McCullough v. Brandt
| Decision Date | 28 February 1967 |
| Parties | Simeon McCULLOUGH, Appellant, v. Carl L. BRANDT, Sr., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
William F. Krueger, Wausau, for appellant.
A. D. Sutherland, Fond du Lac, for respondents.
The question involved on this appeal is whether the plaintiff insurance salesman is entitled to commissions on all renewal premiums under the terms of the insurance contract.
The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to commissions on all premiums paid hereafter regardless of when paid. The defendant contends that plaintiff is entitled to commissions only on such premiums within such one year period.
Paragraph 4 of the contract is the only section requiring interpretation to resolve the case. It reads as follows:
The plaintiff argues that par. 4 means that plaintiff was given a probationary period of two years and that once the probationary period ended and the contract was continued, he is entitled to future commissions on policies sold by him no matter when paid.
We believe such an interpretation would require reading into the contract far more than the provisions will allow.
There does not appear to be any logical reason for distinguishing between renewal premiums on policies sold during the so-called probationary period in the event of termination before the two-year period expired and policies sold subsequent to the original contract period where the contract was continued.
By accepting the plaintiff's construction of the contract the court would be severing from the contract the clause limiting commissions to one year after termination of the contract.
In the interpretation of a contract the contract must be considered as a whole in order to give each of its provisions the meaning intended by the parties. Ketay v. Gorenstein (1952), 261 Wis. 332, 53 N.W.2d 6.
The argument of plaintiff would make the limitation period surplusage and valueless. Other things being equal, a construction which gives effect to every word of a contract should be preferred to one which results in surplusage. Knuth v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1957), 275 Wis. 603, 604, 83 N.W.2d 126.
This court, in Nelson v. Boos (1959), 7 Wis.2d 393, 399, 96 N.W.2d 813, 817, said:
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