McCurdy v. Greyhound Corporation

• Decision Date: 18 May 1965
• Docket Number: No. 15122.,15122.
• Citation: 346 F.2d 224
• Parties: Alberta M. McCURDY, Administratrix of the Estate of Robert A. McCurdy, Deceased, Appellant, v. GREYHOUND CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

346 F.2d 224 (1965)

Alberta M. McCURDY, Administratrix of the Estate of Robert A. McCurdy, Deceased, Appellant, v. GREYHOUND CORPORATION.

No. 15122.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued April 23, 1965.

Decided May 18, 1965.

James C. Larrimer, Dougherty, Larrimer & Lee, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

Randall J. McConnell, Jr., Dickie, McCamey, Chilcote & Robinson, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.

Before McLAUGHLIN, STALEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

STALEY, Circuit Judge.

The administratrix of Robert A. McCurdy brought this wrongful death action, alleging negligence on the part of defendant's employee-bus driver. Federal jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citizenship.¹ The accident allegedly occurred when McCurdy, who was driving along a main street in the city of Pittsburgh, was blinded temporarily by the bright lights of a bus approaching him from the rear. This caused him to crash into a safety island in the center of the street. He allegedly sustained brain damage which led directly to his death four days later. No one but McCurdy saw the accident. The only evidence offered to prove that the bus was responsible for the accident was a statement made by McCurdy to police officers who arrived at the scene shortly after the event occurred. The statement was deemed inadmissible by the district court which then directed a verdict against the plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied. As we are convinced that the statement came within the "res gestae" exception to the hearsay rule, we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial.

The essential facts can be briefly set forth. Plaintiff's decedent left work in the American Telephone & Telegraph Building in the downtown area of the city of Pittsburgh some time after 11:15 P.M. on June 24, 1962. A short time thereafter the accident happened. Although it is not possible to specify the time of the accident to the minute, it is clear that it must have happened some time between 11:30 and 11:45 P.M. One witness, who testified that he came out of a nearby building shortly after the event occurred, said that the police came within 10 or 15 minutes of his arrival.² It was stipulated by Greyhound that a bus left the terminal at approximately 11:30 P.M. This would have placed it at the scene of the accident a few minutes later. The police arrived at 11:45 P.M. They immediately asked McCurdy, who was seated in his car, how it had happened. He said that the lights from the Greyhound bus had caused it.

Testimony of other persons who had observed events from the sidewalk during the time between the accident and the arrival of the police was introduced at the trial to show that McCurdy was strongly under the influence of the event when the police arrived. Robert E. Cooper, a guard in a building adjacent to the street, went outside immediately after the accident. He found McCurdy getting out of the car and asked him what had happened. The only reply was an incomprehensible mumble. According to Cooper's testimony, McCurdy then

"* * * looked at his car and was looking at it and went over to the Union Trust Building the building in which Cooper worked then leaned there for a couple of seconds and then walked on toward the Penn-Sheraton Hotel the next building on the street * * *."

The police officers who arrived on the scene were in the course of their regular patrol. They had not been called by McCurdy. When they arrived, they found the decedent in the car. At this point, he was still "extremely nervous" and "shooken up".

Over the years the Pennsylvania courts and this court have recognized that a hearsay statement is admissible as part of the "res gestae" if made by a participant in the event during a period when he was, for any reason, incapable of reasoned reflection about the occurrence. Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (C.A.3, 1956); Campbell v. Gladden, 383 Pa. 144, 118 A.2d 133, 135, 53 A.L.R. 2d 1222 (1955); Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 760 (1952); Allen v. Mack, 345 Pa. 407, 28 A.2d 783 (1942); Broad Street Trust Co. v. Heyl Bros., 128 Pa.Super. 65, 193 A. 397 (1937); Smith v. Stoner, 243 Pa. 57, 89 A. 795, 797 (1914); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 62(4) (b); Model Code of Evidence, Rule 512. Such a statement is trustworthy if made during the period when "considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear" on the event. 3 Wigmore, Evidence 738 (2d ed.) as quoted in Allen v. Mack, 28 A.2d at 784. In each case the court is required to examine the facts in light of the general principles. Commonwealth v. Noble, supra. Thus, extensive examination of applicable authorities and comparison of decisions based on the analysis of other quite diverse fact patterns is neither necessary nor useful. No...