On October 4, 1990, Ms. McCue filed an internal discrimination complaint. The Department subsequently had defendant Bill Medlock intervene to supervise Ms. McCue and to prevent future contact between Ms. McCue and Mr. Ybarra. Upon hearing of Ms. McCue's internal complaint, Mr. Ybarra allegedly said he was going to fire Ms. McCue. One and one half months later, Ms. McCue received her first unsatisfactory evaluation in twelve years.
On February 2, 1991, Ms. McCue filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and with the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights. The charge alleged Mr. Ybarra had retaliated for her having filed an internal complaint; on April 10, 1991, Ms. McCue amended the charge to include an allegation of sexual harassment. On January 11, 1993, the EEOC issued Ms. McCue a "right to sue" letter indicating that she had ninety days in which to file her claim.
The Department discharged the plaintiff on August 19, 1993, allegedly for unsatisfactory work performance. Ms. McCue filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC on September 15, 1993. She filed the instant suit on March 9, 1995.
The State first challenges the district court's instructions to the jury and the district court's refusal to grant its motion for judgment as a matter of law. These challenges rest on the State's assertion that, as a matter of law, the State cannot intend to act absent a statutory authorization to an authorized agent allowing such action be taken on behalf of the state. More simply, the State argues it can only have intent as outlined in statutes or pursuant to state policy. The State thus argues that because state policy forbids retaliation, the State cannot be liable.
We review the district court's decision to give or not give a particular instruction for abuse of discretion, Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir.1996), but such a decision is reviewed de novo when "the real question raised by [appellant's] proposed instructions" is whether the jury should decide the matter at all--a question of law. United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 1491 (10th Cir.1991). "We review de novo the district court's determination of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court." Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1450 (10th Cir.1997).
In denying the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court found the State's argument unsound in its suggestion that "intent [for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim] must reside in the entity with final termination authority." McCue v. Kansas Dep't of Human Resources, No. CIV.A.95-2116-DES, 1997 WL 231044, at * 1 (D.Kan. Apr.24, 1997) [hereinafter, "District Opinion"]. The court noted that the State provided no support for this premise, and that were the premise true, the resulting law would be unreasonable--"reward[ing] deceitfulness by insulating an organization from liability for retaliatory discharge where the decision-maker is kept ignorant of its subordinates' scheme." Id.
On appeal, the State has presented us some authority, but it is not pertinent to our inquiry. The cases cited by the State are section 1983 cases and a Title IX case. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (§ 1983 action); Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Distr., 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (§ 1983 action); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Distr., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) (Title IX action). There is no basis for analogizing from the section 1983 and Title IX cases to Title VII cases. Title VII applies specifically to "employers." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. "Employers" are defined to include "agents" of the actual employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. As a result of this clear statutory instruction, courts have long and consistently held that the scope of liability in Title VII actions is defined by the law of agency. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1993).
Employer liability in section 1983 actions is restricted away from agency principles because section 1983 permits a lawsuit against a "person" in his individual capacity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title IX does not even include an explicit private right of action, although the Supreme Court has implied a right of action to enforce the general guarantee provided for by Title IX. See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1994. The distinctions in language, form, purpose, and content of the three statutes preclude any reasonable analogies between them with regard to the applicability of respondeat superior in actions maintained under each statute. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted this distinction expressly when it found that agency principles would not apply under Title IX. See id. at 1996 ().
There is simply no basis to restrict liability in Title VII retaliation actions away from the law of agency. The plain language of the statute establishes that agency principles control liability, as do court decisions interpreting the statute and comparing it to other statutes. Finally, permitting such a loophole for avoiding liability would effectively destroy any Title VII retaliation actions. The district court erred neither in its instructions to the jury nor in its denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The State identifies three evidentiary errors and one error in failure to give a limiting instruction, the cumulative effect of which, it argues, impacted the verdict and mandates a new trial. We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir.1995). We also review the district court's decision to limit or refusal to limit the scope of evidence for abuse of discretion. Messina v. Kroblin Trans. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir.1990).
We hold the district court may have erred in admitting bad character evidence about Mr. Medlock, and erred in failing to offer a limiting instruction on the use of Exhibit 33. However, the potential error and error were each harmless, and the two errors are harmless when weighed cumulatively.
The district court dismissed Ms. McCue's Title VII harassment claim as time-barred on the State's motion for summary judgment. Ms. McCue's Title VII retaliation claim was allowed to proceed. In the retaliation trial the district court denied State's motion in limine to exclude evidence of alleged sexual harassment of Ms. McCue by her supervisor, Mr. Ybarra.
The State objects to the evidence on the grounds that it is irrelevant and highly prejudicial. W...
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