McDaniel v. State
Decision Date | 06 January 1992 |
Docket Number | No. A91A1541,A91A1541 |
Citation | 202 Ga.App. 409,414 S.E.2d 536 |
Parties | McDANIEL v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Gleason, Davis & Dunn, John W. Davis, Jr., Rossville, for appellant.
Ralph L. Van Pelt, Jr., Dist. Atty., Michael R. McCarthy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of criminal contempt in the superior court for allegedly making a statement of a threatening and intimidating nature to a juror.
On the morning of the incident, appellant was present at the court as a subpoenaed witness in her sister's divorce trial. The jury reached its verdict just prior to the lunch hour, at which time all participants in the trial were excused. The incident giving rise to appellant's conviction occurred as she was leaving the courthouse when two courthouse employees apparently overheard her making a statement to an elderly woman who had served as a juror in the divorce trial, and they apparently reported their observations.
As a result, appellant was summoned back to the courthouse where she was interrogated by a police detective to whom she gave a statement explaining her conduct with respect to the incident in question. The evidence is in dispute as to whether appellant had received Miranda warnings and had executed a waiver of counsel prior to making a statement. The detective testified at the contempt hearing that she had; however, no such document appears in the record, and in her brief on appeal appellant denies that Miranda warnings had been administered. The court made no finding of fact in this regard.
At the conclusion of that interview, appellant was brought before the judge who had presided at the divorce trial. The judge informed her that she had been accused of making "verbal and insulting comments to a juror ... and also physically assault[ing] that juror," and that such conduct constituted direct criminal contempt authorizing an immediate hearing at which the district attorney would present the evidence against her. When appellant inquired, "Does this mean that I can't have an attorney here," the court responded, "You are not entitled to a lawyer in a case like this, I'll be very blunt with you." As the proceedings commenced, the court qualified that response by stating, "if you want to hire a lawyer or have a lawyer with you right now, that's fine, but I'm not going to delay the hearing for that purpose." The summary proceeding was commenced immediately, without a defense counsel.
The evidence adduced is as follows. After the divorce trial had concluded, appellant left the courthouse with her arm around her sister's daughter who was upset and crying concerning the divorce of her parents. At about the same time, a woman who had served as a juror in the divorce trial was also leaving the building. The testimony is in dispute as to what occurred next. Appellant contends that as she and her niece were exiting the building, the child was expressing fear that she would be unable to attend college because of the divorce of her parents. In an effort to console the child, appellant promised that she would help her attend college and further stated that, "we'll have to sleep on it tonight." At about the same time, appellant observed the female juror who appeared to be "laughing and snickering" at them. Appellant admitted that she was upset and said to the juror, "we'll all have to sleep on it tonight." Appellant's version of the events was confirmed by the testimony of her niece as well as by the detective who had taken a statement from appellant shortly after the alleged incident had taken place, which statement was entirely consistent with her testimony at the hearing.
The juror's testimony at the contempt hearing was self-contradictory. She initially stated that as she was leaving the courthouse to join her husband who was waiting for her across the street, she was pushed, causing her arm to hit the ground. When asked whether anything was said to her at that time, she responded: "No, I don't think so." The prosecutor again asked whether anything unpleasant had been said to her (without specifying who may have been speaking). She responded, In attempting to have the witness identify the alleged perpetrator, the district attorney inquired: "Well, let me ask you to look around the courtroom here, do you see ... the ... [woman] that said this stuff to you and pushed you here today--well, let me just ask you, this lady over here in the green T-shirt?" The juror responded, The district attorney then inquired, to which the juror responded, "No, not at all." She then testified that she was not on the courthouse steps at all when she was allegedly pushed, but was "around the corner." When appellant attempted to cross-examine the witness, admitting "I don't know what questions to ask," she was interrupted by the court and admonished to ask questions and not to testify.
The district attorney then offered the testimony of the two court personnel who said they witnessed the incident. The first witness stated that she had seen "this lady" (presumably the appellant) and "heard her say something like you will just have to sleep with him tonight" or "something like that," which comment was directed toward the juror. The second witness testified that she overheard a lady say to the juror, "you go home and sleep with him tonight or something like that." The district attorney concluded with the following inquiry, "Now the lady that made the comment well, you go home and sleep with him tonight or whatever that was, is this her?" The witness replied, "Yes, that's her."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudged appellant to be in criminal contempt of court in that she had interfered with the administration of justice by directing derogatory statements to a juror. It found insufficient evidence of assault. She was sentenced to five days in confinement, fined $250 and removed from the courtroom in the custody of a deputy sheriff. On the following day, an application for supersedeas of the judgment was filed and was granted pending this appeal.
Appellant posits seven enumerations of error, but we reach only one of them because it is dispositive.
1. The judgment of contempt must be set aside because appellant was deprived of the basic due process components of reasonable notice of the charges against her and a meaningful opportunity to respond to them, as guaranteed by the first right listed in the State Constitution. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I.
The law of contempt in this State has had a stormy history. See Stephenson, The Appellate Judiciary of Georgia and Contempt Out of Court, 2 Ga.L.Rev. 341 (1968). As chronicled in that article, its scope and even its source have been subject to shifts of opinion in the appellate courts. The latest pronouncement in this regard is in Crudup v. State, 218 Ga. 819, 820, 130 S.E.2d 733 (1963), cert. den. 375 U.S. 829, 84 S.Ct. 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 61:
Under the current constitution, this "inherent" power emanates from the authority conferred in Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV: "Each court may exercise such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments ..." This power is not unlimited, however. For one thing, its exercise must be compatible with the constitutional guaranties of free speech and liberty of the press. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 502, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953); Atlanta Newspapers v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).
In addition, the power is balanced to some degree by that of the legislature, for the constitution provides in addition that "[t]he power of the courts to punish for contempt shall be limited by legislative acts." 1983 Const., Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IV. One of...
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...could enjoin parties from engaging in arbitration of matters previously resolved in litigation before the court); McDaniel v. State, 202 Ga.App. 409(1), 414 S.E.2d 536 (1992) (court may use contempt powers to protect judgment). This provision of the Georgia Constitution is not authority for......
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...with a litigant's ability to receive a fair trial or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. See id.; McDaniel v. State, 202 Ga.App. 409, 414 S.E.2d 536 (1992). Furthermore, "criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense and the evidence of the contempt must be beyond a reaso......
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...upon a firm and proper basis.' [Cits.]" Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga.App. 149, 150(2), 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979). See also McDaniel v. State, 202 Ga.App. 409(1), 414 S.E.2d 536 (1992). Contrary to appellee's contention, where the notice of the hearing is unreasonable, the fact that the contemnor vo......
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9 Contempt
...process safeguards including proof beyond a reasonable doubt [Garland, 253 Ga. 789, 325 SE2d 131 (1985)] and right to counsel [McDaniel, 202 Ga.App. 409, 414 SE2d 536 (1992)]. Criminal contempt can remain an issue even after contemnor has ceased defying the court and belatedly complied with......
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9 Contempt
...process safeguards including proof beyond a reasonable doubt [Garland, 253 Ga. 789, 325 SE2d 131 (1985)] and right to counsel [McDaniel, 202 Ga.App. 409, 414 SE2d 536 (1992)]. Criminal contempt can remain an issue even after contemnor has ceased defying the court and belatedly complied with......
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9 Contempt
...process safeguards including proof beyond a reasonable doubt [Garland, 253 Ga. 789, 325 SE2d 131 (1985)] and right to counsel [McDaniel, 202 Ga.App. 409, 414 SE2d 536 (1992)]. Criminal contempt can remain an issue even after contemnor has ceased defying the court and belatedly complied with......
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9 Contempt
...process safeguards including proof beyond a reasonable doubt [Garland, 253 Ga. 789, 325 SE2d 131 (1985)] and right to counsel [McDaniel, 202 Ga.App. 409, 414 SE2d 536 (1992)]. Criminal contempt can remain an issue even after contemnor has ceased defying the court and belatedly complied with......