McDaniel v. Lanigan

• Decision Date: 21 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12-3834 (AET)
• Parties: MICHAEL PAUL MCDANIEL, Plaintiff, v. GARY M. LANIGAN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

MICHAEL PAUL MCDANIEL, Plaintiff,

v.GARY M. LANIGAN et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 12-3834 (AET)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: November 21, 2012

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before this Court upon Plaintiff's submission of his amended civil complaint ("Amended Complaint"), see Docket Entry No. 10, which was followed by his motion for appointment of pro bono counsel and his application seeking this Court's recusal. See Docket Entries Nos. 14 and 15. For the reasons detailed below, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint will be dismissed, and Plaintiff will be allowed one final opportunity to amend his pleading. Plaintiff's application seeking appointment of pro bono counsel will be denied, as premature at this juncture; such denial will be without prejudice to renewal. Plaintiff's application seeking this Court's recusal will be denied, as meritless.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff appears to be a recreational litigant who: (a) instituted a multitude of civil actions in this District; (b) attempted removal of his state criminal prosecution to the District; and (c) had numerous state civil proceedings instituted in state fora removed to this District by defendants named in those removed actions. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Devon Brown, Civil Action No. 05-4817 (AET); McDaniel v. New Jersey State Parole Board, Civil Action No. 07-3205(MLC); McDaniel v. NJ DOC, Civil Action No. 08-0239 (JAG); McDaniel v. New Jersey State Parole Board, Civil Action No. 08-0978 (JAP); McDaniel v. Warden Power, Civil Action No. 08-3221 (SDW); McDaniel v. State of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 08-4371 (MLC); McDaniel v. Hott, Civil Action No. 09-2644 (DRD); McDaniel v. New Jersey State Parole Board, Civil Action No. 10-2899 (MLC); New Jersey v. McDaniel, Civil Action No. 10-5372 (MLC); McDaniel v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 10-5443 (MLC); McDaniel v. State of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 11-0267 (MLC); McDaniel v. Warren, Civil Action No. 12-2102 (PGS).¹ The instant action was, too, commenced by Plaintiff in state forum and properly removed to this District by Defendants. See Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 1-1 to 1-5. Shortly after removal, Defendants filed a Rule 11 motion seeking to strike Plaintiff's original pleading. See Docket Entry No. 4. Having that motion fully briefed, the Court granted Defendants' application and directed Plaintiff to file an amended pleading. See Docket Entries Nos. 5 to 9. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint followed, see Docket Entry No. 10, as well as aforesaid motions. See Docket Entries Nos. 10, 14 and 15.²

II. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff's challenges stated in his Amended Complaint are, unfortunately, quite patchy.

The Amended Complaint opens with an assertion that, in November 2011, prison officials: (a) discontinued sale (or discontinued disbursement, or imposed a bar on consumption) of unspecified "tobacco products" to/by inmates confined at the Administrative Segregation Unit; (b) instituted a dollar-amount limitation on the purchases such inmate could make at the facility's commissary; and (c) began regulating, in a certain, unspecified in the Amended Complaint way, a "work pay" and the amount of showers each inmate could take during a certain period of time. See Docket Entry No. 10, at 2.

Following this chain of assertions, the Amended Complaint alleges that Muslim inmates are denied Halal food. See id. Right after making that claim, the Amended Complaint alleges that the meals served to inmates violates the inmates' rights because the food products are, allegedly, not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration agency. See id. The Amended Complaint then switches to asserting that Jewish inmates are served non-kosher milk and, while they are served kosher meals, these meals are not glatt kosher.³ See id. at 2-3. Plaintiff's allegations conclude with statements asserting that Jewish inmates are denied an opportunity to obtain "tallits"⁴ and they are also prevented from "wearing tzitzit."⁵ Id. at 3.

III. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS ARE DEFICIENT

A. Plaintiff Is Without Standing to Assert Jus Tertii Challenges

Under the "next friend" doctrine, standing is allowed to a third person so this third person could file and pursue a claim in court on behalf of someone who is unable to do so on his or her own. The doctrine dates back to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and provides a narrow exception to the "case or controversy" requirement set forth in the Article III of Constitution. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990). The Whitmore Court set out two requirements that should be met by the one seeking to qualify for "next friend" standing: (1) "the 'next friend' must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf [(s)he]seeks to litigate" (and it has been suggested that a '"next friend' must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest"); and (2) "the 'next friend' must provide an adequate explanation — such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability — why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action." Id. at 163-64. Since Witmore, the Supreme Court further elaborated the standing requirements of Article HI in terms of a three-part test, i.e., whether the plaintiff can demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102-103 (1998). However, "the point has always been the same: whether a plaintiff 'personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention.'" Id., at 103 n. 5 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)); see also, Sprint Communs. Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 301 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The absence of any right to the substantive recovery means that respondents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing. 'When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose'") (quoting, with correction of grammar, Bob Dylan, Like A Rolling Stone, in On Highway 61, Revisited (Columbia Records 1965)).

Here, Plaintiff raises claims on behalf of Muslim and Jewish inmates, as well as inmates confined in the Administrative Segregation Unit and, seemingly, even the inmates in the prison's general population. However, Plaintiff neither showed his significant relationship to these inmates nor provided the Court with any basis to conclude that those inmates are without capacity to prosecute their own claims. Therefore, Plaintiff is without standing to raise any challenges other than claims based on the wrongs he himself suffered. Hence, his AmendedComplaint is subject to dismissal on this ground, and his re-amended pleading, if filed, must be limited to, and only to, the claims ensuing from the events that caused injury to Plaintiff personally.

B. Plaintiff's Challenges Must Comply with Rules 18 and 20

Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the joinder of defendants, and Rule 18(a), governs the joinder of claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2).

Specifically, Rule 20(a)(2) provides: "Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A) and (B).

Rule 18 (a) provides: "A party asserting a claim ... may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Wright & Miller's treatise on federal civil procedure explains that, where multiple defendants are named, the analysis under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18:

Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18. ... Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all . . . .

Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure Civil 3d $1655: see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 143 (1965) (where county registrarswere alleged to be carrying on activities which were part of a series of transactions or occurrences the validity of which depended upon questions of law or fact common to all of them, joinder of registrars in one suit as defendants was proper under Rule 20(a)); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F. 2d 646, 650 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (joinder of defendants is not permitted by Rule 20 unless both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied). Consequently, a civil plaintiff may not name more than one defendant in his original or amended complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Importantly, challenges by incarcerated individuals are not exempt from the reach of Rules 18 and 20. See George v. Smith, 507 F. 3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) ("A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person . . . should be rejected if filed by a prisoner").

Here, Plaintiff asserted a multitude of unrelated events, such as limitations on certain tobacco sale (or...