McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 21602

Decision Date20 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. 21602,21602
Citation128 Idaho 213,912 P.2d 100
PartiesFrank C. McCUSKEY, an individual, and Fred Bell, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CANYON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and Canyon County, Defendants-Respondents. Boise, December 1995 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Kenneth F. White, Nampa, for appellants.

David L. Young, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney; Charles L. Saari, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (argued), Caldwell, for respondents.

TROUT, Justice.

This is an inverse condemnation case in which Frank McCuskey (McCuskey) and Fred Bell (Bell) claim a temporary taking by Canyon County as a result of the County's refusal, through rescission of a building permit and issuance of a stop-work order, to allow McCuskey and Bell to construct a convenience store on their property. The County contends that McCuskey and Bell's action is time barred by I.C. § 5-224. We agree and affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Canyon County.

I. BACKGROUND

McCuskey acquired a parcel of land located in Canyon County in 1978, and sometime thereafter requested a building permit to construct a convenience store on the property believing the parcel to be zoned "heavy industrial." The permit was denied by the County because it contended the property was zoned "rural residential" pursuant to a 1979 Canyon County zoning ordinance. On November 5, 1986, McCuskey and Bell applied for a building permit to construct a Circle K store on the property. The permit was granted and Bell then submitted plans for the construction of a convenience store. On November 13, 1986, the Canyon County Planning and Zoning Commission issued a stop-work order on the construction, notified McCuskey of the stop-work order, and posted the property. All construction on the subject property thereupon ceased.

On December 11, 1986, McCuskey filed a petition for a declaratory judgment on the status of the building permit he had obtained and a writ of mandamus directing Canyon County to issue him a building permit to construct a convenience store. A petition for declaratory judgment on the zoning status of the subject property was filed by Canyon County on the following day. On March 29, 1993, this Court issued its opinion in McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993) (McCuskey I ) holding that the portion of the 1979 zoning ordinance which purported to downzone McCuskey's property was void. Id. at 663, 851 P.2d at 959. We also there denied McCuskey's request for a writ of mandamus. Id.

On February 16, 1994, McCuskey filed an inverse condemnation action, joined later by Bell, claiming a taking by the County between January 1, 1987, and March 29, 1993. The County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted on the basis that McCuskey and Bell's complaint was time barred. The district court converted the County's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment must be granted by a district court if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). A review by this Court of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the same as that required of the district court when it rules on the motion. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 610, 850 P.2d 749, 761 (1993) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court will liberally construe the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Id. (citing McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991)). If reasonable minds might reach different conclusions after all doubts are resolved against the moving party, then the district court's order granting summary judgment must be reversed. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) (citing Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982); Farmer's Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150 (1976)). If, however, the evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact then all that remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994) (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994)).

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The United States Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. Constitutional jurisprudence has extended this protection for property owners and, in addition to an outright taking, governmental interference with an owner's use or enjoyment of his private property may also require compensation. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1013-16, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2892-93, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). As Justice Holmes opined, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." ." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). If a regulation of private property that amounts to a taking is later invalidated, this action converts the taking to a "temporary" one for which the government must pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during that period. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S. 304, 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987).

In this case, Canyon County refused to allow McCuskey and Bell to build a convenience store on McCuskey's land because it contended that the land was zoned "rural residential" pursuant to a 1979 zoning ordinance. The County did issue a building permit to McCuskey on November 5, 1986, which would allow him to construct a Circle K store on his parcel. McCuskey and Bell's attempt to build a convenience store on the property was thwarted, however, when the Canyon County Planning and Zoning Commission issued a stop-work order on November 13, 1986. The order was fully complied with and all construction on the property ceased as of the following day. This Court resolved the underlying zoning dispute in McCuskey I finding that the portion of the 1979 ordinance which purported to downzone McCuskey's property was void.

McCuskey now seeks compensation for the County's interference with his use of the property, which he contends constituted a taking, during the period following the issuance of the stop-work order by the Canyon County Planning and Zoning Commission and until the date the opinion in McCuskey I was filed. 1 Although a zoning ordinance that downgrades the economic value of private property does not necessarily constitute a taking by the government, especially if some residual value remains after the enactment of the ordinance, County of Ada v. Henry, 105 Idaho 263, 266, 668 P.2d 994, 997 (1983), the issue of whether the County's actions here can properly be construed as a taking at all was not decided by the district court. The district court did not reach the substantive issue of whether the County's actions constituted an inverse condemnation because it found that McCuskey's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 2

The limitations period for inverse condemnation claims is contained in I.C. § 5-224 which is the statute of limitations for all actions not specifically provided for in another statute. See, e.g., Intermountain West, 111 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769. I.C. § 5-224 requires that claims within its purview "must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." In determining when the cause of action for an inverse condemnation claim accrues we note that while a taking is typically initiated when government acts to condemn property, the doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings. First English, 482 U.S. at 316, 107 S.Ct. at 2386. In such an informal taking this Court has decided that damages for inverse condemnation should be assessed at the time the taking occurs. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979) (citing Lobdell v. State, 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965)). The time of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiff's loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent. Intermountain West, 111 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769 (citing Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671, 603 P.2d at 1005). In this case, McCuskey was fully aware of the extent to which Canyon County interfered with his full use and enjoyment of the property in question on November 13, 1986, the date that McCuskey was notified, via issuance of a stop-work order, that he could not build the convenience store.

McCuskey argues that since the full extent of his damages could not have been known until this Court declared that the County's downzoning was void with respect to his property, a cause of action for the County's inverse condemnation should not have accrued until our opinion in McCuskey I had been issued. He likens his claim against Canyon County to that of a continuing tort in that the County's downzoning, issuance of a stop-work order and rescission of his building permit were in the nature of ongoing acts that served to continuously constrain him from using his property as he wished until the downzoning was adjudicated as void. See Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 401, 630 P.2d 685, 688 (1981)...

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