McCullough v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 13838,13838
• Citation: 657 P.2d 1157,99 Nev. 72
• Parties: Joseph Lewis McCULLOUGH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 1157

657 P.2d 1157

99 Nev. 72

Joseph Lewis McCULLOUGH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 13838.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Feb. 10, 1983.

Thomas E. Perkins, State Public Defender, Annabelle Whiting Hall, Deputy Public Defender, Carson City, for appellant.

[99 Nev. 73] Brian McKay, Atty. Gen., Dan R. Reaser, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, Virginia R. Shane, Dist. Atty., Jack T. Bullock, II, Deputy Dist. Atty., Winnemucca, for respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury found appellant Joseph Lewis McCullough guilty of possession of a controlled substance and possession of stolen property. Among other contentions, McCullough argues on appeal that the jury was prejudicially misinformed regarding the concept of reasonable doubt, because the district judge made several attempts to quantify reasonable doubt during the voir dire examination of the jurors and also delivered an improper jury instruction on the subject. A review of the authorities and the record leads us to agree with appellant, and we therefore reverse.

THE FACTS

McCullough was charged with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) and possession of stolen property (a 1974 Chevrolet "Luv" pickup truck).

During the voir dire examination of the jurors during trial, the district judge attempted to illustrate the concept of reasonable doubt with a numerical scale. On a scale of zero to ten, the judge placed the preliminary hearing standard of probable cause at about one, and the burden of persuasion in civil trials at just over five. He then twice described reasonable doubt as about "seven and a half, if you had to put it on a scale." After introducing the jurors to the reasonable doubt standard provided by NRS 175.211, the judge again noted, "I have tried to give you that on a zero to ten scale."

The district judge further embellished the statutory definition of reasonable doubt in his instructions to the jury, stating in instruction number five that "it is not necessary that the defendant's guilt should be established beyond any doubt or to an absolute certainty ...." McCullough's trial counsel did not object to the judge's extemporaneous characterizations of reasonable doubt, nor did she object to the above instruction. ¹

FAILURE TO OBJECT

The general rule is that failure to object to asserted errors at trial will bar review of an issue on appeal. Krueger v. State, 92 Nev. 749, 755, 557 P.2d 717, 721 (1976); Walker v. State, 89 Nev. 568, 516 P.2d 739 (1973); Clark v. State, 89 Nev. 392, 513 P.2d 1224 (1973). However, when constitutional questions are raised on appeal, we have the power to address them. Dias v. State, 95 Nev. 710, 601 P.2d 706 (1979); Hardison v. State, 84 Nev. 125, 437 P.2d 868 (1968). We believe that the issues in this case are of constitutional dimension. See Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978).

DEFINING REASONABLE DOUBT

In NRS 175.211, the Legislature has both defined reasonable doubt and mandated that no other definition shall be given to juries in criminal actions in Nevada. ² Despite our frequent condemnations of the practice, the lower courts of this state have persisted in adding to the statutory reasonable doubt definition. See, e.g., Page v. State, 94 Nev. 386, 580 P.2d 477 (1978); Jackson v. State, 93 Nev. 677, 572 P.2d 927 (1977); Tucker v. State, 92 Nev. 486, 553 P.2d 951 (1976). Instruction number five in this case is identical to the supplemental instruction disapproved in Page and Jackson, where we held that, standing alone, the instruction was not reversible error. ³ We now hold that the disapproved instruction is reversible error when coupled with any other attempt to supplement, change, or clarify the statutory reasonable doubt definition.

In the instant case, the district judge tried to edify the jury by placing the reasonable doubt concept on a numerical scale. While an attempt by the trial court to clarify the meaning of reasonable doubt is not by itself reversible error, see Page v. State and Jackson v. State, supra, the question on appeal is whether the court's statements correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); State v. Olivera, 57 Hawaii 339, 555 P.2d 1199 (1976).

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the reasonable doubt instruction should impress on the jury the need to reach a "subjective state of near certitude" on the facts in issue. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). For example, where a trial court had punctuated the statutory reasonable doubt definition with statements to the effect that the state was not required to establish guilt "beyond all doubt," to an "absolute positive certainty," to a "mathematical certainty," or to a "scientific certainty," the judgment was reversed on the grounds that the instruction impermissibly favored the prosecution. State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 421 A.2d 124 (1980).

The concept of reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify it may impermissibly lower the prosecution's burden of proof, and is likely to confuse rather than clarify. See Dunn v....