McCullen v. Coakley

Decision Date08 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 08-2310.,08-2310.
Citation571 F.3d 167
PartiesEleanor McCULLEN et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Martha COAKLEY, Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendant, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Michael J. DePrimo, with whom Philip D. Moran, Philip D. Moran P.C., Benjamin W. Bull, and Alliance Defense Fund were on brief, for appellants.

Dwight G. Duncan and Colbe Mazzarella on brief for Marlynda Augelli, Susanna Brennan, Cynthia Brown, Magdalena Castro, Alveda King, Anita Manninen, Esther Ripplinger, and Molly White, amici curiae.

Kenneth W. Salinger, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General, and Anna-Marie Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellee.

Robert E. McDonnell, Laura K. Langley, Josephine Deang, and Bingham McCutchen LLP on brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Mass., amicus curiae.

Before HOWARD, SELYA and HANSEN,* Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

For more than three decades, those who advocate for a woman's right to choose and those who advocate for the right to life (based on a belief that life begins at the moment of conception) have struggled for advantage in the marketplace of ideas. A series of pitched battles, forming a part of this struggle, has been waged at free-standing abortion clinics, where protestors and anti-abortion counselors seek to dissuade prospective patients, shame clinic workers, and call attention to what they perceive as the evils of voluntary terminations of pregnancies. In this campaign Massachusetts has been a battleground state.

This appeal arises out of yet another skirmish in this chronicle of discord. In a very real sense, genesis of the appeal dates back to the dawning of the millennium. At that time, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute that created a floating buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics throughout the state.1

Given the benefit of hindsight, the legislature revised the law seven years later. The modified version of the statute replaced the floating buffer zone with a 35-foot fixed buffer zone. This appeal involves a multi-pronged facial challenge to the constitutionality of the modified statute.

In a thoughtful and comprehensive opinion, the district court rejected the facial challenge in all its iterations and refused to enjoin enforcement of the new law. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F.Supp.2d 382 (D.Mass.2008). After careful consideration of the record, the parties' briefs, some helpful friend-of-the-court briefs, and the arguments made orally, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In this case, as in so many cases, the past informs the present. We start there.

By the end of the twentieth century, Massachusetts had experienced repeated incidents involving violence and other unduly aggressive behaviors in the vicinity of reproductive health care facilities (RHCFs). Choosing among a host of possible preventive measures, the legislature took up a bill that proposed creating a fixed 25-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of RHCFs.

The state senate held a hearing on the bill in April 1999 and received evidence of widespread harassment and intimidation outside RHCFs. Numerous witnesses addressed not only the peculiar vulnerability of women seeking abortion services but also the deleterious effects of overly aggressive demonstrations on both patient and provider safety. The senate concluded that existing laws did not adequately safeguard clinic staff, prospective patients, or members of the public.

As part of its due diligence, the senate asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the proposed law. The SJC discerned no constitutional impediment. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 430 Mass. 1205, 723 N.E.2d 1, 6 (2000).

The senate subsequently engrossed a bill intended to enhance public safety in and around RHCFs while maintaining the relatively free flow of traffic. See Mass. S. Jour., Feb. 29, 2000. That bill resembled the original senate bill.

Before the house of representatives could act on the senate bill, the United States Supreme Court decided Hill v. Colorado, in which the Justices upheld, as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, a Colorado statute designed to ameliorate the same panoply of evils through the use of a floating buffer zone. 530 U.S. 703, 707-08, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). The Colorado statute synthesized the fixed and floating buffer zone concepts, making it unlawful within a 100-foot fixed zone for any person, in the absence of consent, to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another person "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person." Id. at 707, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (quoting Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-9-122(3)).

The Massachusetts legislature recognized that Hill had shed new light on the legal landscape. Thus, the house tabled the senate bill and repaired to the drawing board. The legislature eventually enacted a law that was loosely patterned on the Colorado statute. See An Act Relative to Reproductive Health Care Facilities (2000 Act), S.B. 148, 181st Gen. Ct. (Mass. Aug. 10, 2000). The key component of the 2000 Act was a prohibition against knowingly approaching within six feet of another without consent for certain defined protest-related purposes. Because the prohibition only operated within an 18-foot fixed buffer zone around RHCF entrances, exits, and driveways, it mimicked the Colorado law in combining floating and fixed buffer zone concepts.

A group of Massachusetts residents who wished to protest in front of RHCFs mounted both facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of the new enactment. In successive decisions, we rejected those challenges. See McGuire v. Reilly (McGuire I), 260 F.3d 36, 51 (1st Cir.2001) (rejecting facial challenges); McGuire v. Reilly (McGuire II), 386 F.3d 45, 65-66 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting renewed facial challenges as well as as-applied challenges).

Over time, legislators became concerned that the statute had failed to achieve its desired goals. In 2007, the legislature held public hearings devoted to the need for rewriting the statute. Testimony (including statements from law enforcement officials and clinic workers) revealed unanticipated difficulties in enforcing the 2000 Act and called into question that Act's efficacy. The upshot was a decision to reshape the law by, among other things, repudiating the floating buffer zone concept and relying instead on a 35-foot fixed buffer zone.

On November 8, 2007, the legislature enacted the revised law. See An Act Relative to Public Safety at Reproductive Health Care Facilities (2007 Act), S.B. 1353, 185th Gen. Ct. (Mass. Nov. 13, 2007). It declares that "[n]o person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to [an RHCF]" within a designated buffer zone. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E 1/2(b) (2007). The Act describes the new buffer zone as comprising

a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive health care facility or within the area within a rectangle created by extending the outside boundaries of any entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive health care facility in straight lines to the point where such lines intersect the sidelines of the street in front of such entrance, exit or driveway.

Id. Moreover, the law prohibits all persons from entering or remaining within the buffer zone during ordinary business hours, subject to exceptions for four classes of persons, namely:

(1) persons entering or leaving such facility;

(2) employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment;

(3) law enforcement, ambulance, firefighting, construction, utilities, public works and other municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment; and

(4) persons using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to such facility solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than such facility.

Id. Each of these exceptions derives from the 2000 Act. And the 2007 Act, like the 2000 Act, also requires that the buffer zone be clearly marked. See id.

On January 25, 2008, the Attorney General sent a letter to an audience that included law enforcement and RHCF personnel. The letter purports to summarize the provisions of the 2007 Act and to furnish "guidance to assist ... in applying the four exemptions." This guidance comprises four paragraphs, set forth verbatim in an appendix to this opinion.

II. TRAVEL OF THE CASE

On January 16, 2008, plaintiffs-appellants Eleanor McCullen, Jean Blackburn Zarrella, Gregory A. Smith, Carmel Farrell, and Eric Caden, all Massachusetts residents who regularly engage in pro-life counseling outside RHCFs, sued the Attorney General of Massachusetts, in her representative capacity, in the federal district court. Their complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, limned a constellation of constitutional claims, and prayed for declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at derailing the 2007 Act. Without objection, the district court bifurcated the case into facial and as-applied challenges. As to the former, the court consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with the hearing on the merits, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2), and began a bench trial on May 28, 2008.

In due season, the court issued a decision denying relief. McCullen, 573 F.Supp.2d at 425. This interlocutory appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

We begin our odyssey by outlining the legal standards that apply generally to facial challenges and then proceed to the myriad prongs of the plaintiffs' facial challenge. Because the issues raised on appeal implicate the First Amendment, they engender de novo review. See Bose...

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