McDaniel v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 15 February 2022
• Docket Number: 19-CV-11265 (AT) (RWL)
• Citation: 585 F.Supp.3d 503
• Parties: Curtis MCDANIEL, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

585 F.Supp.3d 503

Curtis MCDANIEL, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

19-CV-11265 (AT) (RWL)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed February 15, 2022

Curtis McDaniel, Malone, NY, Pro Se.

John Anthony Passidomo, Richard Bahrenburg, City of New York Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants Police Officer Christopher Zollino, Darion Brooks, The City of New York.

John Anthony Passidomo, Melissa Wachs, City of New York Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendant The People of the City of New York.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO HON. ANALISA TORRES: MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBERT W. LEHRBURGER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Curtis McDaniel ("McDaniel"), proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against the City of New York (the "City") and Police Officers Christopher Zollino and Darion Brooks (collectively, "Defendants") for false arrest, malicious prosecution, unlawful conditions of confinement, and other claims, all stemming from McDaniel's arrest on July 14, 2015. Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Additionally, Defendants argue that, for certain claims, McDaniel filed his action after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. For the following reasons, I recommend that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED in its entirety and that all of McDaniel's claims be dismissed with prejudice.

FACTS

The facts are drawn from the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"¹ ). As required on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pled allegations of the TAC and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of McDaniel, the non-moving party. However, the TAC is by no means a model of clarity. The claims are presented in a scattershot manner and are at times difficult to follow. That said, applying a liberal reading afforded to pro se plaintiffs, McDaniel's allegations and claims can be coherently distilled to the following.

On July 14, 2015, McDaniel was a passenger in a car that was pulled over by Defendants Zollino and Brooks, allegedly for a broken taillight. (TAC at ECF 1.)

McDaniel asserts that he and the other passengers in the car were racially profiled, that the car's taillight was not broken, and a ticket was never issued for the alleged violation. (TAC at ECF 12.) McDaniel left the car and was followed by the officers, who stated that they saw McDaniel's hands outstretched as though he and the other passenger had thrown something. The officers "found guns on the street" and arrested McDaniel for possession of a loaded firearm; the other passenger ran away. (TAC at ECF 1, 4, 6.) McDaniel was arraigned and detained for 25 days in pretrial detention from July 14, 2015 to August 9, 2015. (TAC at ECF 1, 9.) A grand jury indicted McDaniel, but the criminal charges were ultimately dismissed. (TAC at ECF 2, 3.)

McDaniel alleges that he was falsely arrested and subsequently subjected to conspiratorial, malicious prosecution consisting of abuse of process, denial fair and speedy trial, and several other constitutional violations. Additionally, McDaniel asserts that while he was detained, he was subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including being subjected to extreme temperatures, unnecessary strip searches, and being housed with other detainees with "bad diseases." (TAC at ECF 10, 11.)

McDaniel was arrested several times following his 2015 arrest and has filed multiple cases in this Court asserting a variety of claims.² The instant case pertains only to claims arising out of McDaniel's arrest on July 14, 2015. As discussed below, all claims asserted from other arrests have been dismissed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

McDaniel filed his initial complaint on December 6, 2019. (Dkt. 2.) The Complaint originally named "The People of the City of New York," the Department of Corrections, several New York City police officers and detectives, several Assistant District Attorneys, and several Judges of the New York City Criminal Court. On January 28, 2020, then Chief Judge McMahon addressed several pleading deficiencies and dismissed several named defendants, including the People of the City of New York, the Department of Correction, the Assistant District Attorneys, and the Judges. (Dkt. 6.) Judge McMahon granted McDaniel leave to file an amended complaint, which McDaniel did on April 13, 2020. (Dkt. 9.)

On August 28, 2020, Judge Stanton, to whom the case had been reassigned, found that although McDaniel had complied with several of Judge McMahon's directives, he failed to abide by others. Judge Stanton also dismissed all claims concerning events arising from or related to arrests other than McDaniel's July 14, 2015 arrest. Judge Stanton granted McDaniel leave to file a second amended complaint and provided specific instructions for doing so. (Dkt. 13.)

McDaniel filed a second amended complaint on January 8, 2021. (Dkt. 20.) On January 28, 2021, the case was reassigned to Judge Torres. The same day, the case was referred to me for general pretrial management. (Dkt. 22.) On February 26, 2021, the Court held that the second amended complaint did not comply with Judge Stanton's August 28, 2020 order. (Dkt. 28.) Specifically, the second amended complaint referenced arrests other than the July 14, 2015 arrest. The Court directed McDaniel to file a third amended complaint and remove any allegations pertaining to conditions or events related to his arrest in 2019. McDaniel filed the operative TAC on April 28, 2021. (Dkt. 37.)

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 12, 2021. (Dkts. 41-44.) On July 13, 2021, the previous order of reference was amended to include issuing a Report and Recommendation on the motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 46.) McDaniel filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion on September 17, 2021 (Dkt. 57), and Defendants filed their reply on October 13, 2021. (Dkt. 59.) The motion is now ripe for resolution.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

Under Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a pleading may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)(6)"). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

"Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. , 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 ). In considering a motion to dismiss, a district court "accept[s] all factual claims in the complaint as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. , 753 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2014). However, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "[R]ather, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... i.e. , enough to make the claim plausible." Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3 , 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A complaint is properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in [the] complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S. Ct at 1966.

For the purposes of considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally is confined to the facts alleged in the complaint. See Cortec Industries v. Sum Holding L.P. , 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991). A court may, however, consider additional materials, including documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, public records, and documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied upon, in bringing the suit. See Kleinman v. Elan Corp. , 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) ). In that regard, if "a document relied on in the complaint contradicts allegations in the complaint, the document, not the allegations, control, and the court need not accept the allegations in the complaint as true." Poindexter v. EMI Record Group Inc. , No. 11-CV-559, 2012 WL 1027639, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2012) (quoting Barnum v. Millbrook Care Ltd. Partnership , 850 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ).

B. Section 1983 Claims

McDaniel brings several civil rights claims pursuant to § 1983. To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, " ‘a plaintiff must allege that some person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right.’ " Ahlers v. Rabinowitz , 684 F.3d 53, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Washington v. James , 782 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986) ). Because § 1983 does not provide its own substantive right, plaintiffs must identify the federally protected right that was allegedly violated. See Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 285, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2276, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (plaintiffs cannot simply claim a violation of § 1983, because § 1983 " ‘by itself does not protect anyone against anything’ ") (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization , 441 U.S. 600, 617, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) ). Accordingly, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and that (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a...