McDaniel v. State

• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Cochran, J.
• Citation: McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
• Decision Date: 26 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 744-02.,744-02.
• Parties: Billy Wayne McDANIEL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas on State's.

98 S.W.3d 704

Billy Wayne McDANIEL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas on State's.

No. 744-02.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

February 26, 2003.

Kelly R. Myers, Corsicana, for Appellant.

Betty Marshall, Asst. State Atty., Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, HERVEY and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.

This is a probation revocation case. Before the revocation hearing, appellant's counsel filed a "Motion for Examination Regarding Incompetency," asserting there was "an issue" regarding appellant's competency and requesting appointment of an expert for competency testing. The question presented is whether the trial court was, on the basis of that motion, required to hold a competency inquiry prior to the revocation hearing.¹ We hold that a trial judge need not perform a "competency inquiry" unless evidence is presented that raises a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind regarding the defendant's "present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" or his "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [him]."² The Waco Court of Appeals held otherwise, concluding that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to conduct a competency inquiry.³ Thus, we reverse that court and reinstate the trial court's judgment.

I.

In 1998, appellant pleaded guilty to the felony offense of bail jumping. The trial judge sentenced him to three years in prison, but suspended the sentence and placed him on community supervision. On March 13, 2001, the State filed a motion to revoke community supervision, alleging that appellant had violated his probation terms by: 1) failing to pay probation fees and court costs; and 2) making a terroristic threat.

Shortly thereafter, appellant's counsel filed a "Motion for Examination Regarding Incompetency," asserting that there was an "issue in this cause regarding whether Defendant is `competent' to stand trial herein, as such term in defined by Section 1A of Article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure."⁴ He therefore requested appointment of a disinterested expert to examine appellant. Counsel further requested that the judge convene a jury competency hearing under Section 4 of Article 46.02,⁵ "[i]n the event the Court determines that there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency." The trial judge appointed a psychologist, Dr. Paul Andrews, to examine appellant concerning his competency to stand trial.

The trial judge held the revocation hearing before Dr. Andrews conducted his competency examination. Appellant pled "not true" to the State's allegations and asked the judge to allow him to represent himself because he was dissatisfied with his court-appointed attorney. The judge granted appellant's request after a limited explanation as to the potential perils of self-representation, but ordered counsel to assist in the defense. The State called appellant's probation officer to testify that appellant had failed to pay his fines and court costs as alleged. Appellant adequately cross-examined the probation officer, who acknowledged that appellant had, in fact, made some of the required payments.

The State then called Woodrow Wilson Kelly to the stand, who testified concerning the alleged terroristic threat. He stated that appellant had telephoned him and said that "he [appellant] was going to come and kill my whore ass wife and kill me and take them kids where they won't be found." Appellant, in personally cross-examining Mr. Kelly, put forth his defense, which was that he never made any terroristic threat. Instead, he asserted that he had been "framed" by Mr. Kelly, who was having a relationship with his ex-wife. According to appellant, Mr. Kelly was scared that appellant would get his ex-wife back, thus Mr. Kelly wanted Appellant back in jail. It was only toward the end of the hearing, while the prosecutor was cross-examining him, that appellant raised the issue of his own incompetence, and then only by conclusory statements:

Q: Mr. McDaniel, do you understand and know what you're charged with here today?

A: I'm incompetent.

Q: I understand that. But you seem to know, I read the charge to you, did you understand it?

A: I'm a manic depressive.

Q: Okay.

A: I asked Mr. —

Q: I know you're trying to be crazy, but —

A: — hey, I asked Mr. Smith to make a motion for

Q: Are you saying you don't know what you're charged with?

A: I'm saying I asked for a motion of competency hearing, what does that tell you, Mr. Counselor?

Q: I don't know. You seem pretty competent to me.

A: Did, did William —

Q: Have you been able to tell Mr. Smith what you wanted here today?

A: I can't confer with my lawyer in a reasonable degree to prepare me a defense.

Q: You certainly know what needs to be said, but have you given him a list [of prospective witnesses] as you testified to or was that a lie?

A: He didn't do nothing for me.

Q: Okay. But did you give him a list of witnesses that you wanted?

A: He ignored everything I told him.

Q: Okay. But you did tell him things you wanted done in your defense in this case.

A: I told him I felt like I wasn't able to confer with him in a reasonable manner and I would like a competency hearing.

Appellant then started talking to his attorney and the judge:

A: Did I tell you that, Mr. Smith? Did you make a motion for me a competency hearing like I asked?

Court: Yes, that motion has been made and is pending before the Court. You may step down.

A: Can I appeal that to a higher Court, 10th Court of Appeals for a competency hearing?

Court: I will deal with that issue later. A: I am incompetent, [Judge] Jackson. Court: I understand what you're telling me.

. . .

Court: I'll have a ruling and some comments at this time. I'll grant the

Motion to Revoke Probation but I will defer sentencing pending an examination of the defendant on the issue of competency. It appears based on Mr. McDaniel's conduct of his own defense that he is competent. That's what it appears to me at least. I'm certainly willing to consider any report by a mental health care professional. I do find that he understands the nature, or it appears to me certainly at this time that he understands the nature of these proceedings and there appears to be, at least to me at this time, no question that he could, and has assisted counsel in his defense.

The Court finds that Mr. McDaniel has competently if not artfully handled his own defense in this case with the assistance of Mr. Smith, his appointed attorney.... [W]e'll be in recess in these proceedings pending examination.

Dr. Andrews examined Appellant on May 11, 2001. He filed his report, in which he concluded that appellant was competent, on May 30, 2001. The court held the sentencing hearing the next day. When the trial judge told appellant that

Dr. Andrews had found appellant competent, appellant responded:

Appellant: Could I, could I ask you something?

Court: Yes, sir.

Appellant: I filed a motion that I get my own psychiatric evaluations.

Court: Well, I already, I've already appointed —

Appellant: I'm talking about by looking in the law books I have a right to my own psychiatric opinion, do I not? Yes or no?

Court: Well, I'm going to let you address that issue with your attorney and I'm going to proceed with sentencing at this time.... The defendant is sentenced to three years confinement.

Appellant then asked the judge why he was not evaluated until after the revocation hearing: "How was I put through a revocation hearing when my competency was in the balance on the 26th?" The court said that he should discuss the issue with his attorney.

On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred by not convening a jury competency hearing under article 46.02,

§ 4(a). Appellant contended that his motion requesting a competency examination by an expert, together with the events that occurred during the revocation hearing, were adequate to meet the "some evidence" threshold and so required a competency hearing before a jury.⁶

In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals held that the trial judge erred, but not for the reason appellant asserted. Although appellant did not raise the issue on appeal, the majority, citing article 46.02, § 2(a), reversed the trial court and held that appellant's written motion, which raised "an issue" of competency, required the trial court to conduct a "competency inquiry" before trial.⁷ Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, the trial court should have determined if there was some evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial, sufficient to warrant a Section 4(a) jury competency hearing.⁸ Finding that the trial judge abused his discretion, the majority reversed the revocation order and remanded the case to the trial court for a Section 2 competency inquiry.⁹

The dissent noted that appellant himself recognized that he had not alleged incompetence until the end of the revocation hearing. It further observed that appellant never raised a bona fide doubt about his competency to stand trial, so that a Section 2 competency inquiry was not required, much less a Section 4(a) jury hearing. We, like the dissent, find that no formal competency inquiry was required.

II.

In both Texas and the federal system, "[i]t has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial."¹⁰ The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process.¹¹ Thus, to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional rights, a trial court must inquire into the accused's mental competence once the issue is sufficiently raised.¹²

These due process standards are built into Code of Criminal Procedure article 46.02...