McDaniel v. R.J.'s Transp., L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 13 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 53,667-CA,53,667-CA
• Citation: 310 So.3d 760
• Parties: David C. MCDANIEL, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellant v. R.J.’S TRANSPORTATION, L.L.C., Comstock Oil & Gas-Louisiana, L.L.C., Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

310 So.3d 760

David C. MCDANIEL, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellant

v.R.J.’S TRANSPORTATION, L.L.C., Comstock Oil & Gas-Louisiana, L.L.C., Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. Defendants-Appellees

No. 53,667-CA

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Judgment rendered January 13, 2021

H. LYN LAWRENCE, JR., ANDREW C. JACOBS, Counsel for Appellant

VOORHIES & LABBE, By: Cyd Sheree Page, R.J.’s Transportation, L.L.C., Lafayette, Counsel for Appellee,

LISKOW &; LEWIS, By: Paul M. Adkins, Comstock Oil & Gas-Louisiana, L.L.C., , Baton Rouge, Counsel for Appellee,

GALLOWAY, JOHNSON, TOMPKINS, BURR & SMITH, Baker Hughes Oil Field, By: Timothy William Hassinger Operations, Inc., Counsel for Appellee,

MELCHIODE MARKS KINGS, L.L.C., By: Jennifer L. Simmons, Zurich American Insurance, Edward S. Voelker IV Company, Counsel for Appellee,

KEAN MILLER, LLP, By: Scott Louis Zimmer, Chaps Oilfield Services, L.L.C., Shreveport, Counsel for Appellee,

MAX C. TUEPKER, PC, Pro hac vice, By: Max Charles Tuepker, Chaps Oilfield Services L.L.C., Counsel for Appellee,

Before MOORE, THOMPSON, and BODDIE (Pro Tempore), JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

This appeal arises from the trial court's judgment granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of Comstock Oil & Gas-Louisiana, LLC. At issue in this personal injury action is the determination of independent contractor status of Chaps Oilfield Services, LLC, and whether operational control of activities at a well site were retained or exercised by Comstock Oil & Gas-Louisiana, LLC. For the reasons more fully detailed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves a personal injury action arising from a hydrochloric acid spill at the Harrison 30-19 HC No. 1-Alt well, a DeSoto Parish natural gas well location owned and operated by Comstock Oil & Gas-Louisiana, LLC ("Comstock"). Comstock hired Chaps Oilfield Services, LLC ("Chaps"), as the on-site "company man" to be responsible for the supervision of the completion operations. Comstock and Chaps executed a Master Service Agreement (hereinafter, the "Chaps MSA"). The Chaps MSA provides that Chaps is an independent contractor free and clear of any dominion or control by Comstock in the manner in which its work is to be performed. The Chaps MSA requires Chaps to furnish its own tools, supplies, or materials, and allows Chaps to determine the manner in which its work is performed.

Comstock also hired Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. ("Baker Hughes") to perform the ongoing fracking operations to complete the well. Baker Hughes was hired to be responsible for all aspects of the fracking operation and used its own employees to conduct those operations. Comstock also executed a Master Service Agreement with Baker Hughes, the terms of which are not currently before the court.

On June 27 or 28, 2015, R.J.’s Transportation, LLC ("R.J.’s") delivered a requested tanker load of liquid hydrochloric acid to the well site. Baker Hughes ordered the acid from Univar USA, Inc., which in turn hired R.J.’s to deliver the acid to the well site. Plaintiff, David C. McDaniel, Jr. ("McDaniel"), was employed as a vacuum truck driver for Target Oilfield Services, LLC ("Target").

McDaniel alleges that the R.J.’s driver and a Baker Hughes employee were offloading the acid from the tanker into a stationary tank when a substantial amount of the liquid acid spilled, for reasons still uncertain, onto the ground. McDaniel, who was on standby at another location on the site, claims that a Baker Hughes employee directed him to the spill area in his truck. McDaniel testified that the Baker Hughes employee placed the vacuum hose some distance away, where McDaniel could not initially see or smell the acid, and instructed McDaniel to engage the vacuum mechanism. After learning that the hose was resting in acid, McDaniel shut off the vacuum mechanism.

McDaniel claims that the truck's tank valve was damaged such that the acid already vacuumed would leak out unless the truck's engine was running and the vacuum mechanism was engaged. He states that one of the Chaps company men told him that he needed to keep the vacuum mechanism engaged to prevent the acid already in his vacuum truck's tank from leaking back out on the ground. This required him to be in and around his truck and in close proximity to the acid spill on site. McDaniel alleges that he inhaled the fumes from the acid from about 8:30 p.m. until nearly the end of his shift at 6:00 a.m. the following morning, during which he maintained the vacuum action as instructed by and at the insistence of the Chaps company man on location.

McDaniel claims that the inhalation of the fumes caused him serious injury and that the defendants are at fault for the injuries, due to their actions of negligently causing the acid spill, failing to warn him of the acid spill, directing him to the area of the spill without warning, instructing him to initiate the vacuum process of his truck without informing him of the nature of the spill, its composition, and directing/causing him to stay near his vehicle within the spill area causing continued exposure to the harmful fumes.

On February 2, 2016, McDaniel filed suit against R.J.’s, Comstock, and Baker Hughes. McDaniel later amended his petition to include Chaps. On October 10, 2019, Comstock filed a motion for summary judgment, in which the company argued that it was not liable for the actions of Baker Hughes or Chaps because they were independent contractors and directed the court to the existing Master Service Agreements. The trial court granted Comstock's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the company with prejudice from the proceeding. This appeal by McDaniel followed.

PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

McDaniel argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Comstock by finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Chaps was an independent contractor in relation to Comstock; and thus, Comstock was not liable for any acts or omissions of Chaps.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action except those disallowed by law. La. C.C.P. Art. 966(A)(2) ; Klein v. Cisco-Eagle, Inc. , 37,398 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/03), 855 So. 2d 844. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. Art. 966(A)(3). The burden of proof rests with the mover; however, the burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. Art. 966(D)(2). Mere speculation is not sufficient. Klein , supra .

Review of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Lawrence v. Sanders , 49,966 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 169 So. 3d 790, writ denied , 15-1450 (La. 10/23/15), 179 So. 3d 601.

DISCUSSION

This case involves the relationship between Comstock, the owner and operator of a well site, and Chaps, its "company man," whose job entailed supervising the work on the site. It was Chaps’ employee at the well site when the events unfolded that resulted in the alleged injuries to McDaniel. McDaniel alleges that Chaps was not an independent contractor, and thus, Comstock should be liable for the Chaps’ employees’ actions on the day of his accident, which resulted in his injuries.

This court is aware of the risk of the potential for a troubling cramdown of overly broad indemnifications from liability which can result from master service agreements that are not the product of equal bargaining positions. However, Louisiana law is clear that a principal is generally not liable for the offenses of an independent contractor. Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc. , 829 F.2d 548, 549 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied , 485 U.S. 1034, 108 S. Ct. 1593 (1988). Louisiana courts have identified a number of relevant factors in determining whether the relationship of principal and independent contractor exists, including the existence of a contract for performance of a specific job, payment of a fixed price for the work, employment by the contractor of assistants who are under his control, the furnishing of necessary tools and materials by the contractor, and his right to control the conduct of his work while in progress. Davenport v. Amax Nickel, Inc. , 569 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), writ denied 90-2426 (La. 01/04/91), 572 So. 2d 68. It is not the supervision or control which is actually exercised by the employer that is significant, but whether, from the nature of the relationship, the right to do so exists. White v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co. , 06-677 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/07), 951 So. 2d 1208, 1211, writ denied 07-0407 (La. 4/20/07), 954 So. 2d 164.

In this instance, the record is clear that the Chaps MSA governed the relationship between the two parties, and it is undisputed that the contract explicitly states that Chaps was an independent contractor. The contract also explicitly states that Chaps would furnish necessary tools, supplies, or materials to perform the work. Finally, although the Chaps MSA does not describe the specific site or general duties for Chaps or state a fixed price for the work to be performed, the MSA includes the following language:

[The] Agreement shall control and govern all work performed or to be performed by [Chaps] for [Comstock] under verbal or written work orders, purchase orders, delivery tickets, invoices or other verbal or written agreements between the Parties, relating to work to be done by [Chaps] for [Comstock]

Courts applying Louisiana law have recognized that an ongoing contractual relationship between parties can still create a principal/independent contractor...