McCuistion v. City of Siloam Springs, 78-231

• Decision Date: 03 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-231,78-231
• Citation: 594 S.W.2d 233,268 Ark. 148
• Parties: Ted R. McCUISTION and Tobert M. McCuistion, Appellants, v. CITY OF SILOAM SPRINGS, Arkansas et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 233

594 S.W.2d 233

268 Ark. 148

Ted R. McCUISTION and Tobert M. McCuistion, Appellants, v.CITY OF SILOAM SPRINGS, Arkansas et al., Appellees.

No. 78-231.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 3, 1980.

Pearson & Woodruff by Ronald G. Woodruff and P. Karen Pope, Fayetteville, for appellants.

Kelley, Luffman & Matthews, P. A. by Eugene T. Kelley and Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Rogers, Myers & Thomas by Stephen S. Thomas and John David Myers, Siloam Springs, for appellees.

HOLT, Justice.

Appellants financed and constructed a sewer line in Siloam Springs which they claim was pursuant to a contract whereby appellee city agreed to collect charges from individuals and businesses tying onto the line and remit those charges to appellants for fifteen years as reimbursement for appellants' construction of the line.At the end of the fifteen year period, title to the line would vest in the city.When the city failed to remit these charges, appellants filed suit against it for breach of contract seeking judgment for all fees or charges collected from third parties or, in the alternative, recovery of $40,000 (cost of construction) on the basis of unjust enrichment.They also sought injunctive relief to prevent appelleeApartment House Builders, Inc., from connecting its units.Based on interrogatories, the jury found there was a written contract between appellants and the city, and the contract was approved by the city council.It awarded the appellants $25,000 on the breach of contract claim against the city and found that $2,500 was a reasonable charge for Builders tying onto the sewer line.The court sustained the city's and Builders' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and set aside the jury verdict.Appellants seek reinstatement of the verdict as to the city only.

Appellants first contend that the trial court erred in finding there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that a written contract existed between the city and the appellants.It is well settled that the trial court may enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, and one party is entitled by law to a judgment in his favor.Westside Motors v. Curtis, 256 Ark. 237, 506 S.W.2d 563(1974);andSpink v. Mourton, 235 Ark. 919, 362 S.W.2d 665(1962).On appeal we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered.SeeWestside Motors v. Curtis, supra;andHome Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Cartmell, 245 Ark. 45, 430 S.W.2d 849(1968).

We review the uncontradicted evidence concerning the existence of a contract.AppellantTed McCuistion testified that the sewer line was constructed by the appellants in 1969.The 3,750' sewer line terminated at and serviced property he owned for development purposes.According to the agreement, the city was to collect and pay the appellants for enumerated tie or tap-on charges for a period of fifteen years to apply on reimbursement of appellants' costs.Appellants' title to the line would revert to the city at the end of that period of time.He and his brother, Robert, had signed three copies of the contract in the office of the city attorney, who drafted the contract and also took it to the city hall for "signature(s)."He either saw the executed copies or the city attorney (his attorney also) told him they were approved.He was never furnished an executed copy.Robert corroborated Ted's testimony that they had signed the asserted sewer project agreement although he could not remember seeing any other signature.It is not disputed that appellants constructed the sewer line according to the city's specifications.The city clerk testified that she was to withhold certain sewer tie-on charges or tap fees in a separate account pending the outcome of the present litigation and, further, that sometimes the city paid tap fees to a construction contractor.The clerk and a member of the city council testified there was an agreement by the city to absorb the cost difference between an 8 pipe (agreed to during the initial negotiations) and a 10 pipe (later agreed to on advice of the city engineer).The city council's minutes corroborated this agreed change.This same council member testified that he thought the original agreement was written up in contract form, and he was "sure" that he had seen it.He found no record of the contract or of a resolution by the council authorizing the mayor and city clerk or recorder to enter into the contract.A former mayor (not the mayor at the inception of the project when the contracts would have been signed) testified that he assumed that there was a signed contract.There is evidence that the city aided the appellants in the construction of the sewer line by procuring easements, furnishing manholes and paying for engineering services.There was no profit made (as the jury found) by the appellants.Normally the city would approve this type of contract.The city has been collecting and retaining the tap-on fees.It appears no one denies the existence of the asserted contract.When we view the evidence most favorably with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in favor of the appellants, we hold there is substantial evidence to support a finding that the asserted contract existed between the parties.

Even so, appellee city argues that the contract was not formally authorized or approved by the city council as required by Ark.Stat.Ann. § 19-2311(Repl. 1968).Therefore recovery is barred on appellants' theory of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.Even though it is an unenforceable contract for lack of authorization, it does not preclude a recovery on these theories.Revis v. Harris, 219 Ark. 586, 243 S.W.2d 747(1951);Gladson v. Wilson, 196 Ark. 996, 120 S.W.2d 732(1938);International Harvester Co. v. Searcy County, 136 Ark. 209, 206 S.W. 312(1918);Smith v. Dandridge, 98 Ark. 38, 135 S.W. 800(1911);andFrick v. Brinkley, 61 Ark. 397, 33 S.W. 527(1894).See alsoDay v. City of Malvern, 195 Ark. 804, 114 S.W.2d 459(1938).These cases, in effect, hold that a void or illegal contract does not necessarily prevent recovery.In other words, a party cannot retain the benefits of a defective contract and at the same time avoid paying for these benefits.Here, however, as we construe the interrogatories, the issue of unjust enrichment, which would have been based upon the value to the city and not the value to the appellants, was never presented to the jury.Also it appears the court refused to submit instructions on implied contract and quantum meruit.

However, as previously indicated, there is substantial evidence that a contract existed.We must, therefore, look to the terms of the contract for any measure of damages due the appellants.The contract provided that for fifteen years the city would collect and pay to appellants all charges from those connecting onto the sewer line.AppellantTed McCuistion testified there was to be a $500 tie-on fee for each residential connection, $1,500 for each commercial installation and $2,500 for a laundry connection.An Exxon station, Scarbrough Ford and Tri-State Ford were tied on.It appears appellants would have received $4,500 for these connections.A fee of $500 was collected from Herford Manor Apartments as the total due on the multi-unit apartment complex.The jury found, however, the charge should have been $2,500 (an additional $2,000).Although the clerk testified that she was holding tap-on fees in the amount of $750 in a separate account, it is unclear as to what part of the above fees, if any, were included in that account.Clearly, under the terms of the contract, the $25,000 jury verdict in favor of the appellants is unsupported by the evidence as to tap-on charges collected by the city.Viewing the evidence most favorably, the total award would justify at the most $7,750.

If this amount is accepted within 17 calendar days, the verdict is reinstated to that extent.Otherwise the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with the right of appellants, upon proper proof at a retrial, to submit the issue of unjust enrichment, implied or quasi contract, to the jury.

Reversed and remanded.

FOGLEMAN, C. J., and PURTLE, J., concur.

FOGLEMAN, Chief Justice, concurring.

This case has some rather unusual features which are perplexing and difficult to deal with on the abstracted record.Appellants alleged in their complaint that the contract between them and the city called for the city to collect and receive all monthly sewer fees or charges required to be paid by users of the sewer line which appellants agreed to construct, to collect and receive all charges made to others for connecting to the line and to remit all such fees and charges to appellants for 15 years, after the passage of which the sewer line would become the property of the city.They admit that the city had performed its obligations to provide the manholes on the line, to furnish and pay for engineering services, to obtain and furnish necessary easements from third parties, and to pay the difference in cost of the ten-inch line the city desired and the eight-inch line appellants had agreed to construct, but that the city had collected large sums of money for connection fees or charges and had refused to pay them to appellants.They asserted in their complaint that, if the contract for construction could not be established or enforced, they were entitled to judgment for $40,000 on the basis that the city had been unjustly enriched in that amount.According to the testimony of appellants, $40,000 was the amount it cost them to build the line, although it seems that some of the items included in arriving at this figure were questionable.Their prayer was to recover the amounts collected by the city, or, in the alternative, $40,000 for unjust...