McDaniel v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 09 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 13 C 3624.,13 C 3624.
• Parties: Sherise McDANIEL, on behalf of herself and her son, E.E., Marshetta Ross, on behalf of herself and her son, M.R., Frances Newman and Alphonso Newman, on behalf of themselves and their sun, A.S., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Barbara Byrd–Bennett, Chief Executive Officer, and City of Chicago, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

956 F.Supp.2d 887

Sherise McDANIEL, on behalf of herself and her son, E.E., Marshetta Ross, on behalf of herself and her son, M.R., Frances Newman and Alphonso Newman, on behalf of themselves and their sun, A.S., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Barbara Byrd–Bennett, Chief Executive Officer, and City of Chicago, Defendants.

No. 13 C 3624.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

July 9, 2013.

Thomas Howard Geoghegan, Michael Paul Persoon, Sean Morales Doyle, Despres Schwartz & Geoghegan, Patrick James Cowlin, Robin B. Potter, Shankar Ramamurthy, Robin Potter & Associates, P.C., Randall D. Schmidt, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Sally J. Scott, Abizer Zanzi, James C. Franczek, Jennifer Ann Smith, Lisa Anne McGarrity, Michael A. Warner, Jr., Franczek Sullivan P.C., Lawrence Charles Dinardo, Brent Daniel Knight, Elizabeth Bethea McRee, Julie Morrissy Baker, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN Z. LEE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Sherise McDaniel, Marshetta Ross, and Frances and Alphonso Newman (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are parents of children who attend the Chicago public schools slated for closure before the commencement of the 2013–2014 school year. They have sued the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (“Board”), Barbara Byrd–Bennett, the Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”), and the City of Chicago (the “City”) (collectively “Defendants”) on two counts. In Count I, Plaintiffs McDaniel and Ross assert a claim on behalf of themselves, their children, and a purported class of all children who are currently enrolled in special educationprograms at one of the schools scheduled for closure. These Plaintiffs allege that, by closing the schools, Defendants will disproportionately harm students with disabilities, fail to reasonably accommodate these students, and have employed a selection process that violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In Count II, all four Plaintiffs have asserted a claim on behalf of themselves, their children, and a purported class of all African–American students who will be affected by the proposed school closings, including students at both the closing and receiving schools. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used a selection process that resulted in African–American students bearing almost the entire burden of the school closings in violation of the Illinois Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 23/5. Under both counts, Plaintiffs seek an injunction preventing the proposed school closures.

The City moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that, as a matter of law, the Board, not the City, is responsible for school closings and has the statutory power to cancel the closings. For the reasons stated herein, the City's motion is granted, and Plaintiffs' claims against the City are dismissed.

Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of resolving this motion to dismiss. See Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir.2010).

On March 23, 2013, CPS's CEO Byrd–Bennett proposed to close 53 CPS elementary schools, including the elementary schools Plaintiffs' children attend. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14, 32.) The City, through the Mayor, appoints Board members and makes decisions with respect to the revenue available for the education of CPS students. ( Id. ¶¶ 137–38.)

Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue injunctive relief “[e]njoin[ing] the defendants [including the City] from carrying out the proposed closings of Manierre, Calhoun and any other school set for closing by defendants” and “[d]irect[ing] defendants, including the City of Chicago, to provide a reasonable accommodation to plaintiff children and other children with disabilities by keeping such children in the schools they currently attend.” ( Id. at p. 21.) Plaintiffs also request that the Court “[e]join defendants [including the City] on a preliminary and permanent basis from proceeding with the closings and other policies that have the effect of subjecting the plaintiff children to discrimination because of their race.” ( Id. at p. 35.) On May 29, 2013, the City moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Discussion

Although the City brings its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court's “first task, as it is in every case, is to determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction” over Plaintiffs' claims against the City. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Haight, 697 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2012). The Court must engage in this jurisdictional inquiry, even if it is not directly raised by the parties. Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir.2002) (“[N]ot only may the federal courts police subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, they must.”) (citations omitted). In this case, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have standing to seek the requested injunction against the City. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that they do not. Additionally, even if Plaintiffs possess standing to seek alternative forms of relief against the City, see Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.2002), they have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and fall short of the pleading standard announced by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court will address each of these issues in turn.

I. Standing for Injunctive Relief

Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution “limits the ‘judicial power’ to the resolution of ‘cases' and ‘controversies.’ ” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). A necessary element of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement is “that a litigant have ‘standing’ to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.” Id. Whether a litigant has standing is a “threshold question” which the Court must address even if the parties do not raise it, because if the litigants do not have standing, the Court is without authority to consider the merits of the action. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986), Moreover, “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). A party must have personally suffered an injury-in-fact, which is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct, and which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each of these elements. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

The third element, commonly referred to as “redressability,” “examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested.” Norton, 422 F.3d at 501 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). “Redressability thus depends upon the relief requested....” Id. at 502. And there must be a “ ‘substantial likelihood’ that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed....” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59,75 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).

Furthermore, even where a plaintiff may have suffered a legally cognizable injury, this does not mean that the redressability requirement is satisfied. Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir.2000) (“Standing does not automatically attach once an ongoing injury is identified.”). “Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)).

It follows from these fundamental principles that where, as here, a plaintiff seeks an injunction against a defendant, he or she must demonstrate that the defendant to be enjoined has the authority to effectuate the injunction. See Turner v. McGee, 681 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (10th Cir.2012) (“As is often the case, redressibility turns on the scope of authority of the defendants. We ask: Could these Defendants, enjoined as [plaintiff] has requested, remedy [plaintiff's injury]?”); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1111 (10th Cir.2007) (“The redressability prong is not met when a plaintiff seeks relief against a defendant with no power to enforce a challenged statute.”).

Indeed, if a defendant does not have the authority to carry out the injunction, a plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief must be dismissed because the Court cannot enjoin a defendant “to act in any way that is beyond [the defendant's] authority in the first place.” Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426–27 (5th Cir.2001) (dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction because “these defendants have no powers to redress the injuries alleged”); see also Nat'l...