McDaniel v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 May 1908
• Parties: MCDANIEL ET AL. v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

46 So. 981

155 Ala. 553

MCDANIEL ET AL. v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 21, 1908

Appeal from Tuscaloosa County Court; H. B. Foster, Judge.

Bill by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company against Margaret J. McDaniel and others for a sale of certain real estate held in common for division. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Robison Brown, for appellants.

J. M Foster, for appellee, cited Ferris v. Montgomery, etc Land Co., 94 Ala. 557, 10 So. 607, 33 Am. St. Rep. 146; Wilkinson v. Stuart, 74 Ala. 198; Ward v Ward, 40 W.Va. 611, 21 S.E. 746, 29 L. R. A. 449, 52 Am St. Rep. 911; Moore v. Thorp, 16 R.I. 655, 19 A. 321, 7 L. R. A. 731; Louvalle v. Menard, 1 Gilman (Ill.) 39, 41 Am. Dec. 161; Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill. 514, 8 Am. Rep. 665; Fenton v. Miller, 116 Mich. 45, 74 N.W. 384, 72 Am. St. Rep. 502; Clapp v. Nichols, 31 A.D. 531, 52 N.Y.S. 128; Id., 32 A.D. 628, 53 N.Y.S. 1101; Ford v. Knapp, 102 N.Y. 135, 6 N.E. 283, 55 Am. Rep. 782; Moore v. Williamson, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 323, 73 Am. Dec. 93; Broyles v. Waddel, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 32; Prather v. Prather, 139 Ind. 570, 39 N.E. 310; Alleman v. Hawley, 117 Ind. 532, 20 N.E. 441; Freeman on Co-Tenancy (3d Ed.) § 510, and note; Killmer v. Wuchner, 79 Iowa, 722, 45 N.W. 299, 8 L. R. A. 289, 18 Am. St. Rep. 392; Robinson v. McDonald's Widow & Heirs, 11 Tex. 385, 62 Am. Dec. 480, and note; Leak v. Haynes, 13 Wash. 213, 43 P. 48, 52 Am. St. Rep. 34; Ballou v. Ballou, 94 Va. 350, 26 S.E. 840, 64 Am. St. Rep. 733; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 116; Sanders v. Robertson, 57 Ala. 465; Horton v. Sledge, 29 Ala. 498; Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598.

DENSON J.

The case presented by this bill is in brief this: Thomas L. Shamblin was in possession of and claiming to own a tract of land, a part of which (about half an acre) the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company desired to purchase, for the purpose of erecting thereon certain necessary section houses. On the 20th of April, 1904, the company, through its agent, succeeded in making the purchase, and took a deed to the half acre, duly executed by Shamblin and two of his daughters, who were living with him on the premises. After the purchase was consummated the company erected improvements on the land to the value of $2,000. Subsequently Shamblin died, and it turned out that he had in 1894 executed a deed to certain lands, including that parcel purchased by the company, to the respondents in this bill and Easter E. Moses; the latter being one of the grantors in the company's deed. So that, instead of getting a title to the entire interest in the half acre, the company in reality acquired only an undivided one-fourth interest; that being the interest which, under the deed of 1894, was conveyed to Easter E. Moses. The bill shows that the company entered into possession of the land and made the improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that it held and owned the half acre exclusively and in fee simple. After Shamblin's death the respondents (tenants in common with the company of the half acre) demanded of the company that it pay them $1,200 for their undivided interests in the land, or vacate. This the company refused to do; and the respondents instituted an action of trespass to try titles (statutory ejectment) against the company and its tenants in possession. Thereupon this bill was filed by the company, as a tenant in common with the plaintiffs in the ejectment suit, against them, to have the land sold for division amongst the joint owners. The prayer of the bill is for a sale, and that, upon the distribution of the proceeds, the company be allowed the value of the lands, as enhanced by the improvements, over and above their value as unimproved, in addition to one-fourth of the value as unimproved, allowing the respondents their proportion of the rental value as unimproved, if any. The respondents, by demurrer, join issue with the company on the proposition that it is entitled to compensation for the improvements made. From a decree overruling the demurrer to the bill, this appeal is taken.

The demurrants, while recognizing the established principle that in suits for partition, "equity will take into consideration the fact that one tenant in common has occupied a portion of the common property and has enhanced its value by making useful improvements thereon, and will, so far as it can do so consistently with an equitable allotment, assign to the tenant making such improvements the land on which they stand, or so much thereof as represents his proportion," contend and argue that this principle does not apply and cannot be extended to cases in chancery, in which a sale of the land and division of the proceeds are prayed for. The foundation upon which the contention and argument seems in the main to be based is that, the jurisdiction of the chancery court to make a sale of lands for division being statutory, that court is limited, in its exercise, to a division of the proceeds of sale according to the interests of the several parties, and possesses no power to adjust any equities claimed in respect to improvements. The jurisdiction to order the sale is statutory, but, notwithstanding this, even on bills for partition, such as that court had original jurisdiction of, when exact or fair division in kind was impracticable, "the court could compensate for an inequality by a pecuniary compensation charged on the land by way of rent or servitude, could direct an account of rents and profits received by one of the joint owners, and award compensation to a joint owner for improvements made by him, either by assigning him that part of the land on which the improvements were located, or by setting off their value against rents and profits." Marshall v. Marshall, 86 Ala. 383, 387, 5 So. 475, 476. The court in the case cited said: "The court acted upon the familiar principle that, having acquired jurisdiction of the subject on a special ground of equity, it will employ its powers to adjust the equities between the parties, growing out of their ownership and relation to the property and the connection of their interests with those of their co-tenants and with the general right and equity of the complainant." The court having jurisdiction to make the sale, the equity sought to be worked out by the bill in the present case is that, the improvements having been made at a time when the complainant's agents really and in good faith believed it to be the true...